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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims, firstly, to articulate Hanif Kureishi’s and J.M. Coetzee’s novels 
through a Deleuzian ethics of life, and secondly, to explore how Gilles Deleuze exhibits 
literature’s potential for the ethical transformation of our lives. Kureishi’s and Coetzee’s 
presentations of ethical and political life have been discussed by relating them to the 
conceptions of “hybridity”, “alterity”, “unlimited responsibility” and “bare life” 
approached through Bhabha, Levinas, Derrida and Agamben. These theories are rooted in 
incommensurability between black and white, the colonizer and the colonized, and a 
human and a non-human animal. Homi K. Bhabha’s account of hybridity is focused on 
“difference within”, Emmanuel Levinas’s and Jacques Derrida’s ethics of alterity and 
unlimited responsibility, as well as Giorgio Agamben’s notion of bare life are articulated 
through an abyssal difference between the subject and the Other. These approaches are 
ultimately concerned with the ethics of the Other. Yet, Deleuze’s ethical questions of life 
are focused on how we become the Other and how we live an impersonal life. The 
Deleuzian ethical principles of life are related to affective and reciprocal becomings 
between self and the Other in diverse milieus. This thesis argues that a Deleuzian ethical 
reading of Kureishi and Coetzee provides us with ways of understanding our existence in 
terms of affective relations to the Other and the community. In particular, this thesis aims 
to demonstrate, through a Deleuzian ethical reading of both authors, how Kureishi in The 
Buddha of Suburbia, The Black Album and The Body presents transformative subjectivity 
in terms of hybridity situated in metropolitan spaces. However, from the perspective of 
Deleuze, Kureishi does not provide reciprocal becomings between an individual, the 
Other and the community. Compared to Kureishi, Coetzee in Michael K, Foe and 
Disgrace, creates a Deleuzian ethical mode of life: an inventive mode of living, an 
 4 
affective and mutual transformation and an impersonal life. Coetzee’s novels are thereby 
linked to Deleuze’s ethics of an affirmative and immanent life without reverting to 
systems of judgement and the morality of transcendence. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis aims to investigate Hanif Kureishi’s and J.M. Coetzee’s works in 
terms of Gilles Deleuze’s conception of an “ethics of life”. Deleuze explores the 
fundamental classical question of ethics: how should we live? Yet, this question is not 
immediately assimilated into the question: “what life morally ought one to live?” He 
instead explores the ways available for subjects to affirm their existence and invent their 
own singular modes of life in affective relations to the Other. Deleuze’s ethical question 
is thereby linked to our capability: “what can we do?” Both Kureishi and Coetzee, as 
postcolonial writers, also examine ethical forms of life in relation to the Other and the 
community in conflicting social and cultural milieux, whilst demonstrating the myriad 
ways in which political and cultural problems have unsettled and reshaped people’s lives. 
Thus, the goal of this thesis is, firstly, to investigate Kureishi’s and Coetzee’s novels 
through Deleuze’s ethics of life. Secondly, this thesis attempts to articulate more 
precisely Deleuze’s ethics of life and also to explore how Deleuze exhibits literature’s 
potential for the ethical transformation of one’s life without reverting to the teleology of 
virtue ethics. 
In order to develop a reading of Kureishi and Coetzee, firstly, we need to 
examine Deleuze’s conception of an “ethics of life”. Deleuze’s “ethics of life” can be 
articulated through two different questions about ethics and life, but my ultimate aim is to 
discuss the link between the two terms within Deleuze’s theory. Firstly, one can 
investigate Deleuze’s idea of life by comparing it to Michel Foucault’s and Giorgio 
Agamben’s thoughts of life, in order to understand why Deleuze’s idea of life eventually 
has ethical implications. Secondly, through Foucault’s and Agamben’s assertions of life, 
Deleuze’s account of life can be more specifically addressed, because the term “life” has 
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been broadly and at the same time importantly discussed in diverse domains. In fact, 
recent years have seen an increasing range of studies devoted to research on the 
conception of “life”. Since Foucault commented on “biopower” and “biopolitics” in The 
History of Sexuality, Volume I (1976), “life” has been substantially debated in politics and 
philosophy. According to Thomas Lemke, “when life itself becomes an object of politics, 
this has consequences for the foundations, tools, and goals of political action. No one saw 
this shift in the nature of politics more clearly than Michael Foucault”. 1 Specifically, as 
Louis-Georges Schwartz asserts, Foucault observes that “modern states regulated the 
lives of subjects instead of governing through the power to kill”. 2  In this context, 
Foucault’s notion of life, according to Leonard Lawlor, bears the meaning of 
“powerlessness”, 3  because life has been dominantly regulated and shaped by what 
Foucault calls bio-power. As Lawlor asserts, Foucault’s account of life does not provide 
us with the power to fashion our own life, because “there is no desire or will for power”.4 
This power is contrasted with what Foucault calls biopower on the grounds that power 
means the individual’s capability of inventing his/her life. Agamben conceptualizes the 
relation between “bare life” and bio-politics by contesting Foucault’s notion of bio-power 
and Aristotle’s account of “political life”. According to Agamben, our life has been 
divided into bare life (mere or naked life) and political life (good life) by sovereign power. 
This sovereign power exerted by biopolitics reduces citizens to the status of “bare life” as 
                                                          
1 Thomas Lemke, Bio-Politics, trans. Eric Frederick Trump (New York and London: New York 
University press, 2011), 32.  
2 Schwartz, Louis-Georges, “Introduction to the <strike>Meaning</strike> of “Life”, Discourse, 
33:2 (Spring 2011), 136.  
3 Leonard Lawlor, The Implications of Immanence: Toward a New Concept of Life (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2006), 123. Lawlor examines the conceptions of “life” in the final 
writings of Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault. “The signs can be found in the final writings of Derrida, 
Deleuze, and Foucault: Deleuze’s ‘Immanence; a Life’, Foucault’s ‘Life: Experience and Science’, 
and Derrida’s ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’. Derrida reminds us that life is 
always denied by irritability, spontaneously, auto-affection. Deleuze tells us that ‘a life contains 
only what is virtual’. And, finally, Foucault tells us that there are two approaches to the concept of 
life: lived-experience and the living” (Lawlor, 2).  
4 Lawlor, 126.  
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non-human life or “raw material”5 and then decides their death in terms of a state of 
exception. As a result, Agamben assert that “the decision on life becomes a decision on 
death, and biopolitics can turn into thanatopolitics”.6 Lemke also notes that in bio-politics 
“the production of life is articulated with the proliferation of death”.7 In this context, 
according to Rosi Braidotti, Agamben’s account of “life” is “defined as extreme 
ontological vulnerability”. 8  This vulnerable as well as powerless life produced by 
biopolitics and biopower is deeply fraught with ethical demands on life.  
From within Deleuze’s theoretical framework, as Daniel W. Smith claims, life is 
powerful in having a “complex ontological and ethical status”. 9  This diverges 
significantly from the approaches taken by Foucault and Agamben. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, life cannot be determined and confined by any structures of power and language, 
but is rather characterized as a “non-organic” power. Deleuze and Guattari claim that “if 
everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organized but, on the 
contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. In short, the life in question is non-
organic, germinal and intensive, a powerful life without organs, a Body that is all the 
more alive for having no organs, everything that passes between organs”.10 In order to 
examine the “non-organic life”, we need to consider the debates on Deleuze’s conception 
of life discussed by commentators. An increasing range of studies on Deleuze’s 
conception of life has recently been focused on the thinkers important to the development 
of vitalism and biophilosophy. Deleuze is often called a vitalist thinker, undoubtedly 
                                                          
5  Dominick LaCapra, History and its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2009), 159.  
6 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Rozen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 122. 
7 Thomas Lemke, xi.  
8  Rosi Braidotti, “Nomadic Ethics,” Deleuze, eds. Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 171.  
9 Daniel W. Smith, “Introduction: ‘A Life of Pure Immanence’: Deleuze’s ‘Critique et Clinique’ 
Project”, Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), xiii. 
10 Gilles Delueze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
and Foreword by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 
499. 
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influenced by the “vital” philosophy of Bergson. As John Protevi asserts, “‘life’ was a 
major theme for Deleuze, so much so that he would say at one point” 11: “Everything I’ve 
written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is”.12 However, Claire Colebrook, in Deleuze and the 
Meaning of Life, posits Deleuze’s philosophy within a modern “vitalist tradition” that is 
opposed to the “organism as subject or substance”. In other words, she differentiates 
Deleuze’s thought of life from a traditional vitalism, or naturalism whose ultimate 
principle is understood as one of “survival, self maintenance and continuity”. 13 From the 
perspective of biology, Steven Shaviro points out that life is “essentially conservative, 
organized of the purposes of self-preservation and self-reproduction. Organisms strive to 
maintain homeostatic equilibrium in relation to their environment and to perpetuate 
themselves through reproduction.” 14  However, Colebrook insists that Deleuze’s 
conception of life is, instead, involved with “disruption and destructive range of forces”15 
against any organisms. Before Colebrook, in Germinal Life Keith Ansell Pearson 
radically situated Deleuze’s philosophy in the context of modern “bio-philosophy” 
                                                          
11  John Protevi, “Deleuze and Life”, Deleuze, eds. Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 239. 
12 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995), 143.  
13 Claire Colebrook, Deleuze and the Meaning of Life (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), 
137. 
14 Steven Shaviro, “Interstitial life”, The Force of the Virtual: Deleuze, Science, and Philosophy, 
ed. Peter Gaffney (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 141. Shaviro 
adds: “Innovation and change are not primary processes, but are forced to adaptive reactions to 
environmental pressures. Life is not a vitalistic outpouring; it is better described as an inescapable 
compulsion. The image of a “life force” that we have today is not anything like Bergson’s élan 
vital; rather, it is a virus, a mindlessly, relentlessly self replicating bit of DNA or RNA. It seems 
that organic beings only innovate when they are absolutely compelled to, and as if it were in spite 
of themselves.” (141) Shaviro further provides “the interstitial life” in following Whitehead’s 
conception of life. According to Whitehead, “life is a characteristic of ‘empty space’ … Life lurks 
in the interstices of each living cell, and in the interstices of the brain”. Alfred North Whitehead, 
Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1929/1978), 105-6. As a result, Shaviro says that 
“interstitial life points toward a futurity that remains open: one that is not entirely determined by 
the present” (146). Through Whitehead’s and Deleuze’s concepts of life, Shaviro emphasizes an 
empty space rather than a force in life.  
15 Colebrook, 137. 
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running “from Darwin and Weismann to Bergson and Freud”16 and insisted that life, as a 
non-organic and creative power, is open to living systems, beyond human ones. From a 
non-humanistic perspective on life, Pearson further argued that Deleuze’s notion of life is 
centred on “ethology” in his affirmation of mankind’s potential power to inter-involve 
with our habitats. As implied above, the argument about the relation of Deleuze’s notion 
of life to ethology is theoretically based on his affinities to Spinoza’s ethics. Deleuze 
presents life focused on “affects”, which are associated with what he calls “ethology”. 
The study of ethology, according to Deleuze, “defines bodies, animals, or humans by the 
affects they are capable of”. 17  For the conception of affects, Deleuze rejects any 
humanistic approaches to life, but rather provides us with capacities of affects between 
any bodies. In this sense, Manuel DeLanda explains that “affects are not tendencies but 
capacities: the capacities of material entities to affect and be affected by one another”.18 
Similarly, based her idea on the affinities between materials and life, Elizabeth Grosz 
emphasizes that Deleuze’s notion of life elaborates “a pure impersonality, a singularity 
without identity”: “Deleuze seeks to understand life without recourse to a self, subject, or 
personal identity, or in opposition to matter and objects”.19 This impersonality of life is 
available for organs and non-organs to share life. Specifically, Grosz emphasizes that 
Deleuze is concerned with the “life of events”, and the “continuities and connection that 
run between what is conventionally divided between the living and the non-living rather 
than those which distinguish them”. In this context, Deleuze’s conception of life is 
                                                          
16 Keith Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life: The difference and repetition of Deleuze (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1999), 1. 
17 Deleuze, Spinoza, 125.  
18 Manuel DeLanda, “The Metaphysics of Science: An Interview with Manuel DeLanda”, The 
Force of the Virtual: Deleuze, Science, and Philosophy, ed. Peter Gaffney (Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 326.  
19 Grosz adds: “He [Deleuze] seeks something impersonal, singular, that links a living being, 
internally, through differentiation or repetition, to elements and forces that are nonliving. This is 
what links the concept of life, for him, to becoming-animal, to the Body without Organs, and to 
immanence rather than to transcendence, the human, or the organism.” Elizabeth Grosz, Becoming 
Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art (Durham and London: Duke University, 
2011), 35-6.  
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associated with non-organic forces or affects between bodies beyond anthropological 
perspectives. 
Nevertheless, Deleuze’s account of life cannot be reduced to vital forces drawn 
by vitalism or bio-philosophy, because his writings pursue an importantly non-systematic 
and exploratory treatment of the concept. Anthony Uhlmann expands on this, stating that 
“linking ethics and ethology underlines how forming an understanding of one’s 
disposition within one’s habitat enables the proper living of one’s life”.20 However, at the 
same time, there is a question that arises from Deleuze’s works, one that in various forms 
recurs through the western tradition, which concerns ethics, or how we should live. This 
concern with the ethical character of life should not be immediately assimilated into an 
Aristotelian teleological vision or Foucauldian aestheticization of life.21 On the contrary, 
we need to see that Deleuze develops a unique approach to this matter. As Daniel W. 
Smith points out, “Deleuze nowhere explicitly attempts to put forward what could be 
called an ‘ethical theory’ of his own. Yet he has always identified Spinoza and Nietzsche 
as his two primary philosophical precursors, and wrote important monographs on each of 
them.”22 In following Spinoza and Nietzsche, Deleugze distinguishes an ethics from a 
morality, on the grounds that morality is related to “transcendent values which are turned 
against life”.23 According to Smith, “Deleuze uses the term ‘morality’ to define, in very 
general terms, any set of ‘constraining’ rules, such as a moral code, that consists in 
judging actions and intentions by relating them to transcendent or universal values”. 24 In 
                                                          
20 Anthony Uhlmann, “Deleuze, Ethics, Ethology, and Art,” Deleuze and Ethics, eds. Nathan Jun 
and Daniel W. Smith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 154.  
21 For instance, Kenneth Surin connects Deleuze’s ethics to Michel Foucault’s ethics as “a work of 
art”, in which Deleuze’s ethics cannot be distinguished from aesthetics. Yet, Deleuze’s account of 
what life is, and how it connects to ethics, is ultimately involved with our actual lives rather than 
with modes of existence based on Greco-Roman philosophy. Kenneth Surin, “Existing Not as a 
Subject But as a Work of Art: The Task of Ethics or Aesthetics?”, Deleuze and Ethics, eds. Nathan 
Jun and Daniel W. Smith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 147.  
22 Daniel W. Smith, “Ethics: Three Questions of Immanence”, Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 146.  
23 Deleuze, Spinoza, 26.  
24  Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Towards an Immanent Theory of 
Ethics”, Parrhesia, 2 (2007), 66-7.  
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doing this, Deleuze importantly defines an ethics as “a typology of immanent modes of 
existence”.25 This conception, which has affinities to the works of Spinoza and Nietzsche, 
presents a model for an affirmative and immanent life.26 Specifically, based on our “life”, 
Deleuze’s conception of ethics provides ways to affirm our existence as modes and to 
invent our forms of life. How can we create ethical modes of life? From Deleuze’s 
definition of ethics, I will examine the two ethical principles of life: parallelism and 
immanence.  
Firstly, in terms of parallelism, Deleuze radically subverts “any causality between 
the mind and the body” and “disallows any primacy of the one over the other”. 27 This is 
called Deleuze and Spinoza’s “parallelism”. However, according to Deleuze, it is 
important to note that parallelism “is not in order to establish any superiority of the body 
over the mind”, but “is manifested in the reversal of the traditional principles in which 
morality was founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness”.28 
In this context, Deleuze, in following Spinoza’s ethics, says that the mind and the body 
interact with each other at the same level, whilst emphasizing the capability of the body 
that has been ignored. Thus, Deleuze asserts that “what is an action in the mind is 
necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily 
a passion in the mind”.29 By this parallelism, Deleuze importantly replaces the principles 
of causes with the processes of (de)compositions of bodies or ideas: “the order of causes” 
                                                          
25 Deleuze, Spinoza, 23.   
26 Daniel W. Smith explains two different trajectories of “transcendence” and “immanence” in 
“contemporary French philosophy, both of which pass through Heidegger”: “a trajectory of 
transcendence, which includes Levinas and Derrida, and goes back through Husserl to Kant: and a 
trajectory of immanence, which includes Foucault and Deleuze, and goes back through Nietzsche 
and Spinoza. However, he also points that “immanence and transcendence are both highly over 
determined terms in the history of philosophy and it is not immediately clear what it would mean 
to be a philosopher of either one. Yet, as many commentators including Smith insist, Deleuze is 
posited as a philosopher of immanence influenced by Spinoza and Nietzsche”. Daniel W. Smith, 
“Deleuze and Derrida: Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French 
Thought”, Between Deleuze and Derrida. eds. Paul Patton and John Protevi (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2003), 46.  
27 Deleuze, Spinoza, 18.  
28 Deleuze, Spinoza, 18.  
29 Deleuze, Spinoza, 18.  
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is therefore replaced by “an order of composition and decomposition of relations”.30 As a 
result, Deleuze denies the predetermined causes of dominating our bodies and life. For 
instance, Deleuze asserts that the morality of Good and Evil in the Bible derived its cause 
from Adam’s guilt at eating an apple against God’s moral prohibition. However, Deleuze 
replaces this morality with a process of the (de)composing of two bodies, or the encounter 
of Adam and an apple. This encounter is called “bad” rather than “Evil”, because the 
apple decomposes Adam like a poison. Deleuze thereby insist that “there is no Good and 
Evil, but there is good and bad”. “Beyond Good and Evil, at least does not mean beyond 
good and bad”.31 Through parallelism, transcendental morality is substituted by the plural 
ethics of good and bad.  
Secondly, Deleuze provides a more radical form of ethics by laying out a 
“common plane of immanence on which all bodies, all minds, and all individuals are 
situated”.32 This immanence is inextricably associated with parallelism on the grounds 
that the conception of immanence rejects any given causes and values. In order to set up 
this field of immanence, in his final essay, Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, Deleuze 
claims life as “pure immanence”: “we will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and 
nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. 
A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, 
complete bliss.” 33 From this ontological premise, life serves as a field of immanence 
where any subject or mind is in immanence rather than something is immanent to a 
subject or mind. This immanent life generates the “ontology of univocity, which excludes 
any transcendence of Being”.34 As Smith explains, “God does not have a different mode 
                                                          
30 Deleuze, Spinoza, 19.  
31 Deleuze, Spinoza, 22.  
32 Deleuze, Spinoza, 122. 
33 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone 
Books, 2005), 27.  
34 Giorgio Agamben, “Absolute Immanence”, Potentiality, trans. and ed. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 226. 
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of being from other creatures”35 such as a man or a cat. According to Agamben, Deleuze, 
taking off from Spinoza’s conception of univocity that God and Nature are one and the 
same thing, “returns mobility and life to immanence”36: “A cause is immanent … when 
its effect is ‘immanent’ in the cause, rather than emanating from it”.37 Deleuze is thereby 
advancing a distinctive ontological proposition that “there is nothing ‘beyond’ or ‘higher 
than’ or ‘superior to’ Being”38 such as God or Good itself.39 The Deleuzian conception of 
ethics is, accordingly, associated with questions about potential forms of life in our 
common life rather than about the meaning of life based on transcendental morality.  
Taking off from the principles of parallelism and immanence, Deleuze’s 
conception of life provides us with the capacity to escape transcendental morality. 
Nevertheless, Deleuze’s ethics is also inextricably linked to his account of non-organic 
forces and affects, since his ethics is based on Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s conceptions of 
life and the body. From Deleuze’s theory of ethical modes of life, I will use the two terms 
of “becoming” and the “impersonal”, in order to investigate Kureishi’s and Coetzee’s 
novels. Thus, it is, at first, useful to explore becoming as a way in which we can 
understand ourselves as transformative modes. According to Patton, Deleuze and Guattari, 
in A Thousand Plateaus, “develop a version of the ontology of life as a process of 
becoming in the form of a theory of multiplicities or machinic assemblages”. 40 
Specifically, instead of an identity or the subject rooted in hierarchy and binary 
opposition, Deleuze and Guattari express becoming as posited between or among other 
people or groups. This becoming can be also understood as variations of individuals’ or 
groups’ becoming other. However, becoming does not imply the individual’s 
                                                          
35 Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida: Immanence and Transcendence”, 55.  
36 Agmben, “Absolute Immanence”, 226. 
37 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 
1990), 156. 
38 Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida: Immanence and Transcendence”, 48. 
39  According to Beistegui, for Spinoza and Deleuze, ethics “is not concerned with values, 
judgement, or duty, but with ontological potentials, power, and bodily or physical states”. Miguel 
de Beistegui, Immanence: Deleuze and Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 
105. 
40 Paul Patton, “Becoming-Animal and Pure Life in Coetzee’s Disgrace”, Ariel, 35:1-2 (2004), 103.  
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identification with or imitation of the other but is rather finding a zone of proximity: “to 
become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of 
proximity, indiscernibility, or indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished 
from a woman, an animal, or a molecule”.41  For this reason, as Paul Patton asserts 
becoming has to be distinguished from “what Jacques Derrida understands by the process 
of iteration”, namely “the action by which something or someone continues to become 
other (while continuing to be what it is)”.42 The conceptions of iteration (or repetition) as 
well as difference discussed in Western Philosophy based on Platonism eventually 
contributes to an idea of “identity” or “identification”.43  
We need to further examine how we can think of ourselves as becoming or how 
we can experience becoming in our reality. Following Patty Sotirin’s account of 
becoming in terms of five categories, we can approach Deleuze’s conception of becoming 
in diverse ways: “becomings as elements of Deleuze’s ‘positive ontology’; the ‘block of 
becoming’; the importance of thresholds; immanence; and becomings as re-
representational”. 44 In order to articulate the practical aspects of becoming, we also need 
to consider Leonard Lawlor’s discussion of becoming. Lawlor claims that “becoming is 
not imitation; the prepositions are before, in, and for (devant, en, pour); becoming 
consists in a zigzag structure, and the criterion is writing”. 45 In Deleuze and Guattari, 
according to Lawlor, becoming is never a process of imitating, but rather “the one who 
becomes finds himself before another who ends up being in oneself”.46 Lawlor goes on: 
“With the other in me, however, I am not substituting myself for another; the structure of 
                                                          
41 Deleuze, Critical and Clinical, 1.  
42 Patton, “Becoming-Animal and Pure Life”, 104. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), 177.  
43  See Daniel W. Smith, “The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of 
Platonism”, Essays on Deleuze, 3-26.  
44 Patty Sotirin, “Becoming-woman”, Gillles Deleuze, Key Concepts, ed. Charles J. Stivale (Ithaca: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 99.  
45 Lenoard Lawlor, “Following the Rats: Becoming-Animal in Deleuze and Guattari”, Substance, 
Issue 117, 37:3, (2008), 170.  
46 Lawlor, “Following the Rats”, 170.  
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becoming is not reciprocal. It is a zigzag in which I become other so that the other may 
become something else, but this becoming something else is possible only if a work is 
produced.”47 Taking off from Lawlor’s theory, I raise a question whether the structure of 
becoming is zigzag or reciprocal. Moreover, I question whether becoming happens within 
only a work or writing. Lawlor emphasizes, “it seems to me that no one has sufficiently 
recognized this fact: for Deleuze and Guattari, a becoming is successful only if writing 
results”.48 My question relating to Lawlor are involved with how becoming brings the 
self’s transformation in reality rather than in the literary texts. At first, we can look at 
what Lawlor calls the zigzag structure. As we have seen, Lawlor asserts, “I become the 
other so that the other may become something else.” However, this structure of zigzag 
can be achieved only on the condition that self and the other are located in the gap or 
difference between the prepositions of “before”, “in” and “for”. Through the prepositions, 
self can never meet the other. However, from Spinoza’s and Deleuze’s ethics, the 
becoming is reciprocal and mutual, which does not mean the one’s imitation or 
identification with the other. We can discuss this matter in terms of Deleuze’s conception 
of affects.  
Given Deleuze’s theory of affects, we, as the body, can continue to become 
something else. Spinoza’s notion of affects describes our capacity to affect and be 
affected by other things: that is, the relative degree by which our power of activity is 
increased and diminished by our interactions. 49  We affect and are affected by other 
bodies in our routine life, which also leads to mutual or interactive becoming rather than 
zigzag becoming. To be the centre of such a network of affect-relations is also to show 
that we are connected to our environment in ways that continually change both ourselves 
and the world. We share affect with other bodies, and we are shaped by the ways they 
affect us. Affect is a site at which our powers and interactions are involved in a 
                                                          
47 Lawlor, “Following the Rats”, 170.  
48 Lawlor, “Following the Rats”, 170. 
49 Deleuze, Spinoza, 123. 
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continuous interrelational and intersubjective interplay. Moreover, it is important to note 
that affects, as Pearson asserts, “do not bring about the transformation of one body into 
another, but rather something passes from one to the other. Affects communicate on the 
level of becomings, which involve neither an imitation nor an experienced sympathy… It 
is not a resemblance, although there is resemblance”. 50  According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, “Man does not become wolf, or vampire, as if he changed molar species; the 
vampire and werewolf are becomings of man, in other words, proximities between 
molecules in composition, relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between 
emitted particles.”51 From the perspective of Pearson, we can also consider Lawlor’s 
account of “writing” as a locus of becomings. As we have seen, Lawlor insists that, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, “this becoming something else is possible only if a work is 
produced.” He adds: “without the tangible result of a creation, becoming fails and 
becomes a bare repetition circle of the same behaviour, or worse, suicide”.52  However, as 
we have seen with the affects, “becoming something else” is possible in reality as well as 
in literary works. In addition, Pearson asserts that “Deleuze and Guattari construe the 
exchange of affects on the level of human becomings as not involving in some dubious 
and highly problematic return to the origins”,53 which implies the imitation of becoming.  
Secondly, Deleuze, in Pure Immanence, importantly indicates the impersonal as 
an ethical life. The impersonal modes of life are associated with ways in which lives are 
able to become virtually inter-involved with other’s lives and to thereby generate 
immense variations in both individuals and communities. As Patton asserts, the 
impersonal life is an ethical as well as unique theory of Deleuze. 54 According to Deleuze, 
                                                          
50 Pearson, 179.  
51 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 275.  
52 Lawlor, 170-1.  
53 Pearson, 179.  
54 Patton insists that Deleuze is “rightly regarded as a vitalist thinker in the sense that a conception 
of impersonal life is a central to his philosophy”. Patton, “Becoming-Animal and Pure Life”, 101.  
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“the life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life”.55 Specifically, 
as Patton explains, life “is not the personal life of the individual character but the 
impersonal and abstract life which is expressed in but irreducible to its particular 
incarnation”. 56  In this context, an individual life is im-personalized like a passage 
between individual lives, but unfolds in a particular case like an event. This paradoxical 
composition is also associated with what Rajchman calls “impersonal individuation”57 
which is linked to ethical question of how a subject is capable of opening to the Other. 
Deleuze’s conception of “the virtual” is available for a “process of im-personalization”. 
The virtual, as Daniel W. Smith explains, has “little to do with the popular notion of 
“virtual reality”.58 Yet, this virtual does not lack reality but is rather “something that is 
engaged in a process of actualization following the plane that gives it its particular 
reality”. 59  Specifically, according to Todd May, the virtual and the actual can be 
understood as way of contrasting them with the possible and the real: “For Deleuze, the 
possible would be an image of the real; it is the real minus its character of actually 
existing”.60 However, as May points out, the possible is distinguishable from the virtual. 
Smith expounds the relation between the possible and the virtual: “Deleuze proposes 
replacing the concept of the possible with the concept of the virtual, and substituting for 
the possible-real opposition the virtual-real complementarity”. 61  In this context, for 
Deleuze, the virtual is real and is involved with a process of actualization. In Charles 
Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend, which Deleuze takes as an example of im-personalization, 
                                                          
55 Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 28.  
56 Patton, “Becoming-Animal and Pure Life”, 114. 
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58 Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 252.  
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the interval between life and death generates a common ground between people, and the 
disreputable Rogue Riderhood becomes our “common friend”. Riderhood and other 
people experience this common ground as im-personalization through the process or 
passage of both the virtuality of universal death and the actualization of individual’s 
dying. The ethos of im-personal life is, thus, to explore the ways in which an individual 
coexists and sympathizes with the Other.  
In terms of impersonal life, we can consider how people think of themselves as 
“multiplicity”62  or assemblage rather than as an individual. Deleuze’s conceptions of 
multiplicity and assemblage can be approached differently on the grounds that 
multiplicity is concerned with Bergson’s assertion of the relationship between the virtual 
and the actual while assemblage is related to Spinoza’s notion of the compositions of the 
body.  Yet, the two terms can be used similarly, since Deleuze accounts of an assemblage 
as a multiplicity of composing heterogeneous terms and of establishing their relations: 
“What is an assemblage? It is a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous 
terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and 
reigns—different natures”.63 Multiplicity is, according to John Rajchman, “not simply a 
logical, but also a practical matter, a pragmatic matter—something we must make or do, 
and learn by doing”. 64  Multiplicity is basically to get away from our understanding 
ourselves in terms of the hierarchical conception of “identity”.65 However, by multiplicity, 
                                                          
62 As Keith Ansell Pearson explains, based on Bergson’s theory, Deleuze asserts two types of 
multiplicity: “In Bergsonism, the difference between the two is presented as one between a 
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multiplicity is being represented purely extensively in terms of a homogeneous ordering (it is 
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63 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 69.  
64 John Rajchman, The Deleuze Connections (Cambridge and Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
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65 As for the hierarchical conception of identity, Erinn Cunniff Gilson explains: “The identity 
categories that are ‘major’ (for instance, human, male, adult, white, rational) are defined as such in 
virtue of their dominance, the way they set the standards for the hierarchical terms of identity; they 
distribute and maintain binaries that reinforce their dominance.” Erinn Cunniff Gilson, “Ethics 
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Deleuze and Guattari do not mean multiplicity in the sense of many people in contrast 
with one. Multiplicity is not a matter of multiple numbers of people and other bodies, but 
is rather concerned with a “symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’”66 by proliferating their multiple 
relations. Rajchman claims, we confront the problem of “making multiplicity”—“the 
attempt to create uncentered spaces prior to personalized identities and identifications, 
and so to invent new “habits of saying I and we” no longer tied down to identification or 
representation”.67 Multiplicity is thus inevitably concerned with our relation to “others” in 
the community. Moreover, we can think of multiplicity as a Spinozan conception of 
assemblage. Assemblage is associated with multiple modes of being shaped by affects. 
From the framework of Deleuze’s ethics of affects, the individual as a body is already an 
assemblage, as we affect and are affected by other bodies. In this context, for Deleuze, 
while every existence is singular, it is also already an assemblage. This is because a 
human being can be described as a mode rather than as a subject or substance. A mode is 
an assemblage of multiple relations between our body and other bodies produced by 
affects. In this context, Deleuze’s conception of becoming and the impersonal refer to 
multiplicity or assemblage rather than an individual.  
Through Deleuze’s conceptions of becoming and the impersonal, we can examine 
Kureishi’s and Coetzee’s literary works in terms of an “ethics of life”.  Before we 
approach this matter, however, it is helpful to rethink the relation of literature to an ethics 
of life within the theory of Deleuze. As we have seen, Deleuze’s ethics of life is 
concerned with the creation of modes of existence. This is why life and literature 
converge each other in Deleuze’s theory. Specifically, for Deleuze, literature is, first of all, 
related to becoming. According to Deleuze, “to write is certainly not to impose a form (of 
                                                                                                                                                               
between Deleuze and Feminism”, Deleuze and Ethics, eds. Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith 
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66 Deleuze and Parnet, 69.  
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expression) on the matter of lived experience”.68 Rather than a form or an identification 
of the subject, writing is concerned with becoming or the “zone of proximity where one 
can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule”.69  In this 
context, Deleuze says, “writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in 
the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience. 
It is a process, that is, a passage of life that traverses both the livable and the lived”.70 
Furthermore, through his writings, Deleuze repeatedly connects literature both to 
ontological and ethical questions about how we should live. Deleuze’s ethics of life as a 
“pure immanence”, connected to our ordinary everyday existence, makes an even more 
decisive advance in moral philosophy by developing the importance of “the virtual”. In 
doing so, Deleuze enables a fruitful and transformative account of the ethical value of 
literature to emerge. This occurs in the way in which fiction engages with the virtual. 
Literature is a domain of fabulation or fiction, yet compatible with the demands and 
complexities of our actual lives: it is not simply a retreat into idle fantasy or falsity. 
Rather, literature, despite its fictive aspects, or rather, because of them, plays a crucial 
ethical role. Even falsifying narratives encourage us to realize Deleuzian ethical ideals of 
“becoming” and “the impersonal”. “Becoming” and “the impersonal”, which are 
immanent in our life, are the primary domain of literary imagination and the source of its 
potency.  
The second aim of this thesis is to investigate Kureishi’s and Coetzee’s literary 
presentation of different ways of living through a Deleuzian conception of ethics of life. 
Despite the fact that both Kureishi and Coetzee are categorized as (post)colonial writers, 
their biographical backgrounds are distinctively different. As a British writer, Kureishi 
positions himself as an Asian writer, since, as Ruvani Ranasinha observes, “he discovered 
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that his mixed Pakistan and English parentage identifies him structurally and racially as 
black in Britain.”71 Handling his “biographical material”72, Kureishi presents the figures 
and lives of the immigrant in the multi-cultural and post-colonial settings based on 
London and South-East England. On the other hand, as a white writer, Coetzee depicts 
the marginal figures in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. Through Kureishi and 
Coetzee, this thesis will investigate how the characters in different postcolonial situations 
can experience “becoming” and “the impersonal” from the perspective of Deleuze. This 
thesis will, accordingly, show how Kureishi and Coetzee differently present potential and 
inventive forms of life in terms of Deleuze’s ethics of life.  
Firstly, Kureishi, as a British Asian writer represents a minority in Britain. With 
Anglo-Pakistani/Indian parentage, Kureishi, as Bart Moore-Gilbert observes, became a 
“minority within a minority”. 73  In situating himself as an Asian writer, Kureishi 
frequently examines the immigrant and minority experiences, especially in his earlier 
works. As Donald Weber emphasizes, Kureishi’s ‘black’ identity bears political and 
cultural dimensions that enable the critique and deconstruction of “whiteness as 
ideology”.74 Nevertheless, as Kureishi asserts, radical black discourse can become the 
“easy, thrilling talk of ‘white devils’ instead of close analysis of the institutions that kept 
blacks low”.75 In this respect, Kureishi can be seen to have transitioned from a radically 
polarized stance (one in which he identified himself as a radicalized minority) into new 
hybrid positions which combines Asian and White identities in metropolitan spaces such 
as London. Thus, much of the critical debates about Kureishi’s works have focused on 
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“hybridity” and the politics of representation.76 As Moore-Gilbert argues, Kureishi’s work 
presents everyday British life where “the imperial past still remains and the institutional 
structures and social hierarchies simultaneously subordinate minorities,” and the concept 
of hybridity is helpful both to explore and reverse the multiple aspects of this “domestic 
colonialism”.77 “Hybridity” is praised by Homi Bhabha as a way of subverting the binary 
opposition of the colonizer and the colonized and the idea of a fixed and stable identity, 
because there is always “a third space” (“in-between” or a “difference within”) in a 
hybrid or in the hybridization.78 However, my contention is that the hybridized identity 
and culture as depicted in Kureishi’s novels have limitations for the perspective of 
affective relations and the impersonal life, although the conception of hybridity is 
undoubtedly useful to explore the ethnic and religious minorities and spaces in the 
(post)colonial situations.  
Bhabha’s conception of hybridity has affinity with Deleuze’s notion of 
assemblage or multiplicity, since both reject a solid idea of identity and offer the in-
between of self and the other. Specifically, as David Huddart asserts, Bhabha’s 
conception of hybridity refers to a cultural identity, that invokes an “original mixedness 
within every form of identity”: “In the case of cultural identities, hybridity refers to the 
fact that cultures are not discrete phenomena; instead, they are always in contact with one 
another, and this contact leads to cultural mixed-ness”. 79  Huddart’s argument about 
hybridity means that it is fundamentally available for cultural identities to connect and 
mix with others, which is close to Deleuze’s conception of assemblage. Moreover, 
Huddart radically interprets Bhabha’s conception of hybridity on the grounds that the 
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concept of hybritidy, as Huddart observes, is not merely related to the mixed form of 
identity or culture, but also marks “the constant process of creating new identities (their 
open-endedness or their ‘becoming’)” by drawing the borderline between “unsettled 
cultural forms or identities”.80 Accordingly, Bhabha’s conception of hybridity can provide 
ways in which ethnic and religious minorities in Kureishi’s novels can invent their 
identities as hybrids in metropolitan spaces. However, from the perspective of Deleuze’s 
theory of becoming and assemblage, Bhabha’s conception of hybridity does not consider 
affective relations, which trigger the mutual transformation between self and the other. In 
fact, Bhabha’s conception of hybridity is distinguishable from assemblage, because, as 
Peter Hallward asserts, the concept of hybridity is based on Derrida’s notion of différence, 
which implies the “fundamental non-relational terms of ‘pure incommensurability’ or 
‘untranslatability’”. 81  Hallward further explains that Derrida’s and Bhabha’s idea of 
individuals are “always derivative”82 as a result of differentiation of language, which is 
distinguished from Deleuze’s definition of assemblage. In this context, the hybridity 
described in Kureishi’s works can be productively rethought through Deleuze’s ethical 
theory of becoming and the impersonal. In particular, in terms of Deleuze’s ethics of life, 
we can reconsider how a minority can affirm themselves as modes and invent their forms 
of life.  
Secondly, as a South African writer whose earlier writing coincided with the time 
of apartheid, Coetzee frequently examines the ethical and political contexts of his 
homeland. David Attwell, for example, describes Coetzee as a writer addressing the 
ethical and political stresses of living in contemporary South Africa. However, Attwell 
presents Coetzee’s fiction as primarily concerned with the political context: “Coetzee was 
a philosophical idealist whose fiction graphically portrayed the breakup of the dominating, 
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rationalist subject of colonialism”, but offered “neither an analysis of the play of 
historical forces nor a moral anchor in the search for a humane response to colonialism 
and apartheid”.83 However, Derek Attridge insists that “it is evident that it is the political 
that is to be corrected by the ethical, and not vice versa”.84 Attridge’s contention, in his 
reading of Coetzee, is that the unpredictability of literature produces an ethical force 
allowing one to encounter the “singular demands of the other”.85 This interruption of 
otherness evinces a responsibility toward the Other. In short, Attridge’s ethical reading of 
Coetzee presents us as having an unlimited responsibility toward the Other. Basing his 
idea on the responsibility for the Other, Michael Marais also stresses Coetzee’s ethical 
concern with alterity. However, in regard to the relation between the ethical and the 
political in Coetzee’s works, Marais asserts that “the ethical community implied by 
Coetzee’s fiction is generated by a tension, rather than a dialectic, between politics and 
ethics. At issue in this community is not the integration of the latter into the former, but 
the interruption of the former by the latter”. 86 Although Marais suggests the tension 
between politics and ethics, in reading Coetzee’s works, he gives priority to an ethics of 
unlimited responsibility for the Other. However, I will seek to expose the strong 
differences between Attridge’s and Marais’s accounts of “unlimited responsibility” and 
my own Deleuzian perspective of ethical life. Moreover, within the framework of 
Deleuze, my ethical reading of Coetzee’s works is inherently political, which is also quite 
different from Attridge’s and Marais’s positions on the relation between politics and 
ethics. As Erinn Cunniff Gilson asserts, in terms of Deleuze’s theory, “the question of 
how to live ethically is fundamentally a political question. … insofar as the conception of 
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subjectivity under dispute is a political one”.87 Additionally, as we have seen, Deleuze’s 
ethical conceptions of becoming, the impersonal and assemblage are basically concerned 
with the political, since they are concerned with questions of the subject, the other and the 
community. Nevertheless, my reading of Coetzee will be focused on an ethics of life, 
although I will inevitably discuss the political problems during the apartheid and post-
apartheid period.  
My contention of an ethics of life is distinguished from the ethics of alterity taken 
by Attridge. Attridge’s contention, in his reading Coetzee through the theoretical writings 
of Derrida and Levinas, is established by recognizing and addressing the extreme 
Otherness of the Other. However, Attridge’s reading comes to posit the Other as “the 
impossible”, because we can never know the Other, nor encounter the Other. For this 
reason, Susan Anker calls the Other “the impossible character of ethical responsibility”.88 
Martin Hägglund also insists that Levinas’s ethics of the Other establishes the Other as 
“primarily Good”, 89 which is given as a transcendental position. This results in fixing the 
relation between the subject and the Other. However, as Hägglund points out, the Other is 
an interchangeable term in relation to the subject in diverse situations: “I am an other for 
the other and vice versa”.90 As Jack Reynolds asserts, “Deleuze and Guattari implicitly 
accuse Levinas’ account of the Other as reinstituting the Other as a model of 
transcendence within immanence”.91 In other words, as Daniel W. Smith explains, “we 
are in the realm of transcendence, since we never encounter the pure or the absolute in 
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our experience, it is never something that can be present to our experience”.92 As a result, 
Attridge’s reading does not capture Deleuze’s ethical insights of immanent life and 
impersonal life available for affective relations and assemblage. Despite the fact that a 
Deleuzian ethical reading of Coetzee’s works provides a fruitful platform for rethinking 
the nature of the Other and community, there have only been a few comparative studies 
of these authors, such as Paul Patton’s (dealing with becoming-animal and pure life) and 
Chris Danta’s (discussing becoming-sacrificial), and neither of these has sufficiently dealt 
with Coetzee’s works in terms of its relation to Deleuze’s ethics of life.93  
The encounter between a Deleuzian philosophy and the literary works of Kureishi 
and Coetzee provides us with ways of creating ethical forms of life. Moreover, from the 
conception of Deleuze, Kureishi’s and Coetzee’s ethical visions I aim to develop will be 
shown to be sharply distinct from forms of ethics premised on hybridity, alterity and 
responsibility. In order to investigate the ethical visions of Kureishi, Coetzee, and 
Deleuze, this thesis will be divided into two sections, the first dealing with Kureishi and 
the second with Coetzee. Each section will have three chapters on a particular work by 
each author. In the first section, firstly, by employing Deleuze’s conception of 
“difference”, Kureishi’s first novel, The Buddha of Suburbia (1990) will be examined in 
order to challenge readings of the work relying upon the idea of “hybridity”. Specifically, 
this chapter will examine how an ethnic minority is represented as difference in terms of 
the negativity of identity. This matter will be accounted alongside the dramatization of 
difference as suggested in Deleuze’s theory. Secondly, the relationship between an 
individual and the community presented in Kureishi’s Black Album (1995) will be 
explored in terms of Deleuze’s conception of “betrayal”. Specifically, the chapter will 
discuss how an individual belonging to an ethnic and religious minority has an ethical 
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relation to the Muslim community in terms of Deleuze’s conception of “double turning”. 
This “betrayal” (as the double turning) will be discussed as a way of inventing ethical 
modes of life rather than of reverting to a transcendental morality. Thirdly, Kureishi’s The 
Body (2002) will be examined by questioning Kureishi’s conception of bodies and 
hybridity in terms of Deleuze’s conception of “assemblage”. Kureishi presents a hybrid 
composed of self and other or the living and the dead. Through this peculiar hybrid, this 
chapter will discuss how Kureishi’s presentation of hybridity reproduces the system of 
desire and the binary opposition between the mind and the body. As a result, concerning 
these works, I will show that Kureishi’s writing has both its potentials and limitations in 
generating Deleuze’s conception of ethical life.  
In the second section, firstly, in the light of Agamben’s conception of biopolitics, 
the politicization of Michael K’s life will be explored in Coetzee’s Life and Times of 
Michael K (1983).  Specifically, this chapter will discuss how the character’s life is 
divided into political life and bare life during apartheid, and also question whether K’s 
refusal to eat can be understood as a political or an ethical resistance. At this point, 
Agamben’s theories of life will be also discussed in comparison with Deleuze’s ethical 
conception of life. Secondly, through Deleuze’s conceptions of “becoming-animal”, 
ethical questions concerning the ontological division between humans and animals will be 
examined in Coetzee’s Foe (1986). This chapter will investigate how the animalization of 
Friday is constituted through the colonizer’s self recognition of a human being by 
discussing Spivak’s theory of a “marginality” and Marais’s thought of “responsibility”. 
By contrast, as an ethical life, the becoming-animal of Cruso will be explored in 
comparison to Barton’s morality of pity through the perspective of Deleuze. Thirdly, in 
terms of a Deleuzian ethics of “suffering”, the affective relations between the subject and 
the Other will be discussed in Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999). This approach will be 
associated with the question of how suffering as affection flows between the subject and 
the Other, and, accordingly, triggers an impersonal form of life or an affirmative power of 
life. This chapter will investigate how death as presented in Disgrace leads us to open up 
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to the impersonal mode of life focused on the corporeality of life while critically 
discussing Attridge’s and Marais’s ethics of “unlimited responsibility” and Danta’s 
notion of “becoming-sacrificial”. Consequently, this thesis aims to demonstrate, through 
its Deleuzian reading of both authors, that where Kureishi offers becoming as a 
transformative mode of being, Coetzee radically invents non-organic and impersonal 
forms of life by dealing with becoming and assemblage. 
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Chapter 1 
The Theatre of Difference in The Buddha of Suburbia 
  
1. Introduction 
Most philosophy in Western history, according to Deleuze, has been a philosophy 
of “representation” from Plato to modern times. Importantly throughout the history of 
Western thought, representation has also been equated with the primacy of identity.1 
Philosophy has continuously made the same gesture of subordinating difference to 
identity: this was done to ensure the representation of identity or the identical, which is 
kept untainted and uninfluenced by what is other or difference. For this reason, the 
conception of difference has always implied a negativity or a negation through the 
mediation of a particular concept of identity. Accordingly, Deleuze argues that we cannot 
even imagine or think “difference in itself”. 2  However, Deleuze claims that “all the 
identities are only simulated, produced as an optical ‘effect’ by the more profound game 
of difference and repetition”.3 From Deleuze’s perspective, the representation of identity 
has been only an illusion or a theatre of phantasms.   
Through Deleuze’s criticism of the representation of identity and difference, we 
can rethink “difference” without a negation. The conception of difference can be 
understood as the Other or otherness which refers to a minority group such as racial, 
                                                          
1 Joe Hughes explains that Deleuze’s conception of representation has a lot of meanings: “the word 
‘representation’ will be equated with the ‘form of identity’, sometimes with the form of the 
‘concept’; sometimes it will be divided up into to a ‘fourfold root’. Deleuze will equate 
representation with ‘knowledge’, the ‘proposition’, the solution to a problem, consciousness, 
opinion and judgement. The list is quite long, but all of these instances refer back to one thing: the 
object”. However, I will focus on the conception of representation as identity in order to discuss 
difference in this chapter. Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2009), 1.  
2 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), xiii.  
3 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xix.  
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ethnic and sexual groups in a society. Paul Patton observes that several modern 
philosophers, such as Derrida, Foucault and Kristeva, have contributed to the “philosophy 
of difference” and that their works have now been assimilated to the “politics of 
difference” that “characterises a number of minority social groups and interests: feminists, 
racial minorities, gay and lesbian movements have all demanded the recognition of 
differences that were previously assimilated, denied or simply unknown”.4 In this sense, 
the recognition of difference has the political implications to claim a right and freedom to 
differences. However, Deleuze seems more radical in thinking “difference” than even his 
French contemporaries were – as can be seen in his passionate pursuit of the “affirmation 
of difference.” Deleuze tries to release difference from the concept of identity and also to 
open “difference” to “the affirmation of life itself”. In this context, we can ask a question 
of how difference such as a racial and ethnic minority expresses itself rather than the 
identification of “difference” as a negative conception. This concern, thus, has political 
and ethical implications.   
Kureishi’s The Buddha of Suburbia unfolds a theatre of representation. Identity in 
this novel is presented as a performative, almost theatrical, affair: the characters explore 
and invent their identities by experimenting with the different social categories of race, 
class and gender. From the start, the protagonist, Karim, quests for his identity: “My 
name is Karim Amir, and I am an Englishman born and bred, almost”. 5  Karim’s 
nationality is British but his racial identity and heritage is not wholly white British, as he 
is the son of a British mother and an Indian father. Karim’s mixed parentage leaves him 
with this plurality of identity rather than a single, fixed identity. His self-recognition of 
identity is, however, considered as a difference or a negativity of identity, as the nuance 
of the word “almost” implies incompletion of identity. Peter Hitchcock also explains 
                                                          
4 Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 29.  
5 Hanif Kureishi, The Buddha of Suburbia (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 3.  
 34 
Karim’s expression of “almost” as a “predicament in identitarian formulae”.6 This leaves 
Karim in an unstable situation within society and causes him to persistently try to escape 
his position and search for an identity. Moreover, as Ruvani Ranasinha emphasizes, 
Karim’s profession as an actor is available for “a series of personas”. 7  Apart from 
Karim’s specific position, other Asian characters in this novel are also forced to adapt 
themselves to their Asian identity or invent their identity regardless of their ethnic 
positions. These characters quest for their identity as if they were performing roles on a 
theatre stage. From this perspective, Karim’s and other Asians’ self-recognition of 
difference displays the plurality of differences.   
Given the characters’ self-recognition of difference, it is helpful to consider the 
relation between identity and difference in terms of Homi Bhabha’s account of difference 
and hybridity. Karim’s self-recognition as an “almost Englishman” can be also associated 
with Bhabha’s conceptions of “hybridity”, “difference within”  and “in-betweenness”.8 
From the perspective of Bhabha, Karim can be understood as a hybrid of the white and 
the black as well as a subject living in-between Indian and British cultures. Karim can 
also be regarded as “difference within”, which implies a minority within the regional 
domain. These characteristics of Karim are readily seen in London, as a cosmopolitan 
society. In the cosmopolitan space, as Bhabha observes, plural cultures and identities are 
celebrated as diversity, but the problems of minorities are reproduced and redistributed at 
the local level.9 It is here that Bhabha’s concern is a “right to difference-in-equality” 
through utilizing the conceptions of hybridity and in-betweenness. Specifically, rather 
than diversity in a cosmopolitan society such as London, Bhabha emphasizes “vernacular 
cosmopolitanism” which measures a cosmopolitan society from the “minoritarian 
                                                          
6 Peter Hitchcock, “Decolonizing (the) English”, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 100:3 (Summer 
2001), 761.  
7 Ruvani Ranasinha, Hanif Kureishi (Devon: Northcote House, 2002), 70.  
8 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 19.  
9 Homi Bhabha, xiv-xvi.  
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perspective”. 10  As a result, a right to difference in equality is articulated from the 
“perspective of both national minorities and global migrants” in cosmopolitan spaces.11 
Through the lens of Bhabha, this novel can be seen as presenting “vernacular 
cosmopolitanism” on the grounds that Karim’s hybridity is produced as a site of 
“difference within” rather than diversity or plurality. As a result, Karim’s hybridity 
produces an ambivalent and critical space in which the power of the white cannot 
dominate. 
As Susie Thomas observes, much of the critical debate about The Buddha has 
focused on “hybridity and the politics of representation”.12 The migration in this novel is 
a catalyst for ethnic and cultural hybridity. As the theatre director Shadwell observes, “the 
immigrant is the Everyman of the twentieth century” (141). In this context, Hitchcock 
points out that the migrant, in Kureishi’s works, is often a “metaphor of identity” through 
questioning an English identity and “decolonizing” it.13 The novel is set in London and 
the suburbs during the 1970s after a period of prolonged immigration, and Haroon and 
other Asians appear to represent the immigrants. Although Karim is born and bred in 
Britain, he thinks of himself as a “new breed” or a hybrid, “having emerged from two old 
histories” (3). Moreover, as Bart Moore-Gilbert asserts, popular culture and global 
commerce in this novel produce a “template for the progressive processes of 
                                                          
10 Homi Bhabha, xvi. According to Bhabha, the conception of “a vernacular cosmopolitanism” is 
derived from Julia Kristeva’s assertion of a “wounded cosmopolitanism” (xvi). He insists that his 
term is better to describe “global progress from the minoritarian perspective”. From the 
perspective of Bhabha, diversity in cosmopolitanism has reproduced “dual, unequal economies as 
effects of globalization that render poorer societies more vulnerable to the culture of 
conditionality” (xvi). For this reason, he asserts that “a right to difference-in-equality” can be 
founded on a “vernacular cosmopolitan” which can be articulated “from perspective of both 
national minorities and global migrants” in cosmopolitan spaces. Bhabha also insists that “the 
vernacular cosmopolitan takes the view that the commitment to a ‘right to difference in equality’ 
as a process of constituting emergent groups and affiliations has less to do with the affirmation or 
authentication of origins and ‘identities’, and more to do with political practice and ethical choices 
(xvii).” In this context, the conception of a vernacular cosmopolitanism can be accounted for 
“difference within” or “in-betweenness”.  
11 Homi Bhabha, xvii.  
12 Susie Thomas, Hanif Kureishi (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 63.  
13 Peter Hitchcock, 761.  
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hybridisation and cross-fertilisation in which Kureishi is most interested”. 14  These 
popular and global influences have left their hybridizing marks everywhere within the 
suburban environment in which Karim lives.15 In this context, hybridity, whether it refers 
to a migrant or someone with black and white parentage, dismantles the foundation of a 
fixed self. In addition, the conception of hybridity undermines the “white mythology” of a 
“white Englishness” and then makes possible a coloured Englishness, namely, a “brown” 
or “black” skinned Englishman who has non-western roots. Thus, this is pre-eminently 
why Kureishi can be located among postcolonial writers even though he claims the 
postcolonial label has always bothered him because it is too narrow a term.16  
However, from the perspective of Deleuze, we can consider an important 
limitation in the concept of hybridity. Firstly, the conception of hybridity can run the 
danger of reproducing hybridity as difference based on the binary opposition between 
white and black. Secondly, Bhabha’s conception of hybridity relies on a space in-between 
the white and the black, which is neither the white nor the black. This conception does 
not provide the ways of affirming difference, but rather depends on a difference between 
black and white based on aporia. By comparison, Deleuze’s philosophical project is 
dedicated to both showing how “difference” has been negatively imagined, conceived and 
disparaged throughout the history of philosophy and culture and at the same time how to 
get away from these negative conceptions of difference to appreciate “difference itself” in 
terms of what Deleuze calls “dramatization”. Consequently, this chapter aims to employ 
Deleuze’s conceptions of “difference itself” and “dramatization” in order to challenge the 
                                                          
14 Bart Moore-Gilbert, Hanif Kureishi (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
2001), 8.  
15  Interestingly, in his interviews, Kureishi insists that we have always already experienced 
hybridity, that is not a recent phenomenon. For example, according to Kureishi, when we look at a 
child with its mother and father, he is composed of at least two genders who have come from 
different places, so that hybridity is traditional. Hanif Kureishi and Baradley Buchanan, “Author 
Interview”, Hanif Kureishi (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 119. 
16 Nahem Yousaf, Hanif Kureishi’s The Buddha of Suburbia (New York and London: Continuum, 
2002), 16.  
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assumption of critics who rely upon the notions of “hybridity” for their interpretation in 
this novel.  
 
 
2. Representation of Difference 
The landscapes of London and of suburbia in this novel are all presented from the 
perspective of young Karim. The spheres in which black immigrants and white (and 
other) British coexist with each other are hybridized and thereby multiple racial, ethnic 
and cultural identities are mixed. In the case of Karim, as Ranasinha remarks, he 
“straddles two cultures” composed of Indian and British relatives: “On his father’s side, 
there is Haroon’s childhood friend Anwar, his wife Jeeta and their daughter Jamila. On 
his mother’s side there are his white suburban relations Jean and Ted”. 17 At the mid-point 
of the novel, Karim comes to connect more diverse ethnic and racial people by moving to 
London with Haroon, his white lover Eva and her son Charlie. However, Karim’s 
experiences of ethnic and cultural hybridity are fraught with cultural differences and 
social discrimination. Although Anthony Ilona asserts that London is described as a 
“location of cultural diversity without the stifling tensions seen in the suburbs”,18 almost 
nowhere in either depicted suburbia or London, is hybridity celebrated. In particular, the 
Asian immigrants in this novel confront discrimination and racial violence in everyday 
life. For example, the “lives of Anwar and Jeeta and Jamila were pervaded by fear of 
violence”: “It was full of neo-fascist groups, thugs … At night they roamed the streets, 
beating Asians and showing shit and burning rags through their letter-boxes. Frequently, 
the mean, white, hating faces had public meetings and the Union Jacks were paraded 
through the streets, protected by the police” (56). From Karim’s perspective, Asian 
                                                          
17 Ruvani Ranasinha, 61-2.  
18 Anthony Ilona, “Hanif Kureishi’s The Buddha of Suburbia: ‘A New Way of Being British’,” 
Contemporary British Fiction, eds. Richard J. Lane, Rod Mengham and Philip Tew (Oxford: 
Polity, 2003), 101.  
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immigrants and their children are perceived as racial and ethnic minorities who are 
located as “difference within”. 
Above of all, Karim thinks negatively of his own identity. Although he has 
British nationality, Karim does not perceive himself as an Englishman but, as we have 
seen, as merely resembling an Englishman: a “funny kind of Englishman” (3). From 
Bhabha’s perspective, Karim is “almost the same but not white”,19  which means in-
between the white and the black. However, his hybridity, comprised of two different 
histories, does not give him any positive thoughts or emotions but only makes him 
persistently “restless” and depressed (3). Thus, Karim tries to escape his identity as well 
as his discouraging circumstances. Ilona also points out that “this process of self-negation 
is evident in the young protagonist Karim”.20 More specifically, Karim’s depression and 
restlessness are symptoms of his self-negation, fuelled by his own perceived difference 
from the dominant “essential white” British identity. In fact, his self-negation of his 
identity is driven by the disdainful attitudes taken towards him and his Asian relatives by 
other British people – something that he then tacitly accepts and internalizes. Karim 
observes: “the thing was, we were supposed to be English, but to the English we were 
always wogs and nigs and Pakis and the rest of it” (53). In this context, Karim 
experiences that racial and cultural hybridity is recognized as a negativity of identity or 
“non-whiteness”.  
We need to consider why racial hybridity is perceived as difference or “non-
whiteness”. From Deleuze’s perspective, we can rethink the mechanism of racism in the 
two ways: the representation of difference and the concept of “faciality”. Firstly, from a 
Deleuzian theory of difference, the representation of a racial difference is associated with 
the illusion of metaphysical philosophy. Based on the hierarchy between identity and 
difference, metaphysical philosophy, as Deleuze asserts, makes identity primary and 
difference derivative and secondary terms. As James Williams explains, Deleuze in 
                                                          
19 Homi Bhabha, 128.  
20 Anthony Ilona, 96.  
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Difference and Repetition criticizes four key moments which have defined difference as 
the negation and negativity of identity: Plato’s “the original”, Aristotle’s “division”, 
Hegel’s “identities and their antitheses” and Leibniz’s “infinitely small differences”.21 
Through these philosophers’ thoughts, difference is defined and determined as a 
negativity in relation to identity. Among these philosophers, Plato famously subordinates 
difference to both identity and resemblance. Plato makes a particular distinction between 
the original and the image, the model and the copy. As Deleuze asserts, Plato’s notion of 
the model is opposed to an “originary superior identity”, while “the copy is judged in 
terms of a derived internal resemblance”.22 In this sense, there is a hierarchy: “difference 
comes only in third place, behind identity and resemblance”.23 As a result, “difference is 
only understood in terms of the comparative play of two similitudes: the exemplary 
similitude of an identical original and the imitative similitude of a more or less alike 
copy”.24 In terms of Deleuze’s account of difference, Karim’s racial hybridity is regarded 
as a resemblance of the white as well as the black, but, from the perspective of the white, 
his identity is also considered as difference or as non-white in terms of the contraries 
between the white and the black. As Williams argues, contraries trigger “judgements” in 
which we divide sets into “hierarchies”, and these sets are also subsumed under a 
representation for a further judgement to take place.25 Deleuze’s critique of representation 
is epitomized by the process in which Karim both represents “difference” and recognizes 
himself as “difference”.  
Secondly, in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of “faciality”, we can 
examine why Karim’s racial colour represents blackness as non-whiteness. Before we 
examine faciality, we need to consider racial colours depicted in this novel. The 
                                                          
21 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2003), 55.  
22 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 127 
23 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 127 
24 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 127.  
25 James Williams, 61.  
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characters’ identities and differences in this novel are represented by their skin-colours. 
According to Ranasinha, “neither Haroon nor Karim can escape being perceived as black. 
Kureishi shows how their identities are defined by colour, a privileged visible signifier of 
difference.”26 In this sense, Karim’s hybridity is reduced to difference or black as non-
whiteness. However, the differences between white and black are not absolute, but 
relative to the viewers. For example, Jamila describes Karim’s face as “creamy”, because, 
from her perspective, the colour of his face looks similar to that of a white person. His 
face is, indeed, neither black nor white. Compared to Karim, Jamila is a black person with 
Indian parentage. From the perspective of Jamila, Karim is posited as a difference within 
differences. On the other hand, despite the fact that his skin colour can be depicted as a 
variety of brown colours between black and white, Karim is always called “black” by 
white British people. For instance, Karim’s girlfriend Helen loves Karim, but Helen’s 
father does not allow Karim to meet her since Karim is a “Wog”. Hairy Back says, “We 
don’t want you blackies coming to the house” (40). In the racial discourse of Hairy Back, 
the “blackies” or “niggers” certainly stand for the negation or negativity of what is 
essential and white. The term “blackies” does not refer to the colour “black itself” or 
blackness but represents the negation of whiteness as constructed through the mediating 
discourse of white identity. Consequently, a whole variety of face colours, such as 
creamy and brown, are reduced to the two simple categories of black and white.    
Given the fact that face colours are represented as racial identities, we can see 
that they are regarded as bearing codes or signs of identity rather than as the parts of body. 
For this reason, racial faces are related to an abstractive conception or a racial meaning. 
According to Simone Bignall, Deleuze and Guattari “identify racism as one privileged 
example of facial politics”, 27 which “operates by degrees of deviance in relation to the 
                                                          
26 Ruvani Ranasinha, 74.  
27 Simone Bignall, “Dismantling the White-Man Face”, Deleuze and Race, eds. Arun Saldanha and 
Jason Michael Adams (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 79.  
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White-Man face”.28  Specifically, people are facialized by the facial system, one that 
produces and generalizes the White-Man face as a model of identity. Accordingly, 
Deleuze and Guattari try to dismantle these ways of discerning and determining faces by 
explaining the mechanism of racial face. As Bignall notes, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of faciality describes a “pure abstraction” 29  or a “conceptual topography 
which diagrams the intersection of the two semiotic systems operating as signification 
and subjectivation”.30 In other words, Deleuze and Guattari assert that face is composed 
and represented by a system of “the white wall of the signifier and the black hole of 
subjectivity”. 31  The white wall, as Bignall explains, digs the black hole of the 
subjectivation “in accordance with an established or normative mode of identity, in which 
the minoritarian self is imprisoned or buried.”32 In this sense, defacing or dismantling the 
face is involved with a politics of anti-racism. In fact, face has a complex composition 
involving facial expressions, their specific languages as well as affects. However, as 
Deleuze and Guattari note, face is generally understood and perceived as only its surface 
like a map: “traits, lines, wrinkles; long face, square face, triangular face; the face is a 
map”.33 But face is connected with its unknown areas: the indeterminate sensations or 
affects like passion, hesitation, anger and satisfaction that are expressed on the face. Thus, 
face cannot be defined and determined as a specific identity, but rather has a zone of 
composing of multiple traits and indeterminate affects. However, in related to racism, 
face is commonly reduced to a mark of discerning difference between black and white. 
This is a process of “facialization”. In this way, the Asians and the British in this novel 
                                                          
28 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minnesota and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 178.  
29 Deleuze and Guattari, 168.  
30 Simone Bignall, 77.  
31 Deleuze and Guattari, 168. “The face constructs the wall that the signifier needs in order to 
bounce off of; it constitutes the wall of the signifier, the frame or screen. The face digs the hole 
that subjectification needs in order to break through; it constitutes the black hole of subjectivity as 
consciousness or passion.” 
32 Simone Bignall, 83.  
33 Deleueze and Guattari, 170.  
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are characterized as black and white by establishing white face as a model, which is 
constructed from racial discourse. As a result, from the perspective of racism, Asian faces 
do not have black colour but only blackness or the property of being non-white. 
Consequently, facialization is in fact the racial discourse which is inextricably associated 
with the representation of difference.  
We can also question how we are able to get away from racial discourse. In 
relation to the representation of difference, we can rethink Karim’s self-recognition of 
difference: why does he identify himself with his father rather than his mother or his dual 
parentage? Karim wants to escape from his father’s Indian heritage as well as his 
mother’s white Englishness. As we have seen with facialization, Karim’s identification 
with his father is actually determined by the discourse of racism, which assigns the 
original face to the white man. Moreover, Karim also tries to escape from his English 
mother Margaret, because his mother reminds him of the “real world” which lets him 
down. Fraught with racial discrimination and violence, the real world forces him to 
identify with his father. However, it is more important that Margaret does not provide a 
way of eluding the facial discourse. For example, Margaret talks to Haroon about Eva: 
“She ignores me. Can’t you see that? She treats me like dog’s muck, Haroon. I’m not 
Indian enough for her. I’m only English”. “I know you’re only English, but you could 
wear a sari” (5). In this dialogue, Karim realizes that Margaret’s recognition of identity is 
not transformative, while Haroon understands identity as a performance like wearing 
clothes.  
We also find in Karim’s choice of identity a familiar theme from Plato’s 
dialectical account of difference, which was concerned with the rejection of difference 
and the identification of eternal, perfect and incorrigible forms. As we have seen, for 
Plato, the original form of something should be distinguished from its copy, the model 
from the simulacrum. Moreover, as Deleuze observes, Plato is profoundly engaged in 
selecting “lineages” to distinguish pretenders and to determine the pure from the impure. 
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According to Deleuze, this Platonic procedure is made for “the testing of gold”.34 How 
does one distinguish the original from the imitation? What is its source or grounding? As 
Deleuze argues: “Platonism is the philosophical Odyssey”. 35  According to Deleuze, 
Odysseus, after returning from his voyages, had to prove to others that he was who he 
claimed to be, and to fight against the many suitors of his wife who rose up to say “I am 
the inspired one, the love”. As for the Deleuze’s account of Odysseus, Michel Foucault 
adds: with the appearance of Odysseus, the true and original husband, the false suitors are 
defeated.36 From this mythic narrative, we can see both the hierarchy of the original and 
the resemblances, and the moral value of distinguishing the original and the pretenders in 
the world. However, by overturning Platonism, as Patton explains, Deleuze asserts that 
the world is actually a play of differences or simulacra in which there is no the original 
identities or foundations: “to assert the primacy of simulacra is to affirm a world in which 
difference rather than sameness is the primary relation”.37  
 Karim has a hybrid or a different origin from either his Indian father or his 
English mother. His different origin displays a play of differences by dismantling the 
binary opposition between white and black. However, from the gaze of a white British 
person, he still looks “exotic”. For instance, Eva Kay, who influenced Karim to move to 
London and to act in the theatre, often says, “Karim Amir, you are so exotic, so original! 
It’s such a contribution! It’s so you!” (9). What she says seems to be a gesture of 
recognizing the “other” as a difference itself because she chooses to use the term “exotic” 
rather than “black”. However, her statement really means that your face looks different 
from mine, because I have the appearance of a white British person. In this context, we 
should consider the transformation that Haroon undergoes during his relationship with 
                                                          
34  Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990), 254.  
35 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 254.  
36  Michel Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum”, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. 
Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 167.  
37 Paul Patton, 34.  
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Eva. Karim comments on “the queer sound I heard coming from his room as I was going 
up to bed”: “he was speaking slowly, in a deeper voice than usual, as if he were 
addressing a crowd. He was hissing his s’s and exaggerating his Indian accent. He’d spent 
years trying to be more of an Englishman, to be less risibly conspicuous, and now he was 
putting it back in spadeloads.” (21) Haroon invents and emphasizes his ‘Indianness’ for 
English people, but his model of Indianness is not derived from the Indian heritage. More 
specifically, Haroon is a pretender or a simulacrum of Indianness, because he is a Muslim 
who pretends to be a Buddhist. However, by following his father Haroon as a model, 
Karim starts to understand his identity as transformative and inventive. As Mark Stein 
points out, “it is his father, Haroon Amir, who gives the novel its title when he “embarks 
upon a radical trajectory of growth, and starts to minister as the Buddha of Suburbia, 
dispensing Eastern wisdom to London suburbanites”.38 Haroon seems to be presented as a 
transformative character who escapes the negativity of blackness. In this sense, Haroon 
seems to unfold a theatre of differences or simulacra. Nevertheless, Haroon’s 
performance of Indianness can be understood as neither a transformative identity nor an 
affirmation of differences. Haroon imitates a model of Indianness in order to sell 
Indianness to English people. His performance of Indianness is eventually to accentuate 
difference between black and white or Indianness and Englishness.  
However, there is also a negative or problematic aspect to real performance. 
Shadwell as a director of the theatre asks Karim to play Kipling’s “Mowgli” which would 
be his first theatrical role. Mowgli, as depicted by Kipling in the Jungle Book, serves as a 
model of Indianness. However, whilst this ‘Indianness’ is invented by Kipling’s fiction, it 
is nonetheless indefinitely repeated and represented as an authentic representation of 
Indianness in other forms of art. The fictive model functions like a myth which can be 
repeatedly represented as being culturally authentic. As Ranasinha notes, Shadwell 
“coerces Karim to appear more ‘Indian’, to put on an ‘authentic’ Indian accent and wear 
                                                          
38 Mark Stein, Black British Literature: Novels of Transformation (Columbus: The Ohio State 
University Press, 2004), 117. 
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‘shit-brown’ make-up over his ‘creamy’ skin”.39 Accordingly, Karim’s performance of 
Indianness is associated with the representation of difference as non-whiteness by 
emphasizing an exotic culture or otherness. For this reason, Shadwell claims: “Everyone 
looks at you, I’m sure, and think: an Indian boy, how exotic, how interesting, what stories 
of aunties and elephants we’ll here now from him” (141). Shadwell also says, “Karim, 
you have been cast for authenticity and not for experience” (147). Thus, Karim’s 
performance at the theatre repeats and at the same time accentuates difference as non-
whiteness. This is a limitation of performance to subvert the representation of identity and 
difference. However, Karim’s performance of Indianness does not successfully repeat a 
model of Indianness as non-whiteness, because his performance becomes a parody. As 
Berthold Schoene asserts, “Karim’s central performance some kind of farcical ethnic drag 
act. The credibility of the stereotype collapse due to Shadwell’s overemphasis on 
accuracy, and with it evaporates the very idea of originary ethnic authenticity.” 40 
Consequently, we can see how characters in this novel competitively imitate the ideal 
forms produced by the society’s white mythology. However, there are only imitators, 
pretenders, or differences, whether they are white British or Black Indian. This point is 
distinguished from Bhabha’s assertions about hybridity and in-betweenness, as the 
conception of hybridity still depends on the hierarchy between the colonizer and the 
colonized or the white and the black. Instead, Deleuze asserts that we must understand 
ourselves as a difference between differences: “every object, every thing, must see its 
own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a difference between 
differences. Difference must be shown differing”. 41  Ultimately, that is why Deleuze 
claims that the modern world is one of “simulacra”.42     
 
                                                          
39 Ruvani Ranasinha, 70.  
40 Berthold Schoene, “‘Herald of Hybridity’: The Emancipation of Difference in Hanif Kureishi’s 
The Buddha of Suburbia, International Journal of Cultural Studies, 1:1 (1998), 212.  
41 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 56.  
42 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xvii.  
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3. Dramatization of Difference 
 
    Deleuze discusses the method of “dramatization” as a means by which one can 
disillusion oneself about the importance of identity and experience “difference itself.” As 
Melissa McMahon explains, Deleuze’s notion of dramatization is presented as “an 
alternative to the system of representation through the concept”.43 How does one thereby 
elude the representation of identity and difference? We can examine how Karim and other 
characters experience their identity without depending on the concepts of identity and 
difference, and are then able to face “difference itself” by employing Deleuze’s method 
of “dramatization”. 
Deleuze’s notion of dramatization is engaged with the methods of our thinking of 
problems such as identity and difference. In the dramatization, rather than the object itself, 
a thinker or an actor tries to think about the object alongside the condition and expression 
which constitutes the object. In this way, as Deleuze asserts, a thinker is not concerned 
with the question of “what” but rather the questions of “who”, “how” “when” and 
“where”.44 Deleuze’s conception of dramatization is also understood as what he calls 
“doing philosophy”. Deleuze suggests that “there is a great difference between writing 
history of philosophy and writing philosophy”. 45  In Deleuze’s argument, “to do 
philosophy” means to “write philosophy” which is associated what Hughes calls “a story”. 
According to Hughes, “everything is a story for Deleuze. There is a story of the eternal 
return, a story of the cogito…”.46 In this context, Deleuze explains his work Difference 
and Repetition as an act of reading and writing both a “detective novel” and a “science 
fiction”. As Deleuze argues, reading or writing a detective novel means first of all to 
                                                          
43  Melissa McMahon, “Difference, Repetition”, Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts, ed. Charles J. 
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44 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 96-6.  
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46 Joe Hughes, 16.  
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suggest the concepts of the problem and to connect them to specific situations. As a result, 
we can observe that “the concepts themselves change along with the problems.”47 On the 
other hand, a science fiction novel guides us to the “frontier of our knowledge, at the 
border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the 
other”.48  Consequently, Deleuze argues that a science fiction leads us to a space of 
transgression. We can try to dramatize individual problems in various circumstances to 
resolve our problems at present but is to open towards the future. Accordingly, as 
Deleuze argues, to do philosophy requires that one conjoin these aspects of the detective 
novel and the science fiction.  
We can examine Karim’s problems of identity through this notion of 
dramatization. Karim’s quest for his identity is motivated by observing other identities for 
“what they are” and dramatizing them in specific circumstances. This dramatization is 
thus compared to what Deleuze calls “double becoming” in writing: “the author takes a 
step towards his characters, but the characters take a step towards the author”.49 For 
instance, Karim’s problems concerning his “Indianness” as a marker of “difference” 
drives him to dramatize other characters such as Mowgli, Anwar and Changez, which 
leads him to becoming-others. As we have seen, Karim tries to dramatize Haroon even 
though he starts perceiving himself and his father as the negation of an ideal white 
identity. Yet, he also finds the dynamic of metamorphosis of identity in his father—as he 
sees, for instance, how his father emphasizes his Indianness and dramatizes himself as a 
Buddha, rather than accept his heritage as a Muslim. Although there are obvious 
problems with Haroon’s performance, his dramatization, in turn, shows Karim a means to 
undertake his own transformation. Secondly, Karim’s search for his identity causes him 
to leave his mother’s home and move to London, just as his father leaves and lives with 
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Eva and Charlie. From Karim’s perspective, his mother seems to live in a fixed world in 
which she is always attached to cooking in the kitchen or watching a TV programme in 
the living room. For Karim, his mother seems to be a symbol of a monotonous suburban 
life. By contrast, Eva excites and frightens Karim. As Karim says, “somehow she had 
disturbed our whole household from the moment she entered it” (11). Thirdly, with the 
help of Eva, Karim can become an actor and dramatize his Indianness, although he is 
forced to represent the stereotype of Indianness. He can simultaneously have the chances 
to watch other people’s dramatization in the theatre. In fact, Karim says, “Eva was 
unfolding the world for me” (87). He is given the chances to play “Mowgly” by the 
director Shadwell and then also dramatize Jamila’s Indian husband Changez at Pike’s 
alternative theatre. Karim’s problems repeatedly make him dramatize his and others’ 
identities. This leads him to experience multiple differences and becoming-others. 
However, we can rethink how Karim’s dramatization affects him. Deleuze shows 
how dramatization brings us into the movements of making difference without a concept.  
 
It is a question of producing within the work a movement capable of 
affecting the mind outside of all representation; it is a “question of making 
movement itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for 
mediate representations; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, 
gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind”.50 
 
It is a matter of inventing vibrations, rotations and other things that directly affect our 
mind rather than being mediated through concepts. Deleuze explains that this is linked to 
Nietzsche’s conception of theatre. Nietzsche’s theatre is also compared to the reader’s 
reading, or re-enacting, of a theatre’s script and stage directions. That is to say, the 
reader’s reading is forced to change the script through repetition. As we have seen, this 
entails the multiple specific questions such as “who”, “how”, “how much”, “where”, 
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“when” and “which case” rather than questions about an essence such as “what is this?”51 
In this way, Karim’s script, whether it is dramatized by himself or written by directors 
such as Shadwell, transforms his “Indianness” (the dominant concept of his identity) 
through the process of repetition – making this identity vary with the different 
circumstances in which it is instantiated. This is the way in which dramatization avoids 
representation as the identical. Moreover, it is important to note that Karim’s 
dramatization is involved with his affective sensation, since the scripts, as Williams 
explains, “force the reader to put new voices and feelings and new contexts and thought 
into them”.52    
 Despite the fact that Karim’s theatrical roles are reproduced and consumed as a 
way of representing stereotypes of Indianness, he nonetheless finds that this act of 
dramatizing Indian people transforms his identity into “difference itself.” After Karim 
plays Mowgly at Shadwell’s theatre, he later joins Pike’s alternative theatre. In contrast to 
his previous experiences with Shadwell, at Pike’s theatre, Karim is no longer forced to 
reproduce the concept of Indianness, since he is required to create his own character. 
Karim starts by deliberately creating a character based on Eva’s son Charlie, but he is 
quickly admonished by Pyke for the supposed inauthenticity involved in rejecting his 
Indianness: “‘we need someone from your own background’, he said. ‘Someone black’” 
(170). Although Karim is still forced to present blackness by Pike, he has chances to 
closely observe the Indian people around him, especially uncle Anwar and Changez. The 
character of Anwar, though, is criticized by a fellow actress, Tracey, who complains that 
he is a mere stereotype of what white people think Asians are like. In this sense, it could 
be argued that Karim’s dramatizations seem to represent the stereotypical models of black 
Asian identity. However, these dramatizations continuously trigger Karim to release 
himself from the negativity of his identity and to forge himself anew. Thus, when Karim 
stays in New York, with Charlie, he realizes that he perceives himself as the negation of 
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white identity: “I realized I didn’t love Charlie any more, I didn’t care either for or about 
him. He didn’t interest me at all. I’d moved beyond him, discovering myself through what 
I rejected. He seemed merely foolish to me” (255). Yet, “discovering myself” means 
neither his Indianness nor his hybridity as a concept of identity but rather the process of 
searching for himself or the becoming-others. In this sense, he understands himself as “a 
swarm of differences” instead of an individual identity on the grounds that he endlessly 
becomes others in the dramatization.  
 Karim’s dramatization of Indianness is significantly contrasted with the 
repetitions of Charlie and Anwar. Charlie, for instance, becomes successful as a punk pop 
singer and makes a large amount of money performing Englishness or a conception of 
Englishness for audiences in New York. Charlie invents a working-class cockney accent. 
That is, he fetishizes a version of Englishness as a means to get success and money. The 
conversation Charlie has with his girlfriend reveals his desire for success: “When I look 
in to the future I see three things. Success. Success—” “And Success,” the girl added, 
wearily” (37). Karim sees that Charlie reaches his dream in New York but also that he is 
only “selling Englishness, and getting a lot of money for it” (247). He produces a version 
of Englishness for entirely commercial reason rather than as part of a process of self 
discovery or becoming-others. The representation of Uncle Anwar’s identity is similar to 
that of Charlie. From Karim’s perspective, Anwar “did not live like a Muslim before, but 
he becomes a hunger striker in order to represent an Asian-style of “absolutely patriarchal 
authority” (64). Anwar’s performance of this Muslim role does not bring about a 
substantial change of identity. He just repeats a model or a concept of Muslim. Charlie 
and Anwar only represent the identical in terms of the illusion of identity. From the 
perspective of Deleuze, Charlie and Anwar repeat the conception of the identical so that 
they “create a false theatre, a false drama, a false movement”.53  
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 However, Karim neither returns to an original model of “Indianness,” nor does 
he commodify his ethnic traits as a form of “exotic” diversity. In this sense, Karim’s 
dramatization reveals to him that he is a mutable individual rather than a stereotyped 
variety of possible Indian people. This is what Deleuze and Nietzsche think of as 
“repetition”. According to Deleuze, repetition is transgressive in every respect because 
“to repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular 
which has no equal or equivalent”.54 For example, a festival is repeated, but one cannot 
repeat the same festival every year. As Deleuze argues, this is the “apparent paradox of 
festivals: they repeat an ‘unrepeatable’”.55 Karim repeats his “unrepeatable” identity in 
dramatizing diverse Asian people as well as British people. His “unrepeatable” identity is 
a Deleuzian manifestation of “difference itself”. Moreover, the process of individuation is 
also what Deleuze calls “difference itself.” Deleuze describes an unrepeatable individual 
as “diffentiation”, and the process of individuation as “differnciation” and emphasizes 
that the two aspects are always correlated. 56  For Deleuze, given that the method of 
dramatization is at work, we cannot any longer truly think of our individuality as 
identifiable, but must instead view it as an on-going process of individuation. In this 
sense, we should generate new perspectives towards our problems, and cease viewing 
ourselves as the negativity of identity, as not measuring up to a certain standard. In doing 
so, we will also liberate ourselves from the obsessive fixation with identity and no longer 
conform to an arbitrary construction of the identical. Reaching this point will, according 
to Deleuze, allow us to affirm difference itself.  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
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 The Buddha of Suburbia reveals both the illusion and the disillusionment of 
identity in a multicultural society. White British people recognize their identity as the 
original and the average but perceive other ethnic groups, such as Asians, as the negation 
of British identity. Asian people internalize this perspective, and also come to think of 
themselves, through the mediation of the dominant white British discourse, as the 
negativity of identity. This discourse, however, is only illusory since it is grounded in the 
false metaphysics of the western philosophical tradition, which has defined difference as 
the negativity of identity and affixed this negativity to minority groups such as Asian 
immigrants. This metaphysics has also been circulated in a mythological form which 
makes Karim negate himself and encourages white British people to fetishize their 
identity as the primary standard. The Buddha shows that this governing discourse is 
illusory, since both black Asians and white British continuously re-invent or change their 
ethnic identities as if they were dramatizing different roles at the theatre. For this reason, 
many critics such as Berthold Schoene and Ruvani Ranasinha have analyzed how the 
novel subverts the concept of identity through its presentation of the power of 
performativity and the subversive influence of hybridity. This has led this novel to 
become hotly debated within post-colonial criticism.  
However, the debates surrounding The Buddha do not provide an exploration of 
its Deleuzain affirmation of “difference itself.” Deleuze explores the method of 
dramatization in order to experience “difference itself” without the concept of 
representation or identity. Dramatization brings eternal repetition (a central concept for 
Deleuze and Nietzsche) because it should repeatedly and differently react to the text with 
various characters in newly diverse circumstances. Through the processes of 
dramatization, an individual can grasp the movement in which his identity changes. As a 
result, he can understand himself as an “unrepeatable” or “identifiable” individual in the 
very act of creating his identity. Karim as the negation of identity is compelled to 
dramatize his identity, which, as an actor, he has more chances to do. These 
dramatizations, of course, lead him to realize that he has an unstable and changeable 
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identity as the critics of performance and hybridity (such as Ranaisinha and Bhabha) note. 
Yet, Ranasinha’s account of performance and Bhabha’s discussion of hybritity do not 
provide Karim with the affirmation of an “unrepeatable” singularity. A Deleuzian 
conception of difference and dramatization leads Karim to an affirmation in a creative 
process of becoming-different or divergence from the majority.  
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Chapter 2 
An Ethics of Betrayal in The Black Album 
 
1. Introduction  
Betrayal is generally regarded as immoral in any relationships between people 
and communities. However, we might ask whether betrayal is always immoral and evil. 
Challenging traditional assumptions on this matter, Deleuze argues that betrayal has an 
inevitable, even ethical, function in the relationship between an individual and a 
community. From Deleuze’s perspective, betrayal draws a line of flight, which is its 
positive function. For this reason, Deleuze regards a traitor as an essential character in 
reality as well as fiction, because a traitor has the potential to shake free from the given 
rules and morality in a community: a traitor is able to have thereby betrayed “the world of 
dominant significations and the established order”. 1  However, Deleuze and Guattari 
assert that a community also needs to betray its members in order to invent a new 
relationship with them so that any alliance within a community has to be cracked to 
produce the community to come. For this reason, Irving Goh asserts that there is “an anti-
community force” in Deleuze and Guattari’s works which “will have already smashed 
from within that amicable element that would structure community”.2 Thus, from the 
perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, betrayal can have a positive and ethical function in 
the relationship between an individual and a community. In this context, betrayal can be 
eventually linked to an ethical form of life in a community.   
Kureishi’s The Black Album raises ethical and political questions about the 
relationship between an individual and a community by describing a particular racial and 
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ethnic minority in London. As Bradley Buchanan points out, this novel has “generally 
been less well-received” than his first novel, The Buddha of Suburbia, and has perhaps 
caused critics to be “less eager to establish the provenance of this novel”.3 However, this 
novel, as Kureishi himself emphasizes, is intended to explore provocatively problems of 
“race and religion” “with their history of exploitation, humiliation and political 
helplessness”.4 Kureishi portrays a traitor who turns away from his “race and religion” 
while also providing a political and theological contestation between fundamentalist 
Islam and western liberalism. In the 1980s, the protagonist Shahid Hasan, a Pakistani 
student at a college in North London, becomes involved with a militant fundamentalist 
Muslim community after meeting its leader Riaz Al-Hussain. However, after coming into 
contact with his liberal tutor Deedee Osgood, Shahid gradually becomes sceptical of this 
fundamentalist community and his circle of Asian Muslim friends who support it. Shahid 
wavers between Riaz and Deedee, but ends up choosing Deedee when confronted with 
the “Salman Rushdie affair”: the burning of The Satanic Verses and the “fatwa” issued 
against its author. Shahid abandons his ethnic and religious community and is then 
brutally attacked by his Muslim friends. After this experience, Shahid decides to travel 
with Deedee who openly protests against the burning of the book. The collision between 
the different beliefs of the Asian Muslim community and the liberal western world 
exactly reflect the Rushdie affair: Rushdie was labelled as a traitor by a majority of 
Muslims but was at the same time celebrated as a defender of freedom of expression by 
most of the West.  
Shahid’s infidelity to the Asian Muslim community seems to address the Rushdie 
scandal and its polarized reactions it produced. On the one hand, there are critics such as 
Ruvani Ranasinha who suggest that Shahid’s betrayal embodies and reinforces the 
stereotype of the Muslim fundamentalist community that the West has already confirmed 
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by defending liberalism. In fact, The Black Album may even contribute to the prejudiced 
image of the Muslim community that the West perpetuates. Thus, Ranasinha complains 
that this novel “uncritically reflects and embodies rather than questions its predominant 
fears, prejudices and perceptions of devout British Muslims as ‘fundamentalists’, 
constructed as particularly threatening in the West”. 5 She further argues that Kureishi 
goes too far in “objectifying this already objectified group, whilst reinscribing dominant 
liberalism as the norm”.6 On the other hand, most critics such as Kenneth Kaleta and 
Maria Degabriele explore Shahid’s betrayal of his own ethnic and religious group by 
endorsing postmodern and postcolonial values such as flexible identity, sexuality, 
hybridity and popular culture. By praising the fluidity of the self in this novel, Kaleta, for 
example, suggests that Kureishi reveals “his strong political liberalism”. 7  Degabriele 
similarly notes that this novel offers a transformative and “ambivalent sexual and political 
identity” influenced by pop culture. 8  However, rather than repeating the polarized 
positions of Asian Muslims and Western liberalism, Shahid’s betrayal can also be 
discussed by focusing on the ethical and political relationship between people and 
community. A traitor, whether he belongs to a minority or a majority group, is judged and 
punished in terms of the morality given by the community. Thus, a traitor who decides to 
abandon his own community puts himself into a dangerous situation. In this context, it is 
an important ethical question to ask why Shahid decides to become a traitor in relation to 
his own religious and ethnic community.   
Interestingly, the theme of the traitor also appears in Kureishi’s other works. He 
persistently seems to seek to unfold the “literature of betrayal,” while vigorously 
exploring a range of issues such as identity, race, class, gender, sexuality and art. From 
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his earlier works onwards, characters tend to show diverse forms of infidelity to their own 
family, ethnic group and religion. In his earlier novels from The Buddha of Suburbia to 
The Black Album, Kureishi examines political and cultural problems in myriad ways. In 
The Buddha of Suburbia, the protagonist’s father Haroon as a Pakistani Muslim leaves his 
wife Margaret for his lover and also pretends to be an Indian Buddhist. In Kureishi’s 
middle-period works, from Love in a Blue Time (1997) and Intimacy (1998) to Midnight 
All Day (1999), he clearly shifts into excavating personal relations and individual 
psychology in domestic settings, and shows characters who are less influenced by their 
colour, class and nation. In his characters’ private and psychological relations, betrayals 
happen within the family. Intimacy, for example, has drawn hostile responses because the 
main character Jay reveals a desire to leave his wife Susan without displaying any 
scruples.9 This infidelity breaks both his marital commitment as well as his innocent 
family. After this period of probing the private life, Kureishi seems to move into more 
diverse and imaginative territory with a more light-hearted and minimal style. Gabriel’s 
Gift (2001) is written in “a somewhat inconsistent version of magical realism”, while The 
Body (2002) is described as being based on “a science fiction-like premise”.10 During this 
period, Kureishi’s screenplay, The Mother (2003) also shows scandalous betrayal: the 
protagonist May has a love affair with her daughter’s lover. May’s betrayal also shatters 
the image of a mother who has been described as the cement of the family. However, the 
betrayals depicted in Kureishi’s works are usually neither reproached nor punished, but 
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rather linked to ways of creating multiple modes of life. However, the traitor in The Black 
Album is immediately punished for betraying his racial and religious community.  
Kureishi’s description of the traitor in Black Album can be symbolically 
understood as addressing his betrayal of his own minority group. In his essays and 
interviews, Kureishi often confessed how his minority experience has, since his childhood, 
caused him to deny and curse the Pakistani part of his self. Thus, he recalls how, in his 
youth, he sympathized with a story in a newspaper about a black boy who, “when he 
noticed that burnt skin turned white, jumped into a bath of boiling water”.11 Subsequently, 
however, when Kureishi was a little older, he was gradually absorbed in the radical 
thoughts about blackness such as Richard Wright, Muhammad Ali, Malcom X, and Franz 
Fanon. In this way, Kureishi takes the perspective of an ethnic and religious minority, 
sometimes identifying with an Asian identity, sometimes with a Black one. However, it 
seems provocative that in The Black Album Kureishi illustrates a traitor who betrays his 
own minority ethnic group and defends white liberalism. In creating such a narrative, 
Kureishi might well be thought to have abandoned his former convictions as a radical 
black writer. However, this is not, from the perspective of hybridity, an act of betrayal, as 
his ethnic group is no longer singular but multi-form and manifold. On the other hand, 
Kureishi may be condemned for re-establishing white liberal ideology and failing to 
represent positive images of British Asians.12  
Kureishi’s portrait of a traitor in The Black Album encounters thorny problems 
concerned with the relationship between an individual and a community (especially 
                                                          
11 Hanif Kureishi, “The Rainbow Sign,” The Word and the Bomb, 15. 
12 Kureishi, as Susie Thomas observes, may be involved with what Kobena Mercer calls “the 
burden of representation.” According to Mercer, the “artistic discourse of marginalized subjects is 
circumscribed by the assumption that such artists speak as “representatives” of the communities 
from which they come.” Mercer argues that this role is a “burden of creating what is logically 
impossible for any one individual to bear”, which is nevertheless integral to the “stereotypes” 
produced by the majority culture that “every minority subject is, essentially, the same.” Kobena 
Mercer, Welcome to the Jungle: New Positions in Black Cultural Studies (London: Routledge, 
1994), 214. See Susie Thomas, ed. Hanif Kureishi: A Reader’s Guide to Essential Criticism (New 
York: Plagrave Macmillan, 2005), 3. 
 59 
religious and ethnic groups). In fact, religion and ethnicity have increasingly become 
divisive issues. As Kureishi points out, “in the post-war period, race—and now religion—
have become subjects around which we discuss what is most important to us as 
individuals and a society, and what scares us about others.”13 As a minority, Pakistani 
Muslim communities, in particular, are regarded as a racially and socially harassed group. 
In these circumstances, the more the communities are alienated and discriminated against, 
the more their individual members are likely to identify with the community. Shahid, 
nevertheless, abandons his own people and chooses Deedee who condemns the radical 
Muslims as a dangerous group. In this context, rather than repeating the polarized 
approaches represented by Islamic morality and White liberalism, this chapter will 
explore how Shahid’s betrayal invents an ethical relationship with the community in 
terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of betrayal. In order to discuss this matter, 
this chapter will investigate the difference between a traitor and a trickster and then the 
double turning away (or double becoming) from the lens of Deleuze and Guattari, finally 
to examine how Shahid creates an affective form of life, which is different from the 
approaches taken by the split of Islam morality and Western liberalism.  
 
 
 
2. Double Turning Away  
 
“Shahid” (or Shaheed) means “martyr” in Arabic, and, in the Qur’an, signifies 
one who sacrifices his or her life for Allah’s cause. In a world where many Muslims have 
killed themselves to attack the enemy in the name of Allah, Muslim “suicide bombers” 
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are frequently treated as if they are Shahid.14 However, the character Shahid in The Black 
Album assumes a role diametrically opposite to that of a martyr. As a college student, 
Shahid becomes a traitor who abandons his Muslim community and stays with Deedee 
who supports “postmodern thought.” In this sense, Shahid is pictured as a traitor for 
turning away from his own religion and race, rather than as a martyr sacrificing himself 
for his creed. Initially, his betrayal fundamentally seems associated with his 
irresponsibility. For example, he made his previous girlfriend get a late abortion and then 
left her. After his Pakistani father’s death, he escapes from his family and enters the 
college. He shirks and evades his duties. From the view of Muslims, Kureishi’s 
description of Shahid as a traitor might even be regarded as a form of blasphemy because 
it insults the sacred name “Shaheed” and turns a holy martyr into a self-interested 
apostate. However, from the lens of Deleuze and Guattari, we can consider how the 
traitor Shahid has an ethical function in relation to his own religious and ethnic 
community.  
Initially, Shahid is much more a victim of racism in Britain than a traitor to his 
own people. As a member of an ethnic minority, Shahid suffered a lack of identity and 
racial discrimination before he becomes a member of the Muslim community. Shahid’s 
lack of identity is symbolically reflected by his father’s death when his connections to the 
authority and vitality of his own cultural past and traditions are severed. His father’s 
death also leads to the breakdown of his family. Without his father, the “family had 
seemed to fly apart”.15 For this reason, Shahid leaves his family and searches for a place 
to settle on for his identity to develop. In other words, he desires a “new start with new 
people in a new place” where “he wouldn’t be excluded; there had to be ways in which he 
could belong” (24). After his involvement with the radical Muslim community led by 
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Riaz, he comes to have much more of Pakistani Muslim identity than before and to feel a 
strong bond with the community and its people. Their Asian faces are marks that Shahid 
easily finds to efface a sense of exclusion: “Riaz and Hat and Chad were the first people 
he’d met who were like him, he didn’t have to explain anything. Chad trusted him. Hat 
had called him brother. He was closer to this gang than he was to his own family” (67). It 
is clear that, for Shahid, his father and family are replaced by the Muslim community that 
Riaz leads. In this sense, as a member of a minority ethnic group, Shahid identifies 
himself with the ethnic community and this prevents him from losing his identity. Yet, he 
subsequently betrays this community and then comes to be deprived of the sense of 
identity the community offered.   
Through Shahid’s betrayal of the community, we can see how Shahid’s identity is 
transformative in relationship to the community. As Shahid becomes a traitor, his 
identification with the community is challenged and betrayed. Shahid’s transformative 
relations with the community can be understood in terms of the relations of signs in the 
semiotic systems. Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus assert that signs can have 
inventive relation to other signs only in terms of betrayal. Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
the “regime of signs”, which means “any specific formalization of expression,”16 in the 
semiotic systems. Ronald Bogue describes the “regime of signs”, in other words, as 
“regular patterns of power relations that organise sign production”.17  In this context, 
Deleuze and Guattari try to show that the relations of signs are productive and 
transformative rather than static. In general semiotics, a sign is composed of the signifier 
and the signified with the signifier regarded as being fixed to the signified—even though 
the link is arbitrary. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “it is impossible to 
attach any privilege to the form or regime of the signifier,”18 because “there is a simple 
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general formula for the signifying regime of the sign (or the signifying sign)”: “every sign 
refers to another sign, and only to another sign, ad infinitum”.19 Deleuze and Guattari’s 
account of the regime of signs foregrounds the mobile structure of signs or the dynamic 
relation of “expression”.  
There are, according to Deleuze and Guattari, four regimes of signs: the pre-
signifying regime, the signifying regime, the counter-signifying regime and the post-
signifying regime. Among them, the post-signifying regime is what Deleuze and Guattari 
call a universal betrayal. However, in terms of the regime of signs, every sign is basically 
mobile and transformative in connecting with other signs. Firstly, the pre-signifying 
regime is much closer to “natural codings operating without signs,” 20 as signs are not 
glued to a specific signified or content. In this sense, the regime fosters “a pluralism or 
polyvocality of forms of expression”. 21  For instance, as Deleuze and Guattari note, 
“cannibalism” in a pre-signifying regime is precisely this: “eating the name.”22 According 
to Deleuze and Guattari, “every time they eat a dead man, they can say one more”23. In 
other words, signs are not fixed to the content or the universializing abstraction of the 
signifier, their expressions can limitlessly be proliferated. Secondly, the despotic, 
signifying regime characteristically brings a sign’s significance and interpretation. A sign 
can be considered to be attached to a form of signification like an “index” or an “icon”, 
which is the despotic signifying regime. For instance, the face of Asians designates “non-
white” in a racist discourse. However, Deleuze and Guattari observe that it is impossible 
for a sign to be fixed to “one” signification or “one” interpretation because a sign can be 
signified by referring to another sign(s) in a “so-called signifying chain”. Thirdly, the 
counter-signifying regime is mobile and nomadic. It is associated with the “line of flight” 
as in fleeing from the established significance and interpretation. Finally, the post-
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signifying regime is linked to betrayal. In the post-signifying regime, a sign betrays to 
refer to another sign(s), which opens up a new relation between a sign and a sign.  Thus, 
Deleuze and Guattrari call this regime of signs a “universal deception”, which can invent 
a new relation between signs and signs or between an individual and a community.  
From the vantage point of Deleuze and Guattari, we can think about the 
transformative relationship between people and a community in diverse situations. The 
Muslim community in this novel can be intimately related to the nomadic, counter-
signifying regime of immigrants who cannot settle in their country of origin that they 
nonetheless identify with. It amounts to the diaspora regime of wavering between 
multiple places and languages. This itinerancy can also be related to what Deleuze calls 
“deterriorialization”.24 It means that people are leaving, fleeing, escaping and passing on 
the earth, tracing a “line of flight” from the places they inhabit. The immigrant 
community featured in the novel is continuously forced to shuttle between Pakistani and 
British identities. For instance, despite his sense of being a member of a minority group, 
Shahid is fascinated by western culture and its literature, art and pop music. His western 
taste is influenced by his parents and their uncle Asif who were able to acquire an affluent 
and stable life, and are moderate adherents to the principles of Islam. Shahid gets soaked 
in the liberal European heritage that satirical uncle Asif left: “Joad, Lask, and Popper and 
studies of Freud, along with fiction by Maupassant, Henry Miller, and the Russians” (28). 
Shahid’s brother Chili desires to live in America, because he grew up watching 
Hollywood movies such as Once Upon a Time in America and The Godfather (63). 
Although Shahid and his family frequently visit Karachi in Pakistan, they do not feel like 
they belong to a Muslim community in the UK. In this sense, the Muslim community and 
its members in the UK is linked to the nomadic regime which traces the line of flight 
between Pakistani and British identities.  
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Although Ranashinha complains that “all the Muslims in this novel are extreme 
‘fundamentalists’ and Kureishi’s polarity ignores the range of different forms of Islam 
that are not extreme or aggressive”,25 this novel clearly shows both moderate and radical 
Muslims that present the nomadic and despotic regimes. Moreover, this novel shows how 
the divisive Muslim identities are based on their social and political positions in the UK. 
Riaz and his radical Muslim community are represented as poor and unprivileged 
Muslims, while Shahid and his family are presented as wealthy and educated Muslims. 
Because of their unprivileged position within both Pakistan and British communities, 
these poor people strongly identify with the radical Muslim community in order to protect 
themselves against racism and discrimination. As an immigrant, Riaz has a strong bond 
with the Muslim community, although his accent is typically a “compound of both 
places,” which explains why he sounds like a “cross between J.B. Preistley and Zia Al 
Haq” (14). In spite of his position, Riaz is, however, not moving “between” two countries 
like a nomad because he always emphasizes his connection to “Lahore,” and his 
“original” place. He has indeed fixed all of the space “between” the regions he inhabits 
into the limited horizon of Pakistan and Islam. Chad, Riaz’s henchman, similarly insists 
that Asian people must not assimilate as that means “they lose their souls.” (91) Riaz’s 
desire for his “original” Lahore and Chad’s negation of assimilation are analogous to 
what Deleuze and Guattari call Jewish “nostalgia.” For example, Deleuze and Guattari 
assert that “the Hebrews and their God would always be nostalgic”: they ardently hope 
not just to “bring the wandering to a halt, but overcome the diaspora, which itself exists 
only as a function of an ideal ‘regathering’”.26 Similarly, Riaz and Chad seem nostalgic 
because they try to re-territorialise the regime of the Pakistani Muslim in Britain in order 
to resist the discrimination of the racists.  
However, the members of Riaz’s community must lose their unique, singular 
lives in order to identify with the community. Thus, Shahid’s identification with the 
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community becomes a process of sacrifice to it. This Pakistani Muslim group which Riaz 
leads can be described as a radical or fundamentalist Muslim community as it is brought 
back to the despotic, signifying regime of sign. However, the community with which its 
members identify is filled with its members who unfold their own different and multiple 
lives. Moreover, as we have seen with the regimes of signs, they cannot be purely 
members of just one community, but are always unconsciously engaged with numerous 
other communities in ways that escape the authority and edicts of Riaz. In this 
circumstance, we need to consider whether Shahid’s betrayal implies the possibility of 
connecting other communities and of having another identity. According to Deleuze, “it 
is difficult to be a traitor; it is to create. One has to lose one’s identity one’s face, in it. 
One has to disappear, to become unknown.”27 But Deleuze distinguishes a traitor from a 
“trickster” who “takes another face or identity”,28 for example, simply joining another, or 
an opposing, community. This would be a conventional notion of betrayal: one leaves to 
join the opponent’s camp. However, the Deleuzian concept of a traitor would enact a pure 
kind of betrayal and never explicitly joining any single community. In this context, 
Shahid’s betrayal to the community does not mean that he joins a white community or has 
a white identity. A traitor, as Deleuze and Guattari observe, is above all connected to a 
“line of flight”.29 More specifically, the line of flight may be “something demonical, or 
demonic”, operated by “deterritorialisations”: people are fleeing from established 
territories and codes or jumping across intervals of them. 30 A “demonic” traitor, Deleuze 
argues, is someone like Captain Ahab in Moby Dick. Ahab has traced a demonic line that 
destroys both him and his men because of his choosing Moby Dick, the white whale, 
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instead of obeying “the law of the group of fishermen” who think “all whale are fit to 
hunt”.31 Thus, there is always betrayal in a dazzling line of flight.  
As mentioned already, Shahid’s line of flight is dramatically exposed as a 
repetition of the Rushdie scandal. However, Shahid’s betrayal does not lead to his 
becoming a trickster. By publishing The Satanic Verses, Salman Rushdie was branded as 
a traitor by a majority of Muslims and received the “fatwa,” or death sentence. His novel 
also brought about a series of acts of revenge: Muslims bombed stores that were selling 
the novel, the Japanese translator was assassinated and several other translators were 
injured. The Black Album depicts the vengeful reactions towards Rushdie’s betrayal. Riaz 
and his Muslim friends regard the book as a moral “crime” and they burn it as an 
expression of their rage. By contrast, Deedee openly insists that their burning of the book 
violates the freedom of expression as an illegal act and calls the police. The news of 
Muslim bombing the stores is intermittently inserted into the scenes of Riaz and Deedee 
confronting each other. In facing Riaz and Chad’s burning of the book, Shahid suddenly 
feels a kind of shame and also realizes it is impossible to be neutral towards this event: 
“He looked away immediately, with a guilty expression, as if he weren’t enjoying it as 
much as he should. He wanted to appear neutral but knew that wasn’t possible. It wasn’t 
as if he felt nothing, like many of the people looking on. If anything, he felt ashamed” 
(236). As a result, he recognizes that he cannot join Riaz’s group and so chooses Deedee 
instead. In a symbolic gesture of this shift in allegiance, Shahid rewrites a religious poem 
composed by Riaz erotically and turns it into an erotic epic. Shahid repeats the profane 
writing of The Satanic Verses and through this act of betrayal turns away from his 
heritage and Riaz. He thereby puts himself into Rushdie’s perilous position. However, his 
betrayal does not simply shift his position into another morality or community—even 
though he stays with Deedee, a supporter of Western liberalism. In other words, he is not 
a trickster who substitutes identification with one community for identification with 
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another. He rather chooses to be a traitor who loses his identity and face together. From 
Deleuze’s perspective, he experiences becoming-something else. In this sense, his 
betrayal of the Muslim community, in the Deleuzian conception, is not an act of 
supporting Western liberalism, but an ethical act of opening to the immanence of life.  
The development of Shahid’s character provokes us to ask a further question 
about the positivity of betrayal in relation to a community: when an individual turns away 
from the community, how can the community become ethical? The regime of betrayal 
happens in the structure of mutual betrayals or double turning-away. That is, betrayal is 
always a “double turning” because betrayal of the community is always parallel with 
betrayal by the community. In other words, the community can open to its members’ 
multiple lives and becomes something else. For instance, in the Old Testament, which 
Deleuze calls “the first novel,”32 Cain committed the first murder by killing his brother 
Abel and thus may be considered a traitor who ironically traces a “positive” line of flight 
through this action. From the perspective of Deleuze and Guattrari, Cain revealed “a 
double turning away”: he “turns away from the God who turns away from him”.33 In 
other words, he committed a murder after God rejected his offering but accepted Abel’s. 
However, God delayed his punishment of Cain and instead ordered him to wander the 
earth forever. Deleuze and Guattari observe that Cain’s betrayal was paradoxically 
faithful to God because God allowed him to live and then “invented a “new positivity” of 
“alliance” in the form of “covenant” between the human and the divine.34 God’s delay in 
punishing Cain makes possible the endless relation of God and humanity. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, this mechanism may amount to the function of the “spiral regime” 
or the limitless circulation of signs. If God kills Cain in order to punish Cain’s crime, 
there is no excess in the signifier of God’s law. The excess of the signifier activates an 
endless circle of the significance of God’s law, and, as a result, Cain’s infidelity 
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consequently becomes fidelity to God. Accordingly, Deleuze and Guattari insist that 
“Abel, whose name is vanity, is nothing; Cain is the true man”.35 The traitor thereby 
becomes the true man, who brings about the regime of universal betrayal: “It is the 
regime of betrayal, universal betrayal, in which the true man never ceases to betray God 
just as God betrays man, with the wrath of defining the new positivity.”36 Thus, the 
community which represents Good or God has to lead to the invitation to betrayal.  
However, the betrayal of Shahid like Rushdie’s does not glide into a “spiral 
regime”, as there was no excess of the signs, instead, a death sentence against Rushdie 
was announced by the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Similarly, a cruel 
attack against Shahid is mounted by the Muslim friends. As for the Rushdie affair, Mani 
Haghighi points out that the announcement of Khomeini’s “fatwa” ironically perpetuated 
Rushdie’s prominence. According to Haghighi, prior to Khomeini’s intervention, the 
protesters against the book had unfolded in a “familiar field of signification”: the 
organizers of the Bradford book-burning insisted that their protests were an entirely legal 
expressions of dissent by appealing to the British law against blasphemy, but this had 
begun to “shift the focus of the protests away from the question of blasphemy as such and 
towards the question of the judicial prejudice against British Muslims.”37 In this context, 
Maghighi argues that the Bradford book-burnings can be seen as “attempts to invoke and 
reinterpret the notions of law and democracy.”38 The concept of rights was expressed by 
two opposed groups: the protesters against, as well as supporters of, Rushdie. Both 
groups sought to imbue their demands with moral “authority” or to bring their demand 
within the “fold of a secular and therefore historical and negotiable, code of law.”39  
However, Khomeini’s announcement of the “fatwa” shifted the political and negotiable 
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regime on the Rushdie affair into the central and despotic regime. Relating this situation 
to Kierkegaard’s account of the “Apostle”, Maghighi argues that “Khomeini does not 
announce the fatwa in his capacity as a statement; rather, he is a messenger or medium, 
an authority in matters divine, and nothing can compromise this authority and this 
position.”40 A messenger as an Apostle does not interpret God’s message but merely 
delivers the message to people. As a result of Khomeini’s proclamation of the fatwa, as 
noted above, the Rushdie affair was transformed from a negotiable into a despotic regime 
of signs. In the signifying regime, the fatwa was perceived as the sign of the violation of 
free speech, and Rushdie was thereby regarded as the symbol of liberalism.  
Shahid’s betrayal, like Rushdie’s, does not create the betrayal regime of signs in 
his relation to the radical Muslim community. Shahid betrays the community and is then 
punished in the name of Allah and the community. There is no an excess or delay in 
delivering the punishment and no opening up of a new relation between the traitor and the 
community. We might well now ask why the community failed to produce the post-
signifying regime of sign. In other words, we can wonder why the community could not 
offer Shahid the excess of God’s law but only punish his betrayal as a moral crime. The 
most crucial reason may be that Riaz, the leader of the community, confuses his role as 
political negotiator with that of a prophet or a priest. Riaz negotiates with the government 
(or the authorities) for the Muslims and at the same time delivers God’s law to the 
Muslims. However, while Riaz plays the role of a religious leader, or “Imam”, he is not 
an Imam. As a religious leader, Riaz interprets Shahid’s decision as a “moral crime”. 
Deleuze and Guattari point out that the priest’s interpretation prevents God from giving 
his mercy to humanity and from opening new relations with men. For this reason, 
Deleuze and Guattari insist that the true man is the traitor rather than a priest.  
The true man, or traitor to God is the prophet in the view of Deleuze and Guattari. 
Deleuze and Guattari cite the prophet Jonah as an example of a traitor who turned away 
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from God, as well as a prophet who avoided interpreting God’s message. Jonah was 
“fundamentally a traitor” like Cain in the Bible, but he accordingly “fulfilled God’s order 
better than anyone who remained faithful could.”41 God ordered Jonah to go to Nineveh 
in order to prophesy to the inhabitants, who had repeatedly betrayed God. But Jonah 
disobeyed God and took a ship for Tarshish which is located in the opposite direction to 
Nineveh. His fleeing from God and God’s prophecy, resulted in a violent storm and, in 
fear of their lives, the ship’s sailors threw the profane Jonah into the sea. However, Jonah 
was saved by being swallowed by a great fish. After that, Jonah preached God’s message 
to the people in Nineveh. Jonah’s fleeing from the face of God, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, is “exactly what God had wanted: he took the evil of Nineveh upon himself; he 
did it even more effectively than God had wanted, he anticipated God.”42 In this sense, as 
Deleuze and Guattari say, “the prophet is always being forced by God, literally violated 
by him, much more than inspired by him.” However, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize 
that the prophet is not a priest: “the prophet does not know how to talk, God puts the 
words in his mouth: word-ingestion, a new form of semiophagy. Unlike the seer, the 
prophet interprets nothing.”43  
Through repeating Rushdie’s betrayal, Shahid treats Riaz as a political and 
religious leader who distorts God’s messages. Riaz asks Shahid to type and publish his 
devotional poem, but Shahid changes Riaz’s poem into an erotic one. As Maria Degariele 
points out, “one of Shahid’s gravest sins was to vulgarise the holy man’s verses.”44 
Degariele suggests that Kureishi here parodies the Prophet of God’s words just as 
Rushdie does in The Satanic Verses. Shahid began to type Riaz’s work “in good faith,” 
but, as Degariele observes, he “couldn’t avoid falling into a dream-like state” such as that 
in which the Prophet heard God’s words, or verses, through the Angel Gabriel.”45 Thus, 
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“there were certain words, then phrases and verses, he couldn’t bring himself to 
transcribe.” Like Shahid’s transcription of Riaz’s poem, Riaz’s interpretation of what the 
Prophet said may not have authority over the truth. Riaz, nevertheless, judges Rushdie’s 
book as “evil” and think such a profane writer should be executed. Shahid asks Riaz 
suddenly, “would you kill a man for writing a book?” (182), to which Riaz answers that 
“sometimes there is violence, yes, when evil has been done” (183). Thus, Riaz replaces 
God’s message with the judgement of God, one which does not bear “surplus” or delay 
punishment. Without the excess of signs, the judgement of God is a morality that 
prohibits people from developing and creating their relationship with God.  
 
 
3. An ethics of life 
 
Shahid’s betrayal of the community can also be understood as his choice of the 
sexual hedonistic life that Deedee represents. As Bradley Buchanan asserts, Deedee’s 
conviction is ultimately based on “pleasure over politics”,46 which can gradually affect 
Shahid’s decision of turning away from the Muslim community fraught with political 
problems. As Ranasina points out, Deedee, who offers Shahid “sex, raves, Ecstasy and 
postmodern uncertainties”, causes him to avoid “antiracist vigils and typing Riaz’s 
religious tracts”.47 In fact, Shahid’s sexual experiments with Deedee (which are forbidden 
by the Islamic group), lead him to his political disengagement as well as his betrayal of 
the community. In this context, Shahid’s choice of Deedee can be understood as his 
choice of intimate pleasure as much as western political liberalism. Thus, we need to 
rethink whether Shahid’s betrayal is ethical. Kaleta claims that Shahid is a “more definite 
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character than Karim” in The Buddha of Suburbia: “he makes a choice not to commit”.48 
Shahid’s choice not to commit repeats the basic tenets of Western liberalism: “Shahid 
never accepts dogma, creed, or solution”, but instead engages with a provisional choice or 
relation.49  
Giorgio Agamben argues that the decision is involved with ethics, but it is 
opposite to a concept of morality. From Agamben’s perspective, morality, especially, in 
the doctrine of the “old theology”, shackles humans’ potentiality or possibility through 
the doctrine of original sin: “Humans, in their potentiality to be and to not-be, are, in 
other words, always already in debt; they always already have a bad consciousness 
without having to commit any blameworthy act.”50 Possessed by a bad consciousness, 
humans try to find a room for repentance. Humans just become a “deficit of existence”. 
By contrast, for Agamben, ethics is connected to acts which have no foundation, no 
essence, no morality, and no power. Agamben’s ethical act is thereby the refusal of 
Bartleby: “Bartleby, a scribe who does not simply cease writing but ‘prefers not to’, is the 
extreme image of this angel that writes nothing but its potentiality to not-write.”51 In this 
context, Shahid also seems an ethical figure who refuses simply to transcribe Riaz’s 
religious poem and is willing to exist as an “exception” in the radical Muslim community. 
However, his refusal or even his decision to refuse does not lead us to the affirmation of 
being.   
Deleuze’s ethics is located in an effort to establish the positivity and affirmation 
of life by criticizing a transcendental morality or the judgement of Good and Evil. As 
Deleuze remarks, “life is poisoned”52 by the categories or judgement of Good and Evil. In 
following Spinoza’s theory of ethics, Deleuze explains that Spinoza’s criticism of 
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morality or theology is premised upon undermining God who is a “legislator and judge, 
the planner and protector.” As a legislator and judge of morality, God, in short, affects us 
with a negative feeling, or “sadness”, because its morality turns us back “in the form of 
guilt”: “sadness itself, then hatred, aversion, mockery, fear, despair, morsus,  conscientiae, 
pity, indignation, envy, humility, repentance, self-abasement, shame, regret, anger, 
vengeance, cruelty”.53 These sad passions make people decrease their potential to invent 
their forms of life. Through the transcendental morality, people, as Deleuze asserts, 
become slaves of sad passions, which symbolically requires the tyrant and the priest who 
need people’s sad passions. “Sad spirits”, according to Deleuze, also need the tyrant and 
the priest in order to be content and to multiply their sad passions. 54  By contrast, 
Deleuze’s conception of ethics is concerned with a “capacity of affecting and being 
affected”, which corresponds to a degree of our power. This is related to what Deleuze 
calls “joyful passions” as well as an “ethics of joy”.55 
In this novel, characters are highly likely to identify with their own community 
and represent its morality or ideology. Characters’ lives, however, seems to be curtailed 
by their morality and ideology. Morality is powerful enough to dominate the characters’ 
lives. Most of the characters’ lives seem to represent their belief and ideology: 
fundamentalist Islam, postmodern liberalism and Marxist-Communism. Riaz’s 
fundamental Islam is depicted as being in contest with Deedee’s liberalism. There are 
also debates about other ideologies. Dr. Andrew, who is a history teacher in the college, is 
described as a Marxist-communist. Although he comes from the upper-middle class, he 
helps the underprivileged and the radical Muslim community in resisting “imperialist 
fascism and white domination” (40). Thus, he takes part in the radical Muslims’ burning 
of The Satanic Verses, which is contrasted with Deedee who protests against the act. 
However, for the radical Muslims, there are different positions among the Muslims. Juma, 
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54 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza, 25.  
55 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza, 27-8.  
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who is Chili’s wife, insists that the radical Muslim terrorists “must be eradicated from 
society like a disease” (202). This aspect makes the novel a field of different debates and 
opposing thoughts, rather than a work dedicated to unfolding the characters’ emotions 
and their affective relations with other people. At its core, however, is Shahid’s 
complicated mind or his skeptical views of other people. Although the novel probes 
Shahid’s experience of diverse people and different ideologies, as Kureishi said to Kaleta, 
“The Black Album is about Shahid, his experience in his life but it’s not from his point of 
view in that way, not from inside his mind. It’s a cooler book emotionally.”56  
In a society where morality and theology constitute the whole substance of 
people’ lives, total obedience to morality and theology is required. As Deleuze asserts, “it 
is a matter of obeying and of nothing else” in this society.57 People’s actions are measured 
by whether they obey or disobey the command of the morality of Good and Evil. As 
Ronald Bogue explains, human actions are assessed according to the “higher standard of 
divine forms” or the judgement of God, and their actions and values are measured in 
terms of “the extent to which an ideal form is realized.”58 The relations of Muslims in The 
Black Album seem hierarchical, because the characters are dominated by the morality of 
Good and Bad. When Shahid meets Riaz and Chad for the first time, Chad looks 
faithfully obedient to Riaz’s authority and command: “Before he could speak he was 
hushed by Riaz with an authoritatively raised finger. Immediately he obeyed Riaz and sat 
down, quivering” (17). Accordingly, Shahid is obligated to respect and obey Riaz’s 
command after he becomes one of the members of the community. When Chad tells 
Shahid that someone might as well take Riaz’s soiled clothes to the laundrette: “Shahid 
grasped from Chad’s look that he meant him to take Riaz’s washing to the laundrette! It 
was outrageous. He was about to decline but instead hesitated. Wouldn’t it be churlish to 
refuse? Shahid had been seeking interesting Asian companions. Why did he have to start 
                                                          
56 Kenneth Kaleta, 144. 
57 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza, 4.  
58 Ronald Bogue, “The Betrayal of God,” 22. 
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getting proud when things were looking up?” (23) In this situation, the more morality is 
strictly demanded, the more obedience is praised.  
Shahid’s acceptance of Riaz’s authority is a process of subjection to power in the 
name of God. Shahid obeys the authority of Riaz, despite the fact that he sometimes feels 
anguish about it. Most of the Muslims in The Black Album follow Riaz’s order without 
any reluctance. Their sense of belonging as part of the community makes them obedient 
to Riaz’s authority. For example, Riaz tells Shahid that “we are pleased to have you with 
us” (20). Similarly, Riaz and Chad often uses the expression “you belong to us.” As we 
have seen, their identification with a community is in fact a way of protecting themselves 
from discrimination in Britain. They are not properly protected by the government and 
the law. One little Asian boy, who is simply going to school, is arrested and “charged 
with assault and sentenced to fifteen months” (45). The community hall gets vandalized 
by the police themselves (45). In this situation, they need a community to resist 
discrimination and protect their identity. Despite the fact that he is not under-privileged 
economically and educationally, Shahid is willing to belong to this Muslim community. 
Chad who was adopted by a white couple suffered from his “racist” mother, “talking 
about Pakis all the time and how they had to fit it” (116). He consequently changed his 
name from “Trevor Buss” to “Muhammad Shahabuddin Ali-Shah.” Their “sense of 
exclusion” and “homelessness” practically drove these people to seek for a group with 
which they are able to identify. However, the fear of exclusion also leads them to be 
subjugated by this very same community. In other words, they can lose their self or their 
singularity in order to identify with the community. However, the community with which 
they identify cannot be substituted for their unique “singularity.” Moreover, as John 
Rajchman observes, people’s identification with family, clan, nation, or community can 
lead to “terrible violence”, and “the problem posed by this potential violence is one that 
cannot simply be settled through a more or a less ‘rational’ arrangement of interest or 
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choices”.59 The community could force the members to sacrifice themselves or to attack 
its dissenters and enemies. Thus, such identification would deprive people of their life in 
the Deleuzian sense.   
In order to appreciate Deleuze’s ethics, it is necessary to explore the Deleuzian 
concept of singularity, which is consequently connected to an affirmation of life, or an 
ethics of life. Deleuze in reading Spinoza’s ethics insists that people should regard 
themselves as a singularity rather than identify with communities. According to Deleuze, 
singularity has its own power: every singularity, whether he is an underprivileged Muslim 
or a white British racist, has “power.” From Spinoza’s perspective, power means “power 
to exist and to act.” This power should be distinguished from the “power” commonly 
used to dominate and to control others physically and psychologically. Power to exist, 
from Spinoza’s perspective, is supposed to be equal to “power to act”: “the identity of 
power and essence means that a power is always an act or, at least, in action.” 60 The 
power of acting, in the Spinozan point of view, also offers us the capacity to be affected 
which means sensibility, or affection, connects us to other people and the world, because 
“all power bears with it a corresponding and inseparable capacity to be affected.”61 This 
affection is always mutual so that singularities affect and at the same time are affected. 
The affection thereby makes or constructs “multiplicities” that open singularities to 
transform themselves as part of such a becoming. Rajchman explains that to think of 
ourselves as “multiple”, or as “composed of multiplicities”, is “to get away from 
understanding ourselves in terms of identity and identification”.62  
The concept of multiplicity is deeply engaged with the “body.” The Deleuzian 
conception of the body is, as Bruce Baugh explains, defined as an assemblage composed 
of parts, where “these parts stand in some definite relation to one another, and has a 
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capacity for being affected by other bodies”.63 Deleuze cites Spinoza’s ethical question: 
“We do not even know of what a body is capable. That is, we do not even know of what a 
body is capable, nor the extent of our power. How could we know this in advance?”64 
Spinoza’s concept of “body” is truly contrasted to the concept of “consciousness” which 
is an element of the Cartesian framework. Consciousness has generally been assumed to 
play a role as the major cause of the body’s action, and in relation to the morality of 
domination. Yet, for Spinoza and Deleuze, consciousness cannot be the cause of the body, 
nor does it determine how the body acts in advance: “the body surpasses the knowledge 
that we have of it, and that thought likewise surpasses the consciousness that we have of 
it.”65 This point about the body does not deny “any causality between the mind and the 
body” but “disallows any primacy of the one over the other.”66 For Deleuze and Spinoza, 
it is important that the body above all creates a “dynamic relationship” when a body 
encounters another body. When two bodies meet each other, there are two dynamic 
relationships because a body has, as a result of its internal structure, the power to be 
affected.   
In The Black Album, affection of bodies is limited by the morality of the radical 
Muslim community. Except for Shahid and Deedee, the characters do not affect and are 
not affected by other people. Any free affection of bodies is apparently excluded by this 
community. The characters are fixed to their identity as Muslims. There is also no activity 
or pleasure that engages Riaz’s and Chad’s bodies. If they mention something associated 
with the body, it is only ever to talk about the curse of the homosexual. Riaz said, “God 
would burn homosexuals forever in hell, scorching their flesh in a furnace before 
replacing their skin as new and repeating this through eternity” (129). Otherwise, erotic or 
sexual desire is not mentioned at all by Riaz, Chad or Hat. For them, sexual desire is 
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definitely repressed. Shahid, on the other hand, is interested in art and music as well as 
literature, which are closely related to our sensory capacities. The Black Album by Prince 
which provides the title of this novel is Shahid’s favourite pop record. Yet, for the radical 
Muslim community, these arts and pop culture are considered to be symptomatic of the 
taste of decadent intellectuals and the superficial Westerner. Shahid, however, finds that 
his teacher Deedee is also enthusiastic about the arts and pop music. When he meets her 
in her office, above the desk are pictures of Prince, Madonna, and Oscar Wilde, with a 
quotation beneath them, “All limitations are prisons” (33). Their interest in the arts leads 
them into mutual affections including a sexual relationship and drugs use. Shahid’s 
encounter with Deedee makes him waver between the regulations of fundamentalist Islam 
and the liberal pleasures of hedonism. Accordingly, connecting with Deedee, just as much 
as with Riaz, triggers a change in his life.  
We can now ask whether Shahid’s connection with Deedee and Riaz opens him 
to what Deleuze calls an ethics of life. In other words, we need to explore whether 
Shahid’s encounter with Deedee triggers a “composing” or “decomposing” relation. 
According to Deleuze, “the object that agrees with my nature determines me to form a 
superior totality that includes us, the object and myself. The object that does not agree 
with me jeopardizes my cohesion, and tends to divide me into subsets, which, in the 
extreme case, enter into relations that are incompatible with my constitutive relation 
(death).”67 For example, if I eat a fresh apple, that is, I meet the apple, the apple and I 
combine into a new form for my body and mind. By contrast, if I eat a rotten apple, my 
meeting with the apple negatively affects my body and mind. These two relations 
correspond to two affections: joyful affection and sad affection. If I encounter another 
body whose relation allows me to preserve my nature or “agree with my nature,” I 
experience joyful affection, which is good and useful to me.68 In contrast with this, if I 
meet with another body whose relations cannot be combined with my own, or which fails 
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to agree with my nature, then I experience “a sad affection (a passive affection, feeling, or 
passion)”.69 This is bad and even harmful to me. The Spinozan and Deleuzian concepts of 
composing and decomposing relations as well as of joyful affection and sad affection 
subvert the cause and effect of morality since the rules or morality we are conscious of 
are only the effects of these composing and decomposing relations.70 From this principle, 
Deleuze and Spinoza dismantle the morality of Good and Evil. They say that “there is no 
“Good” and “Evil” in Nature in general but goodness and badness”71 on the grounds of 
the relation of composing and decomposing. As Deleuze observes, evil is always a bad 
encounter, the decomposition of our body: our body’s encounter with the poison. In this 
sense, Deleuze insists that “the distinction between good things and bad things provides 
the basis of a real ethical difference, which we must substitute for a false moral 
opposition”. 72  In other words, ethics is only the relation of composition and 
decomposition rather than the opposition of “Good” and “Evil”. Thus, “Good” and “Evil” 
that fundamentalist Muslims and white racists deploy are replaced by good and bad 
relations of multiplicities.   
From the perspective of Deleuze and Spinoza, Shahid’s first meeting with Riaz 
can be seen as compatible to Shahid because he thinks of it as an opportunity to enrich his 
identity as a Pakistani Muslim. However, their subsequent relations draw Shahid into 
losing his “power” and involve his subjugation to the radical community. Moreover, he 
cannot have “active affection” with Riaz because he always connects with him in terms of 
the mediation of morality or “beyond what the world is.” In this sense, Shahid can have 
only a passive affection with Riaz in the name of morality, which is a decomposing 
connection. By contrast, Deedee is a radical liberal willing to experiment with extreme 
hedonism, who leads Shahid into a dynamic variation of our power of action. After 
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meeting with Deedee, Shahid can acknowledge that one’s self can be inventive by 
affecting and being affected by multiple people. Moreover, when they have sex, Deedee 
makes up his face like a woman. Through his experience of his new female face, he 
becomes a woman, which means the exchange between himself and a woman. Through 
his connection with Deedee, Shahid gradually escapes from the morality of the radical 
community and can increase his capacity of affecting and being affected. In other words, 
he is able to flee from a morality which separated him from his life. Consequently, this 
connection enables him to betray the radical community, which leads to his own life 
rather than a semblance of life. He opens himself to affective relations with others, which 
is linked to his joyful life and ethics.  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
As we have seen, on one level Shahid might be regarded as a traitor who 
abandons his Pakistan Muslim people and erotically rewrites Riaz’s holy poem in a re-
enactment of the gesture made by Salman Rushdie in his The Satanic Verses. Moreover, 
Shahid decides to stay with his teacher Deedee who supports western liberalism and 
criticizes fundamentalist Muslims. Critical responses to Shahid’s betrayal have mainly 
been divided into two different groups. Ruvani Ranasinha who critically approaches the 
act of betrayal asserts that Shahid reinforces the stereotype of the fundamentalist Muslim 
community in terms of repeating The Satanic Verses. On the other hand, Kenneth C. 
Kaleta reads Shahid’s “betrayal” more positively as an example of fluid identity, 
sexuality, and hybridity. Such critical responses seem to reflect the different positions 
assumed respectively by a politicalized Islamic ethos and those guided by the prevailing 
values of Western liberalism. These criticisms of Shahid’s betrayal in The Black Album 
also repeat many of the debates around the “Rushdie affair.”    
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As Kureishi emphasizes, the discourse of race and religion has become important 
and fearful to us both as individuals and as a society. Racial and religious groups have 
provided different images of “good” and “evil.” The betrayal of the radical Muslim 
community in Britain seems thereby to bring about the extreme responses of either 
condemnation or praise. However, from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, betrayal 
enables us to change or reinvent the relation between individuals and the community or 
between a minority group and a majority group. More specifically, Deleuze and Guattari 
claims double turning or double becoming is able to invent a new relation between an 
individual and a community, which is associated with the universal betrayal. From the 
perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, Jonah in the Bible turns away from God who then 
turns away from Jonah. However, God delays punishing Jonah, which leads to a new 
relation between God and humanity. His infidelity becomes paradoxically a fidelity to 
God. Without a traitor, God cannot realize his prophecy. Yet, the excess, or mercy of the 
law of God, also enables humans to invent a new relation to God or the community. This 
is what Deleuze and Guattari suggest the positivity of betrayal.  
However, The Black Album does not provide the double turning-away which 
triggers the positivity of betrayal. The community does not delay its punishment of 
Shahid. Instead, its members attack him violently as a means of vengeance against his 
transgression of its mores. At the same time, Shahid’s betrayal is regarded as a way of 
searching for his own ethics because the radical Muslim community deprives him of his 
own life. From the view of Deleuze and Spinoza, life is closer to ethics which is clearly 
opposite to morality. Shahid’s obedience to the morality of community leads his life into 
what Spinoza and Deleuze call passive and sad affection. This is because Shahid’s power 
of affection is rejected and excluded by the community in the name of its code of 
morality. On the other hand, Shahid and Deedee affect each other by their tastes in music, 
arts and literature, which lead in turn to their sexual relationship. His encounter with 
Deedee makes him decide to betray his community and search for his own way of life. As 
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a traitor, he becomes a nomad who cannot settle on any territory but moves into the 
boundaries.   
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Chapter 3 
The Predicament of Hybridity in The Body 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In his interview with Kureishi, Bradley Buchanan refers to the postcolonial term 
of hybridity: “to be seen as creating something new that may push the boundaries of the 
human by crossing ethnic or racial lines”.1 Kureishi argues that if the notion of hybridity 
means “the pulling together of disparate things”,2 “there is hybridity everywhere, there 
always has been”. 3  However, many commentators, 4  as Susie Thomas asserts, hail 
Kureishi as the “herald of hybridity”,5 so that Kureishi’s elaboration of the notion of 
hybridity is connected to a blend of any different ethnic people and cultures. In The 
Buddha of Suburbia and The Black Album, Kureishi uses hybridity to challenge the rigid 
conception of racial and ethnic identities, exploring the possibility of transformative 
identities, while in The Body he addresses how technology is able to produce new hybrid 
bodies, raising the question of the possibility of a new conception of identity beyond 
humanism, and of how such hybrid identities affect our life in the ethical and political 
contexts.  
The Body displays metamorphoses in which characters become hybrids with the 
aid of bio-technology. Whereas Gregor Samsa in The Metamorphosis wakes up to find 
himself changed into a monstrous insect, something repulsive to him, the characters in 
                                                          
1 Bradley Buchanan, Hanif Kureishi, “Author Interview” (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 119.  
2 Bradley Buchanan, 119.  
3 Bradley Buchanan, 119.  
4 Bradley Buchanan, 147.  
5 Susie Thomas, Hanif Kureishi (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 4.    
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this novel are actively willing to metamorphose by their consciousness being transferred 
into young and beautiful bodies. For this, they secretly trade corpses and implant their 
brains into them and become a hybrid of self and other, living and death.  With the 
advance of technology, narratives of metamorphoses have greatly proliferated: from the 
modification of human bodies and genes in the real world to the transformation of 
humans, machines, aliens and vampires in the virtual world. Compared with science 
fiction and film, the modes of characters’ metamorphoses in this novel do not seem to be 
either unique or remarkable. However, given Kureishi’s focus upon socio-political issues 
in his previous works, this novel provides an exceptionally insightful exploration of 
technological hybridity and its concomitant effects. The Body is far removed from his 
previous realism and moves into more imaginative territory by drawing on science fiction. 
Although, as Susie Thomas notes, “this novel doesn’t read like science fiction but rather 
allegory or fable since there is little interest in the medical or mechanical aspects of brains 
being implanted into deceased bodies”,6 it does nonetheless explore various aspects of 
hybridity related to technology and how it can alter the conception of our identity and life 
beyond humanism.  
Hybridity proliferated by technology can be also rethought in an ethical and 
political sense by considering Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptions of assemblage and the 
body. Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of assemblage has at least certain affinity with 
hybridity as a mode of subjectivity in the way they both involve a flexible subject. 
However, as Peter Hallward asserts, Bhabha’s notion of hybridity is not associated with 
collectivity or collective relations, but is rather accounted for by the “fundamentally non-
relational terms of pure ‘incommensurability’ or ‘untranslatability’”. 7  Specifically, 
Bhabha focuses on singularity of difference by hybridizing subjects. By contrast, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s conception of assemblage is to be understood as the body composed of 
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 85 
collective relations between heterogeneous elements. Simone Bignall clearly explains 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the body as follows: 
 
A body is not a discrete entity defined by stable boundaries and a set of fixed 
characteristics; rather, it is an assemblage of components bound into a 
coherent form, but this bodily consistency is only ever temporary and is 
always shifting. This is so, because the component parts of a body constantly 
change as they enter into new relations with other parts encountered by the 
assemblage in its interaction with parts encountered by the assemblage in its 
interactions with its existential milieu. A body is, then, a ‘composition of 
relations between parts’.8  
 
In this passage, the body as assemblage is changeable in relation to other bodies. The 
body is also social because the body is, as Bignall asserts, an “extensive entity” which is 
related to other bodies and also forms an “element part in a multitude of more complex 
assemblages formed with other bodies in its social milieu”.9 For this reason, the body as 
assemblage is not predetermined, but inherently transformative by relating to other bodies 
in the milieu. This milieu is, as J. Macgregor Wise explains, understood as “the 
surroundings, the context, the mediums in which the assemblages work”.10 Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of the body as assemblage is associated with the “becoming-other” 
beyond individualism and is also related to the “double-becoming” between bodies. 
Moreover, assemblage as a “constellation of singularities”11 or a collection of singular 
parts, is focused on the veritable affects of affecting and being affected by other bodies as 
well as interactive with the milieu. This complex of affects is inextricably associated with 
                                                          
8  Simone Bignall, “Affective Assemblage: Ethics beyond Assemblages”, Deleuze and the 
Postcolonial, eds. Paul Patton and Simone Bignall (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 
83.  
9 Simone Bignall, 83-4.  
10  J. Macgregor Wise, “Assemblage”, Deleuze Concepts (Ithaca, MacGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2005), 78,  
11 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minnesota and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 406.  
 86 
the becoming-other. Thus, we can approach Kureishi’s description of hybridity in The 
Body in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptions of assemblage and the body to 
examine how a new body can bring interactive transformations between self and other or 
the living and the dead in the ethical and political spaces.  
Relying on Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, this chapter will discuss whether 
a hybrid can bring a new conception of identity beyond humanism and the mutual 
interactions between self and other in The Body, by focusing on complex repercussions 
for both these individuals and their society. For this, firstly, I will examine the pleasures 
and anxieties of hybridity invoked by Kureishi’s depiction of a new body by comparing 
the characters’ “desire” with Deleuze’s concept of desire. Secondly, I will explore how a 
new body can experience Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of “becoming-other” by 
affective relations with the dead body. This becoming-other will be discussed alongside 
“aging” or “auto-affection” concerned with a process which is denied by the 
appropriation of new bodies.  
 
 
      2. The pleasure and anxiety of hybridity  
     
As a result of bio-technology, a hybrid in The Body becomes a “new body” 
physically and philosophically. The protagonist Adam, in his mid-sixties, thinks of his 
body as a “half-dead old carcass”12 and suffers a lot of illness. Once he is offered the 
possibility of becoming a new body, he thinks of it as an irresistible invitation. After he 
has asked his wife Margot for a “six month sabbatical”, he decides to transform his body 
into a hybrid one by implanting his brain into a young dead body. In terms of Adam’s 
metamorphosis, he is situated at the boundary between self and other, the living and the 
dead. This drives Adam to experience a new body and new life. The prospect of 
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transformation is seemingly pleasurable at the beginning. Technology and humans seem 
to have a symbiotic relationship with each other so that advanced medicine and skilful 
doctors help Adam change his body and enjoy the abandonment of an apparent liberation. 
On the basis of this optimistic vision, Adam can metamorphose into a hybrid physically 
as if he were incarnating the flesh of a Greek god. However, concerned with what Adam 
expects through his possession of a new body, we can question whether Adam becomes a 
new body as part of a new concept of identity.  
As Bruce Clarke and Caroline Walker Bynum point out, narratives of 
metamorphoses in which humans transmogrify into machines, animals, trees, and light 
have continuously been represented in numerous ways in legend, art, fiction and film.13 
According to Clarke, “archaic and classical metamorphs—fictive entities once merely 
human that become some hybrid of human and nonhuman traces—were typically 
reinscribed back into the natural orders: Daphne into a laurel tree, Narcissus into a 
flower”.14 Bynum also explores tales of metamorphosis of werewolves and examines 
poetic images of transformation as depicted in the works of Marie de France and Dante in 
the middle ages. 15  From Bynum’s perspective, these medieval stories and images 
struggled to retain the identity of things, “both their entity-ness, or unitas, and their 
spatiotemporal continuity, despite physical or spiritual transformation”.16 In these pre-
modern metamorphoses, the narratives of transformations maintained the identities of 
humans and things, whereas the narratives of modern metamorphoses, according to 
                                                          
13 Caroline Walker Bynum, Metamorphosis and Identity (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 28-33. 
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 88 
Clarke, overlap with those in the pre-modern age, but also anticipate “posthuman 
transformation”.17 Metamorphosis has in recent times become a fascination in the popular 
imagination, finding instantiation in the ever-increasing virtual spaces of film, television 
and computer media. Indeed, the bestiary of hybrids and mutations such as “Batman” or 
“Spider-Man” has led to the production of powerful cultural icons.18 However, we need to 
think why these narratives of hybridity are enticing. Some of these mutants glorify 
hybridity, in that they both possess enhanced power and keep their human identity. These 
narratives of mutants are in fact related to superhumans, which could exhibit the positive 
expectations of hybridity promised by technology.  
Transformations both in the virtual and actual world force us to reconfigure 
ourselves and our circumstances. Donna Haraway and Rosi Braidotti use the term “post-
humans” to designate the current condition of mankind, which they view as already 
having metamorphosed both physically and philosophically into a new species. 19 
Specifically, Haraway accounts of a cyborg as a posthuman: “A cyborg is a cybernetic 
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a 
creature of fiction”. 20 She also claims that “by the late twentieth century, our time, a 
mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and 
organism; in short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics”.21 
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19 See Donna Haraway, “A Cyberg Manifesto: Science, technology and socialist-feminism in the 
late twentieth century”, The Cybercultures Reader, eds. David Bell and Barbara M. Kennedy 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 291-324. Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a 
Materialist Theory of Becoming (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 214-29. 
20 Donna Haraway, 291.  
21 Donna Haraway, 292. 
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However, as Cary Wolfe argues, the concept of “posthumanism” should be distinguished 
from “transhumanism”, a term Joel Garreal suggests to describe the extension of 
humanism.22 According to Garreal, humanism has shifted into transhumanism, that is, 
“the enhancement of human intellectual, physical, and emotional capabilities, the 
elimination of disease and unnecessary suffering, and the dramatic extension of life 
span.”23 In this respect, transhumanism is for Wolfe the opposite of “posthumanism”24 
which he defines by quoting R. L. Rutsky: “The posthuman cannot be simply identified 
as culture and age that comes ‘after’ the human…. If, however, the posthuman truly 
involves a fundamental change or mutation in the concept of the human, this would be 
seemed to imply that history and culture cannot continue to be figured in reference to this 
concept.” 25  In this context, we can question whether Adam’s new body could be 
considered “posthuman” or “transhuman”. Adam’s expectations of his new body point to 
transhumanism, as he is able to enhance his physical capability and to expand his life 
span. However, it is also ethical to consider whether a new body is related to what 
Braidotti says about a “post-humanistic vision of the subject” by providing an “alternative 
foundation for ethical and political subjectivity”.26  
Concerned with Adam’s transformation, there could be the negative expectations 
of a hybrid. If technology has catalyzed humans to become a new hybrid, yet they cannot 
foretell accurately how such transformations will impact on themselves and their life in a 
society. As Chris Hables Gray demonstrates, the proliferation of transformations could be 
                                                          
22 Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2010), xv.  
23 Joel Garreau, Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies—
and What It means to be Human (New York: Random House, 2005), 231-2.  
24 Cary Wolfe, xv.  
25 R. L. Rutsky, “Mutation, History, and Fantasy in the Posthuman,” Subject Matters: A Journal of 
Communication and the Self, Special Issue on “Posthuman Conditions”, 3:2, 4:1 (August 2007), 
107.  
26 Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2006), 11.  
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the premise of monsters, as depicted in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. 27  These 
expectations toward radical changes might be, from Michel Foucault’s perspective, 
described as utopian and heterotopian. According to Foucault, when people face 
unfamiliar and monstrous things or language—for example, Borges’s unusual 
enumeration of animals in his essay “The Analytical language of John Wilkins”—they 
show opposite responses to the strange categories of animals.28 Such uncanny objects 
might remind people of utopia because the utopian locus affords consolation: “although 
they have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which 
they are able to unfold”.29  On the other hand, unfamiliar things might make people 
imagine heterotopias. These are related to “the loss of what is ‘common’ to place and 
name”. 30  Moreover, “heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly 
undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that”.31 In this 
respect, metamorphoses can be either pleasurable or fearful. Adam’s transformation into 
the other body appears to lead to the loss of his identity or to a being in-between self and 
other, as he recognizes himself as a “nobody”: “I was neither an Oldbody nor a Newbody. 
I was a Nobody” (74). 
Adam’s transformation is presented both in terms of pleasurable and anxious 
expectations. At first, we can see the positive expectations of Adam’s transformation. As 
we have seen, the pleasurable expectation is related to the enhancement of Adam’s body 
and power by mixing with the heterogeneous elements. This transformation starts to 
                                                          
27 Chris Hables Cray, Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2002), 195.  
28 Michel Foucault describes Borges’s passage as unfamiliar objects. The passage quotes a ‘certain 
Chinese encyclopaedia’ in which it is written that “animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the 
Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) frenzied, (J) innumerable, (k) 
drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) 
that from a long way off look like flies.” According to Foucault, this passage arose “out of the 
laughter that shattered”, as he read it, “all the familiar landmarks” of his thought—“our thought”. 
Michel Foucault, The Orders of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Vantage Books, 1973), xv.  
29 Michel Foucault, xviii.  
30 Michel Foucault, xix.  
31 Michel Foucault, xviii.  
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engage with what Deleuze and Guattari call “connections”. For Deleuze and Guattari, our 
life is filled with connections to people, objects, nature, feelings etc. Indeed, as Claire 
Colebrook explains, for Deleuze and Guattari, “there is no present life outside of its 
connection: the eye connects with light, the brain connects with a concept, the mouth 
connects with a language”,32 even though we do not fully perceive the process of this 
connection. Yet, if we metamorphose into an “other,” or into other forms of life, it is 
inevitable that we establish connections with “heterogeneous” objects.33 For Adam, his 
encounter with Ralph is a chance to transform himself into another form or body, because 
Adam is an “old body” while Ralph is a “new body”. Despite his successful career as a 
screenwriter, Adam’s circumstance as an old body, as we have seen, is not a good one—
he feels the loss of his physical vitality. Ralph’s situation is very different—he has 
replaced his old body with a new one, and has become revivified and re-invigorated. 
When Adam encounters this young Ralph at a party, his life becomes an adventure, he 
falls down the rabbit hole.  
The motifs of Ralph’s and Adam’s transformations are persuasively suggested by 
the character of their new circumstances. Ralph, for example, undergoes this 
metamorphosis because of his desperation about being old and weak. Moreover, even 
though he dedicated his life to making money, he feels lonely because his wife is dead. 
With nothing else filling his life, he found that the only thing he was preparing for was 
his own death. Reviewing his life, Ralph is consumed with regret at not fulfilling his 
earlier desire to be an actor. Emboldened by the hope of metamorphosis, he undergoes 
surgery to become a beautiful young actor. The process of getting a new body is simple, 
like changing clothes. How could people resist this kind of seduction to gain new bodies, 
to acquire immortality, particularly when they are themselves close to death? As the 
                                                          
32 Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (London: Routledge, 2002), 56.  
33 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), 7.  
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novel suggests, they would gladly sacrifice their old bodies for the opportunity to attain 
everlasting life.    
However, Adam’s expectation of the transformation is based on his 
misrecognition of self as represented in the process of his metamorphosis. The process by 
which Adam and Ralph enter new bodies is less than scientific. It is, instead, simply a 
transitional fantasy, although there is a description of the medical breakthrough. 
Accordingly, the process by which Adam and Ralph undergo metamorphoses, is not 
described, but Adam simply enters the hospital and then finds himself transformed into a 
new body. After that, Adam experiences a passage of identifying his mind with a new 
body by looking at his transformed body in the mirror:  
 
According to my friend, if a creature can’t see himself, he can’t 
mature. He can’t see where he ends and others begin. This process can be 
aided by hanging a mirror in an animal’s cage.  
Still only semi-conscious, I began to move. I found I could stand. I 
stood in front of the full-length mirror in my room, looking at myself—or 
whoever I was now—for a long time. I noticed that other mirrors had been 
provided. I adjusted them until I obtained an all-around view. In these 
mirrors, I seemed to have been cloned as well as transformed. Everywhere I 
turned there were more me’s, many, many more new me’s until I felt dizzy. 
(32) 
 
Given Jacques Lacan’s account of the “mirror stage”, Adam’s looking at the “specular 
image” in the mirror can be associated with a process of his “identifying” with a new 
body.34 From Lacan’s perspective, Adam’s recognition of the image can be understood as 
the “transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image”.35 Adam’s 
                                                          
34 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans Alan Sheridan (London and New York: Routledge, 
2001), 2.  
35 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, 2.  
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“narcissistic identification”36 with the image represents his transformation, but it is, in 
fact, based on what Lacan calls the “méconnaissances”37 of constituting of ego based on 
“illusion of autonomy”. In turn, from Lacan’s perspective, Adam’s identification with a 
new body relies on the reflection of its image and his fantasy of autonomy rather than his 
transformation.  
Considering the relation between the brain (or the mind) and the body as 
suggested in this novel, the transformations of Adam and Ralph are more problematic. 
Firstly, their transformations rather repeat the narratives of transhumanism depending on 
the Cartesian concept of “mind-body dualism”38. As a result, the body and the mind (or 
the brain) can be separated and the body is wholly controlled by the mind (or the brain). 
In this respect, as we have seen, the bodies that Adam and Ralph take are only “skins” to 
be worn like clothes, and they can retain their identity. They believe their identities will 
remain unchanged even though their bodies are new. In this sense, only their brains 
represent their identity and their old and new bodies are simply masks or clothes that 
temporarily house their self.  
From the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, the body interacts with the mind. 
There is neither a separable concept of mind or body, nor a priority between them. 
Moreover, from the lens of Deleuze and Guattari, as we have seen, the body is not a fixed 
form: “A body is not defined by the form that determines it as a substance or subject, nor 
by the organs it possesses or the functions it fulfils”.39 A body is instead an assemblage of 
ceaseless connections or complex relations between other bodies. For this reason, 
Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the potentiality of the body rather than the mind or the 
consciousness. Its potentiality is related to the body’s capacities of affecting and being 
                                                          
36 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York and London: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1981), 257.  
37 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, 7.  
38 Susie Thomas, 154.  
39 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 260.  
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affected by other bodies.40 Thus, Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptions of the body and its 
metamorphosis do not mean that people can change just the form of their body but rather 
that they would only be able to transform the body as an assemblage of complex relations 
of numerous particles and affects. As Pearson emphasizes, “affects do not bring about the 
transformation of one body into another, but rather something passes from one to the 
other.” 41  Adam’s and Ralph’s transformations are not an assemblage of increasing 
affective and mutual relations among other bodies from the perspective of Deleuze and 
Guattari. On the contrary, their transformations are based on their exploitation and 
appropriation of another body, which could be compared to the process of the colonizer 
implanting their power and ideology into the body of the colonized. The dead bodies are 
not able to resist Adam’s and Ralph’s appropriation of them. In this sense, Adam and 
Ralph are represented as socially and economically superior individuals, while the dead 
bodies are comparable to a lower hierarchical level in social terms.   
The conceptual differences between these two accounts of metamorphoses also 
reflect a fundamental disagreement about the nature of desire. What Adam and Ralph 
change are their exterior selves, appropriating bodies as desirable objects that purvey the 
external attractiveness that they wished to attain but found impossible in their previous 
ageing physical incarnations. After the transformation, there is a surge in the characters’ 
desires and a proliferation of desirable things with which they engage. A recuperated state 
of the body itself becomes an object of desire. Those who desire this transformation need 
youth and beauty as well as vitality. All of the characters admire youthful and beautiful 
bodies; ironically these are only young and beautiful corpses when Adam looks at the 
rows of them in the hospital. It seems natural that Adam chooses a corpse as perfect as a 
beautiful Greek sculpture. Adam compares it to “a stocky and classically handsome 
                                                          
40 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1988), 124.  
41 Keith Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1999), 179.  
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sculpture in the British Museum” (27). In contrast, old bodies like Adam’s are “facilities” 
to be nullified. Old bodies represent lack, while new bodies represent the signifier of 
desire. There is no potentiality for bodies to increase their interaction with other bodies; 
what there is instead is the desire for new bodies, in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of the body as an assemblage.   
Deleuze and Guattari reject defining desire as lack. They argue that the 
traditional logic of desire has been wrong-headed from the very outset: from the Platonic 
to the psycho-analytic logic of desire. 42  These logics, whether found in philosophy, 
literature or psychology, all account for desire in terms of lack. As a result, people look 
upon it as primarily lack: a lack of an object. In other words, as Ronald Bogue asserts, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, the logics of lack treat desire as the “acquisition” of an unfillable 
lack, which proliferates in language through endless substitutions in the chain of 
signifiers.43 However, Deleuze and Guattari reject the concept of desire as negation or 
lack and replace it with production or desiring production. Fundamentally, for Deleuze 
and Guattari, as Colebrook asserts, desire is a sort of force, or Nietzschean “power,” 
which multiplies with the proliferation of connections: “When bodies connect with other 
bodies to enhance their power they eventually form communities or societies. Power is, 
therefore, not the representation of desire but the expansion of desire.”44 Desire, as the 
productive expansion of power, is the fundamental way in which Deleuze and Guattari 
reconceive the idea of metamorphoses.  
Looking at the transformation of Adam, we can observe that he re-names 
himself as Leo Raphael Adams as if the new body is his “double”, making the new self 
something almost uncanny, certainly acquiring a surprising objective externality. 
According to Sigmund Freud, “double” is a source of a strong feeling of uncanny which 
                                                          
42 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti Oedipus, 25.  
43 Ronal Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari  (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), 89.  
44 Claire Colebrook, 91.  
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is related to both familiar and unfamiliar sensations.45 A proliferation of desire occurs, in 
which its character as “force” becomes evident, and in which Adam becomes a hybrid or 
an assemblage: Adam’s mind now co-exists with Mark’s body (the former owner or 
possessor of the body). This means Leo R. Adams can experience an unfamiliar life. 
Mark had been a professional model and was also homosexual. Accordingly, Leo Adams 
spends most of his time enjoying various physical activities, but in reality these 
unfamiliar experiences are rooted in the desires that Adam had always felt but never acted 
upon. He travels several European cities and enjoys talking to strangers in cafes, 
museums and clubs and having sex with many women. However, Leo Adams’s desire for 
physical pleasure is insatiable, continuously experienced as Adam’s lack. During his 
journeys, Leo Adams often recalls how Adam was filled with “spirituality” and was 
indifferent to his body. He becomes aware that Adam was “without his body” and was 
“slightly phobic about other bodies” (35). In this respect, ironically, Adam’s 
metamorphosis seems to lead him to search for his lost self. Spirit and self are still 
powerful enough to govern the body, even though Adam becomes Leo Adams. This is 
why his transformation repeats the desire as a lack.   
Adam’s desire as lack is reflected by the structure of a capital society based on 
the exchange of desire. As Colebrook points out, desire and labour in a capital society can 
be traded and exchanged with any other such as money, but “an individual becomes an 
empty point where the flows of money, goods and images intersect for a privation to 
                                                          
45 According to Sigmund Freud, “uncanny” (unheimlich) is “related to what is frightening—to 
what arouses dread and horror; equally certainly, too, the word is not always used in a clearly 
definable sense, so that it tends to coincide with what excites fear in general” (219). Yet, from 
Freud’s perspective, uncanny does not belong to only frightening of evoking dread and horror, but 
is also linked to the meaning of “familiar” or “homely” (heimlich). Thus, Freud asserts that 
“heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally 
coincides with its opposite, unheimlich. Unheimlich is in some way or other a sub-species of 
heimlich” (226).  In quoting Jentsch’s remark on a “doll”, Freud explains the uncanny feeling 
about a doll that appears to be alive: “Jentsch believes that a particular favourable condition for 
awakening uncanny feelings is created when there is intellectual uncertainty whether an object is 
alive or not, and when an inanimate object becomes too much like an animate one” (233). 
Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. 
trans. James Strachey,  (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), 219-33.  
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emerge”.46 For example, money is the typical object of “desire as lack” in such a society, 
because money is exchanged as the privileged virtual object but the desire for money can 
not be fulfilled. Accordingly, as a sense of lack, the desire does not change the existing 
structure in a capital society but only repeats and intensifies it. In the case of Adam, to 
have his operation, he must spend a “considerable amount of money” (22). Without a 
great deal of money, nobody can transform into a new body. This reflects the scene in 
which Adam chooses “his guy” among the dead bodies. It is nothing more than “shopping 
for bodies” (26). Matte also is a new body that embodies this system of desire as lack and 
shows the horrible prospect of the transformations. He is described as a mysterious figure 
but he is known as a man of large substance who owns the island where the festival is 
held for a women’s spiritual centre. For him, bodies are objects he possesses and changes 
as substitutes to fulfil his desire. Thus, he refers to bodies as “facilities” or “equipment” 
or “slack old body suits.” The system of desiring useful bodies causes him to abuse other 
bodies: he is involved in murdering beautiful young bodies to possess and trade them like 
commercial goods. Moreover, he insists that “people might even start to share bodies to 
go out in, the way girls share clothes now” (117). As a result, the novel displays the 
terrifying vision in which an elite is free to shop for new bodies and change their old ones 
whilst innumerable amounts of other people are exploited, abused and murdered. Leo 
Adams is no exception to this violent system. His beautiful new body suddenly becomes 
the object of Matte’s desire. After he rejects Matte’s offer to buy his new body, Matte 
continuously pursues him. Thus, a hybrid produced by the economy of desire actually 
intensifies the brutal power-system that underlies a capitalist society.  
Consequently, the characters’ metamorphoses provide both pleasurable and 
fearful prospects. While technology here promotes and promises to people in the prospect 
of a better and more joyful life, the novel shows how this expectation is marred by the 
paradoxical effects of metamorphosis. Because the characters in the novel, as in capitalist 
                                                          
46 Claire Colebrook, Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed (London and New York: Continuum, 
2006), 143.  
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societies, act according to a logic of “desire as lack”, we find that Adam’s pleasure 
concerning his new body is disrupted and that his new body is threatened by Matte. The 
mobility and potentiality that technology could provide is destroyed by people who desire 
to fulfil their sense of lack. In this context, mutates as new bodies are not presented as a 
“post-human” or a new species beyond humanism or the concept of identity. What is 
more, from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, these new bodies reject the potential 
power of bodies that affect and are affected by other bodies. In fact, from the lens of 
Deleuze and Guattari, the body’s capability of affects truly triggers our transformation or 
becoming-other. However, The Body shows that the body becomes an object of desire 
based on a sense of lack.    
 
          
             3. Becoming-Other 
  
As I have suggested, The Body subverts the system of “desire as lack” and opens 
characters to what Deleuze and Guattari call “becoming.” Regardless of his intentions, 
Leo Adams is repeatedly driven into heterotopian situations, which cause him ceaseless 
bafflement by confusing the fundamental categories of self and other, the living and the 
dead. These perplexing experiences happen in a myriad of unexpected and unfamiliar 
situations, and compel him to face them as challenges to his identity. Encountering this 
problematization of his very identity forces Leo Adams to shake and uproot his idea of 
self. This ungrounding, uprooting, dissolution of the character is the extension and 
intensification of their metamorphosis, whereby they are “becoming-other” from the 
perspective of Deleuze and Guattari. Becoming-other is associated with assemblage or 
multiplicity, on the ground that “becoming” is, according to Deleuze, “always ‘between’ 
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or ‘among’: a woman between women, or an animal among others”.47 Consequently, to 
appreciate the nature of Leo Adams’s metamorphoses, it is necessary to examine the 
problems he encounters as he enters into these newly arisen heterotopias. Through these 
problems, we can investigate how new bodies become the other, although they are 
dominated by their concept of identity. In this sense, we can also explore the capabilities 
of bodies in terms of Deleuze and Guattari.    
The first problem of Leo Adams is that he becomes a “hybrid” and his 
connections to the world become disjunctive. He believes he is temporarily borrowing 
another’s body and that his self-identity as Adam will not change. This faith in the 
stability of his identity is encouraged by Ralph’s statement that: “Your mind and the 
body’s nervous system are in perfect coordination. You have your old mind in a new 
body. New life has been made” (41). However, Adam acknowledges that he has in fact 
become a “new combination” (44), not just a simple dual entity comprised of Adam’s 
brain and Mark’s body. In other words, he is an assemblage of a living brain and a dead 
body, as well as being a disjunctive connection between himself and other. This 
monstrous combination disrupts the traditional distinctions between self and other, the 
living and the dead. Leo Adams recognizes that his self cohabits with the other whom he 
cannot grasp. Consequently, his transformation becomes monstrous, a combination of 
parts like a “Frankenstein” (40), who finds himself “beyond good and evil” (44). It is for 
this reason that new bodies also call themselves “mutants, freaks, and human unhumans” 
(120). Regardless of Adam’s mind, his experience as a hybrid “human unhuman” forces 
him into numerous new connections that undermine the very category of self.  
The other peculiar problem Leo Adams faces is heteroglossia. Heteroglossia 
causes him to lose common ground from which to name and call. Even though Adam 
names his new body Leo Adams, his new body is still referred to as “Mark” by Mark’s 
friends. For example, when Leo Adams is accosted by two gay friends, they call him 
                                                          
47  Gilles Deleuze, Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Grace 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 2.  
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“Mark” and talk to him as if he were their friend. This scene reveals that Adam’s new 
body still in a sense belongs to Mark, or is marked out by his physical externality. And 
yet, paradoxically, as a mutant, Leo Adams’s body cannot be named or defined as Mark. 
Thus, the new body is split into two names, which leads Leo Adams into a labyrinth of 
the signifier. Furthermore, we realize that this new body cannot truly be called either Leo 
Adams or Mark. This hybrid body dismantles the common ground for linguistic reference, 
abrogating the conventionally fixed categories of self. In this sense, from Bhabha’s 
perspective, Leo Adams as a hybrid can be related to the “in-between” self and the other 
or “difference within”. Accordingly, as Hallward explains, Leo Adams as a hybrid 
becomes what Bhabha calls an “‘interstitial’ agency that refuses the binary representation 
of social antagonism”.48  
However, Leo Adams sees himself as a “fake”, as a “difference” rather than as 
an “interstitial” subject, while other people are thought to be “real”. During his trip across 
Europe, he gets an “odd job” cleaning rooms and working in the kitchen at a Women’s 
Center. This Center is a sort of spa or sanatorium where mostly middle-aged, middle-
class, and divorced women receive “spiritual” nourishment or therapy. Patricia, the 
woman in charge of the Center, is in her late fifties, and is depicted as a militant feminist. 
She forces Leo Adams to make love with her. Despite his anger at this situation, Leo 
Adams finds he cannot simply reject Patricia’s persistent demands. He thinks that “there 
was something in her I didn’t want to let go of. Her body and soul were one, she was 
‘real’” (122). In contrast to Patricia, mutants like Leo Adam seem to be phonies, because 
their bodies do not identify with their minds. Indeed, they are multiplicities incapable of 
realizing their former unity. To further complicate his troubles, Leo Adams encounters 
another problem blurring the boundaries between “fake” and “real”. In the hedonistic 
festival that the women of the Women’s Center take part in, Leo Adams is unable to 
recognize a famous film star, who had been metamorphosed into a new body at the same 
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time as him. The world becomes the realm of the “simulacrum’ where mutants are not 
distinguished from “real” people. Despite Leo Adams’s anxiety about his identity, he 
finds himself falling further and further into the realm of the simulacrum in which real 
people are confused with fakes. Despite Leo Adams’s consciousness of the difference 
between real body and fake bodies, the bodies of a real and a fake are not distinguished 
from each other.  
However, it is also the body which propels Leo Adams into ever new lines of 
flight, into ever new heterotopias. We can see this firstly in the fact that it is the body 
which produces Leo Adams’s self—even though he is unaware of this process. Adam’s 
desires, thoughts and memories seemingly survive and are transplanted into the new body 
so that Leo Adams seems to recall Adam’s memories and desires. However, he is also 
aware of a “ghost or shadow soul” inside him: “I can feel things, perhaps memories, of 
the man who was here first. Perhaps the physical body has a soul. There’s a phrase of 
Freud’s that might apply here: the bodily ego.” (51) This obscure ghost-like thing, this 
phantom or trace, turns out to be the distinctive marks or scars left on the body, which 
record its experience and memories. All bodies including new bodies and “real” bodies 
have scars, which keep their memories. Leo Adams doesn’t know Mark’s history exactly 
but the memories inscribed into scars on the body cannot be removed. For example, 
Alicia at the Women’s Center, with whom he falls in love, asks him about the scar under 
his elbow. He cannot answer her, because he does not know about it. Similarly, when 
Patricia at the festival sees Leo Adams’ ears pierced and tells him they have matching 
earrings, he is perplexed to find his ears have several holes. These holes are traces on the 
new body which Adam’s mind cannot govern. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conceptions of becoming and assemblage, Leo Adams’s scar can be accounted with 
Adam’s becoming-Mark as well as Leo Adams’s becoming-Mark. Moreover, as Leonard 
Lawlor asserts, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “becoming” is connected with “aging”, 
which “indicates the necessary condition for becoming; the condition in which one’s 
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molar form is destroyed—the condition, in other words, of “desubjectification”. 49 
Specifically, according to Lawlor, Deleuze and Guattari explain life as cracking: “in a life, 
there is a type of cracking, that is micrological, like the small, almost imperceptible 
cracks in a dish”.50 This crack can be understood as aging. The bodies of Mark and Leo 
Adams have been aged and cracked over time.     
Scars left on the body in this novel play a key role by providing a signature that 
both discloses and proves a person’s identity. Just as Odysseus’ scar on his thigh proves 
his identity to his nurse, Euryclea, scars in The Body serve to indicate identity in diverse 
ways. One interesting case is that of Alicia, who deliberately inscribes scars onto her 
body. One day, Leo Adam discovers three little childhood scars on her knees and is also 
surprised at the “random and deep scratchmarks” on her left arm. These marks are letters 
she “doodles on herself". Eventually, he even finds the word “poet” inscribed on her chest. 
Although Alicia has many scars and has suffered from painful experiences in her 
childhood, the marks she deliberately makes serve to symbolize that she controls her life 
herself. In contrast with Alicia’s scars, new bodies have marks produced by doctors. 
Mutants believe they are transformed to be “all seamless”, but they also receive scars as 
part of the process by which their new bodies are “born.” Matte who desires Leo Adam’s 
body, suddenly attacks him to examine the mark on his head. Matte says the “mark” on 
his head shows that he has “been achieved” (116) rather than born naturally and scarred 
normally. Thus, in this novel, bodies have scars or marks that record both “real” people’s 
and new bodies’ lives.  Leo Adam’s body continuously reveals that it belonged to Mark 
because its diverse scars, holes and marks are uncontravertible testament to its 
provenance and history.  
Nevertheless, new bodies, including Leo Adam, belong to neither the former 
owners of the bodies nor the present owners, because new bodies generate their own new 
                                                          
49 Leonard Lawlor, “Following the Rats: Becoming-Animal in Deleuze and Guattari”, Substance, 
Issue 117 (37:3, 2008), 173.  
50 Leonard Lawlor, “Following the Rats”, 172.  
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scars, holes, and marks as they live out new connections with other “real” people and 
mutants. That is to say, they as mutants make new histories or lives, although their 
histories are also endlessly mixed and affected by the histories of the dead bodies. Ralph, 
for example, falls in love with Florence who plays the part of Ophelia at the theatre. 
Ralph and Florence eventually even have a child who is, therefore, the offspring of a 
mutant and a human. Ralph is making his own traces on his body as he lives out new 
possibilities. Similarly, Leo Adam becomes obsessed with his own sensory experience 
and the ways in which different emotions penetrate his new body. His sensations and 
pleasures as well as his sufferings are produced by his new body which has continuous 
connections with other bodies. These sensations and affections cannot be accounted for 
merely by seeing them as the union of Adam’s mind and Mark’s body. This is because 
these feelings also have to be seen as produced through the complex web of relations and 
forces that the body connects to and which condition the body. From the perspective of 
Deleuze and Guattari, it is only as the emergent property of this network of dynamic 
relations that Leo Adam and Ralph are truly metamorphosed. 
Finally, Leo Adam actively experiences “becoming nothing” as a means by 
which to escape from the system of “desire as lack.” When Leo Adams is running away 
from Matte, he returns back to the hospital with the hope of regaining his old body. But 
Matte waits for him there in order to take possession of his body. What is worse, Adam’s 
old body is no longer available because the hospital cremates all useless corpses, as his 
has been designated. Leo Adams recognizes that he cannot return to his old body nor get 
away from Matte. His final act is to burn his body, degrading it in the process, so as to 
forever evade Matte. His body can no longer be the object of pursuit nor can it ever be 
possessed by other people. Leo Adams’s “self-immolation” is the final transformation 
that he undergoes. This metamorphosis is one where he becomes a nobody, a nullity: “I 
was a stranger on the earth, a nobody with nothing, belonging nowhere, a body alone, 
condemned to begin again, in the nightmare of eternal life” (149). This is his affirmation 
of metamorphosis, one which opens him up to the true freedom of nomadic existence, but 
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only at the cost of ever actualizing it. The liberation from the logic of lack is finally only 
possible for Leo Adam with the termination of all desire.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Hanif Kureishi in The Body explores many possibilities of the hybrid or more 
specifically, of a mode of being produced with the aid of bio-technology. The protagonist 
Adam transplants his brain into a young and beautiful corpse and becomes a “new body”. 
This fantastic transition from his old body into a new one leads to both pleasurable and 
horrific visions. The optimistic potential of this transformation is found in the expansion 
of power: Adam is able to change his body and to enjoy a desirable life. Yet, this prospect 
is also reversed by the logic of desire premised upon lack. The opportunity for humans to 
increase their power is finally found to be limited by their rigid adherence to conventional 
categories such as self and the other and to their pathological experience of “desire as 
lack.” Even though Adam is able to transform himself into Leo Adams, his mind (or 
spirit) is still anchored in his old self, and all the pleasures that he seeks are simply 
neurotic repetitions of previously suppressed or thwarted desires. From the perspective of 
Deleuze and Guattari, Adam as a hybrid does not experience his transformation into a 
new body: he merely plays out the patterns and structures of desire that had been socially 
inscribed into him. In other words, the characters’ transformations repeat and even 
intensify the fixed system of desire inherent in their society. Given this situation, 
Kureishi’s presentation of a hybrid of self and other does not invent a new mode of being, 
but rather repeats and intensifies the fixed conception of identity.  
Despite this critical attitude toward hybridity, Kureishi nonetheless shows how 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of “assemblage” and “becoming” opens the possibility 
for hybrids as new bodies to push themselves into the “in-between” of self and other, the 
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living and the dead. From the perspective of Homi Bhabha, these hybrids would be 
located in-between self and other, which implies that they are neither self nor other. 
Although Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of becoming is similar to Bhabha’s notion of 
hybridity based on the “in-between”, Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage and becoming 
focus on affective and reciprocal relations between and among bodies. Accordingly, Leo 
Adam as a new body affects and is affected by the dead body, which leads the characters 
to “becoming-other” and “aging” with an assemblage of self and other, or the living body 
and the dead body. Finally, Leo Adam as a new body becomes nobody, which flows 
between the boundaries that had previously supported his identity. This demonstrates the 
possibility of evading the categories that define us, and as such it indicates the radical 
potential for transformation to self and other, which our encounter with hybrids, mutants 
and monsters can trigger.  
 106 
 
 
 
 
Part II. J.M. Coetzee’s Novels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
 
Chapter 4 
The Politics of bare life in Life & Times of Michael K 
 
1. Introduction  
             Michael K as an African gardener, in J.M. Coetzee’s Life & Times of Michael K, 
searches for his own minimal form of life, but his life is branded as an “idle” one, accused 
of being like a “parasite”1 by the apartheid regime. K’s simple life, accordingly, causes 
him to be imprisoned in the labour camps. From Giorgio Agamben’s perspective, K’s 
form of life is politicized and excluded from mainstream society by the regime. 
According to Agamben, ever since “living bodies” became the objects of politics in 
Western history, our forms of life have been divided into “bare life” and “qualified life”. 
As Agamben asserts, bare life is produced by the process of the split between zoe and 
bios. In Ancient Greek, zoe means the “simple fact of life” common to all living beings 
(animals, men or gods), and bios indicates the “form or way of living proper to an 
individual or group”. 2 However, once zoe is entered into the sphere of the “polis”, which 
is the process of the “politicization of bare life”,3 “bare life” is produced as a “political 
element”.4 In fact, bare life bears many affinities to zoe on the grounds that both represent 
natural and unqualified life. Yet, bare life is neither zoe nor bios because it is located at 
the threshold between zoe and bios. In terms of Agamben’s theory, K’s life is not merely 
excluded from the form of political life, but it is at the same time included in it. As a 
result, he is imprisoned in the camps, as a part of the process of the politicization of his 
                                                          
1 J. M. Coetzee, Life & Times of Michael K (London: Vintage Books, 2004), 116. 
2 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.  
3 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 4.  
4 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 9.  
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simple life. The camp is, according to Agamben, a “biopolitical space”5 in which power 
decides life and death outside the law. In this exceptional space, humans are reduced to 
“homo sacer” who “may be killed and yet not sacrificed”6 and is located at the zone of 
indistinction between the inside and the outside of the law. From Agamben’s perspective, 
this novel raises a question of how K’s life is produced as that of homo sacer by 
biopolitics and incarceration during the period of apartheid. 
Additionally, given that K endlessly escapes from the camps, K’s elusiveness 
raises another political issue. According to Dominic Head, K represents an elusive 
“challenge” to his times, one which was a form of resistance to the oppressive social and 
political of apartheid institution.7 The novel is set during the period when the oppressive 
regime was still in power. As David Attwell notes, the novel was written, “partly …in 
response to a particular political and constitutional debate in South Africa in the early 
1980s, when the nation seemed to enter a cycle of insurrection and repression whose 
outcome threatened to be bloody”.8 Nevertheless, K’s elusiveness seems to represent a 
passivity, disassociated from any forms of social and political life, rather than a political 
resistance to oppressive power. As Attwell indicates, Coetzee “chooses not to represent 
mass resistance”,9 although the novel shows sporadic guerrilla activity. K’s escape is also 
distinguished from that of deserters, like the grandson of the Visagies. In order to avoid a 
war, the grandson ran away from the army and hid in his grandparents’ farm. However, in 
spite of his continuous escapes from the camps, K is not directly engaged with any 
organized activities against the apartheid regime, but K instead gets away from any rules 
that might deprive him of freedom of movement. As K remarks, “I am not in the war” 
(138), seeking to deny the war’s reality.  In the light of his denial, K’s elusiveness can be 
                                                          
5 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 123.  
6 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8. 
7 Dominic Head. J.M. Coetzee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 93. 
8 David Attwell, J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the politics of Writing (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 93.  
9 David Attwell, 93. According to Attwell, Coetzee in this novel “has freed himself from the 
burden of having to unravel the meaning of the last stage of colonialism” (Attwell 88). 
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considered as a negation of socio-political life, rather than a political challenge to the 
oppressive power of apartheid. 
 However, through the lens of Agamben’s works, what would make K’s life a 
challenge to the established order is precisely his “inactivity”. According to Agamben, 
“inactivity” renders the sovereign power inoperative, because the sovereign power 
operates through the distinctions between natural life and political life. In other words, the 
condition of bare life, of being at the threshold between zoe and bios, makes the sovereign 
power inactive, as it is neither natural life nor political life. Similarly, Agamben, in The 
Open, explains the “anthropological machine”10  which draws the distinction between 
humans and animals and defines human life as opposed to animal life. A hybrid, such as 
the werewolf, occupies the space between the divisions drawn by the sovereign power: 
“The werewolf, who is precisely neither man nor beast, … dwells paradoxically within 
both while belonging to neither”.11 For Agamben, this paradox marks a threshold between 
a man and a beast, as it is associated with “something for which we perhaps have no 
name”.12 As Alex Murray emphasizes, this challenge “is not a matter of choosing animal 
or human life, but of attempting to render the machine inoperative, to stop it from 
working”.13  This inactivity is also linked to Agamben’s conception of “potentiality”. 
Potentiality is considered as the potential to do something, but Agamben’s conception of 
“potentiality” is also “the potentiality not to (be or do)”14 something, which means “the 
potential not to pass into actuality”.15 In the light of Agamben’s notion of “potentiality”, 
K’s elusiveness manifests the “potentiality” not to do something: K not only escapes from 
the camps, but also refuses to speak. K refuses to speak to soldiers and medical staffs who 
                                                          
10  Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and animal, trans. Kevin Attwell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 26-7.  
11 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 105 
12 Agamben, The Open, 83.  
13 Alex Murray, Giorgio Agamben (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 45. 
14 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 45. 
15 Giorgio Agamben, “On Potentiality”, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed., trans. 
and intro. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 180. 
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want to hear about his identity and to people who want to know his story of life in the 
camps, although he often expresses his thoughts in monologue and he engages in 
dialogue with people. In this respect, K’s character, as Duncan McColl Chesney asserts, 
is to be understood precisely through his “silence”. More specifically, Chesney asserts 
that K’s silence produces the “ethico-political aporia” as Agamben’s conception of 
potentiality.16 In short, K’s reticence implies “the potentiality not to do”, which provides 
the possibility of inactivating the sovereign power.   
K’s refusal to eat food can also be considered as potentiating non-engagement, 
not doing. However, K’s act is problematic, since his decision to live only on a daily 
spoonful of water, will lead to his starvation. This refusal is an attempt to negate the 
body’s natural impulse to eat in order to survive and is consequently an act designed to 
negate life itself. Additionally, if his refusal makes the sovereign power inoperative, it 
also means that he may be politically victimized or sacrificed like a suicide bomber who 
uses his body to pursue the political or religious belief of his own community. In this 
context, Hardt and Negri highlight the limitations of Agamben’s conception of “bare life”. 
According to Hardt and Negri, K is presented as a figure of refusal. However, they add: 
“the refusal certainly is the beginning of a liberatory politics, but it is only a beginning” 
and “the refusal in itself is empty”.17 Hardt and Negri’s criticism of K’s refusal is focused 
on its affinity to a form of suicide: “in political terms, the refusal in itself (of work, 
authority, and voluntary servitude) leads only to a kind of social suicide”.18 Instead, they 
argue, “we need to create a new social body, which is a project that goes well beyond 
refusal”.19  The notion of a new social body is enlarged to include a multitude or a 
collective social subject. Regardless of the potentiality of a multitude, it is certain that, 
                                                          
16 Ducan McColl Chesney, “Toward an Ethics of Silence: Michael K”, Criticism 49:3 (Summer 
2007), 307.  
17 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 204.  
18 Hardt and Negri, 204.  
19 Hardt and Negri, 204.  
 111 
from the vantage point of Hardt and Negri, K’s refusal is to exclude a potentiality of 
interaction between bodies in the domain of politics. In this context, it is important to 
question how K’s refusal to eat has both a potentiality and a limitation in regard to 
Agamben’s notion of refusal.   
    In the context outlined above, this chapter will firstly attempt to explore the 
political aspects of what I have called the inclusive exclusion of K’s simple life in terms 
of Agamben’s theory of “homo sacer”. In order to examine the politicization of K’s 
natural life, this chapter will focus on the relation between bare life, political life and the 
camps. Secondly, this chapter will discuss K’s refusal to eat in terms of Agamben’s 
theory of potentiality, which will also be connected with the ethical and political 
questions of social suicide and sacrifice. This discussion of K’s refusal will then be 
rethought through Deleuze’s remarks on the refusal of “Bartleby”. Consequently, through 
K’s simple life and its relation to biopolitics, we can reconsider Deleuze’s ethics of the 
body.  
 
 
            2. K’s simple life as bare life   
 
     From the lens of Agamben, this novel presents the different forms of life: K’s 
bare life and other characters’ qualified life during the apartheid regime. Oppressive 
power is at the heart of the division between K’s and other people’s lives. The title of the 
novel directly places K’s life in relation to the time of apartheid in South Africa. K tries 
to sustain his own life as a gardener, but his life is interrupted by the regime which 
imposes a curfew and requires permits, and also by the precarious life of careless violence, 
food queues, beggars and thieves. K’s simple life is continuously unsettled by oppressive 
power. Once he takes to the road, initially to return his mother to her birthplace, the life 
of K is perceived as an unqualified form of life and is then imprisoned in the labour 
camps. In the light of Agamben’s conception of biopolitics, K’s form of life as an 
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unqualified life entails his imprisonment and then becomes a “bare life”. As for this 
matter, Gert Buelens and Dominiek Hoens significantly discuss K’s life and its relation to 
bare life through the perspective of Agamben. 20 However, I will investigate this matter 
by focusing on the politicization of K’s body and life in regard to his political position 
and his elusiveness during apartheid.  
     In order to examine the politicization of K’s body and life, it is useful to note K’s 
social and political position in society. This novel describes different forms of life 
organized along racial, political and economic lines. Although the novel does not seem to 
directly deal with racial issues during apartheid, there are differences among people’s 
socio-economic backgrounds (such as whether they are farm owners, house servants, 
soldiers or prisoners). Among them, K is described as part of a socio-economic minority 
who is an uneducated and fatherless gardener for the City of Cape Town. However, he 
starts to be categorised as an exceptional and obscure object, once his body and life are 
arrested by those representing the power of the regime. More specifically, his mother 
Anna, a house servant, asks K to take her to the farm in Prince Albert where he thinks she 
grew up. This trip puts him in conflict with the apartheid bureaucracy, which controls the 
mobility of certain racial groups through a system of permits and identity documents. 
Although they do not receive the necessary permits from the police, they decide 
nevertheless to travel to their intended destination. During the journey, K’s mother dies in 
the hospital in Stellenbosh, but he continues to travel to Prince Albert with his dead 
mother’s ashes. In his journey, he is arrested by the police in Prince Albert. In this context, 
K’s body and life are directly controlled by the bio-politics of the regime.  
The politicization of K’s body and life is related to the classification of his 
identity as suggested in the police report when he is arrested in Prince Albert. The police 
report includes the details of his identity and life, a situation which forces him to be 
                                                          
20 Gert Buelens and Dominiek Hoens, “‘Above and Beneath Classification’: Bartleby, Life and 
Times of Michael K, and Syntagmatic Participation”, Diacritics, 37:2-3 (summer-fall 2007), 157-
70.  
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directly involved with political life. It is necessary to look at the official report in order to 
investigate the relation between K’s simple life and political life: “No one knew where he 
was from. He had no papers on him, not even a green card. On the charge sheet he was 
listed ‘Michael Visagie—CM—40—NFA—Unemployed,’ and charged with leaving his 
magisterial district without authorization, not being in possession of an identification 
document, infringing the curfew, and being drunk and disorderly” (70). K’s name and age 
are recorded wrongly: his name is written as “Michael Visagie” rather than Michael K, 
and his age is given as “40” instead of “thirty years old” (4). The meaning of CM and 
NFA are not provided explicitly in the narrative and the details of K’s “being drunk and 
disorderly” are not given; only his endless movements without the permits are depicted. 
Accordingly, he is categorized as unemployed, an outlaw and a deviant, and then enters 
into a process involving the politicization of natural life.  
Given the political context of the apartheid regime, we need to think the relation 
between K’s race and his confinement. As for K’s race, commentators have interpreted 
the acronym “CM” differently. Dominic Head explains “CM” as “coloured male” 21 . 
Poyner follows Head’s interpretation of K’s racial identity and insists that, by being 
characterized as “disenfranchised “Cape coloured” and a vagrant unemployed”, K is 
thereby “marginalized”.22 However, Derek Attridge observes that “questions of race are 
strikingly absent from the novel”, because the family name of K and the name of the 
narrator are not provided and the report of K represents only an official perception: “True, 
Michael is identified as CM (Coloured Male) on a charge sheet (70), but this 
categorization, like the guess at his age—forty—and the garbled name (“Michael 
Visage”), is the product only of official perception”.23 According to Attridge, Coetzee 
                                                          
21 Dominic Head, 97. 
22 Jane Poyner, J.M. Coetzee and the Paradox of Postcolonial Authorship (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 
69. 
23 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in Event (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago press, 2004), 59.  
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indicates K’s race obscurely, because Coetzee tries to describe the “groundlessness of 
racial discriminations”.24 
     Nevertheless, K’s racial position is implied as that of a Cape coloured within the 
apartheid regime. Regardless of his mother’s status, as a domestic servant, he is distinctly 
recognized as a member of one of the oppressed groups, during the apartheid period. For 
example, after he escapes from the labour gang, K crosses the fence to sleep on the way 
to the veld. Because of his physical appearance, he is woken by the countryman and is 
warned to go off the land not to make any trouble: “I just slept here, nothing else,” K 
objected. “Don’t come looking for trouble!” said the old man. “They find you in the veld, 
they shoot you! You just make trouble! Now go!” (46). The Visagies’ grandson also 
regards him immediately as a farm servant when he sees K for the first time: “My 
grandparents were lucky to find you,” the grandson went on. “People have a hard time 
finding good farm servants nowadays” (62). Although the grandson tells K that they can 
live together on the farm peacefully, K escapes from the farm and decides to live as a 
cultivator, because he thinks the Visagie grandson is trying to turn him into a “body-
servant” (65)—in other words, to re-impose categories of apartheid. K is perceived as 
either black or coloured, which causes his movement to be restricted. This restriction ends 
in his confinement only because of his movement without the necessary permits. His 
endless movement is accordingly necessarily involved with an attempt to evade the 
domination of the apartheid regime.   
     K’s movement is controlled by the apartheid regime which is grounded on the 
mechanism of biopolitics: it deals with human life as its object and divides it into a 
simple life and a political life. Following Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality and 
Aristotle’s Politics, Agamben traces the division between simple life and political life in 
Western history. Agamben notes Foucault’s observation that “at the threshold of the 
modern era, natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of State 
                                                          
24 Derek Attridge, 59. 
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power, and politics turns into biopolitics”.25 In other words, our natural life became the 
object of power in the modern era. Despite the fact that he cites Foucault’s conception of 
“biopolitics”, Agamben notes that biopolitics was also found in the classical world where, 
as we have seen, there was a conceptual division between zoe and bios, bare life and 
political life. As I noted earlier, “zoe is expressed as the simple fact of living common to 
all living beings (animals, men, or gods), while bios is defined as “the form or way of 
living proper to” human life required in the political sphere, which makes human beings 
different from animals and gods. The “natural sweetness”26 of zoe was politicized, and the 
political bios became a form of the “good life”.27 This process is called “the politicization 
of bare life”. 28  In this context, Braidotti interprets Agamben’s notion of zoe as a 
“generative force” which is the opposite of Agamben’s ‘bare life’”29 on the grounds that 
the notion of zoe can be considered an “impersonal force, or rather an apersonal force”.30 
Yet, Braidotti’s account of zoe is different from that of the commentators such as Ernest 
Laclau and Alex Murray who emphasize the division between zoe and bios rather than the 
opposition between zoe and bare life. 31 It is here that I would rather stress the division 
between zoe and bios in order to approach the politicization of K’s simple life. As Alex 
Murray observes, the division also means that “politics has to exclude life from its sphere 
in order to pursue political life as the ‘good life’”.32  
                                                          
25 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 3.  
26 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 11. 
27 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7.  
28 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 4. 
29  Rosi Braidotti, “Nomadic Ethics”, Deleuze, eds. Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 172.  
30 Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: Nomadic Ethics (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2006), 234. 
“Life being an impersonal, or rather an apersonal force—zoe in its magnificent indifference to the 
interests of humans—also means that death is so less so”. In this sentence, Braidotti emphasizes 
affinities between life, death and zoe, but her definition of zoe cannot be accounted with Deleuze’s 
notion of “the impersonal” in regard to life and death. Deleuze’s account of life and death as the 
impersonal implies becoming as well as the immanence.  
31 Ernesto Laclau, “Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy?”, Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty & Life, 
eds. Matthew Calarco and Steven Decaroli (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 19.  
32 Alex Murray, Giorgio Agamben (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 60.  
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         From Agamben’s insight, K’s endless movement is problematic, because K crosses 
the boundaries between the inside and the outside of the law. In order to restrict K’s 
movement, the regime labels K as an unemployed vagrant and confines him in the camps. 
However, these labour camps are not prisons for criminals that have violated laws, but 
rather spaces for ‘idle ones’ such as the unemployed and vagrants. In fact, ‘idle ones’ are 
not strictly criminals, but they are imprisoned nevertheless. K is registered as an 
“arsonist” as well as an “escapee” by the apartheid power (131). The nexus between an 
idle one and an escapee signals the process of the politicization of simple life. 
Furthermore, this politicization rests upon the metaphysical logic of what life is proper to 
humans in Western history. In this novel, officials such as soldiers, the police and medical 
officers play a role in politicizing K’s life. They are authorized to regulate people’s 
movements and to imprison them, if necessary. Additionally, the officers turn people’s 
lives into language, or documents, in order to exclude unqualified forms of life. In this 
way, people’s bodies are transformed into writing. Agamben here follows Aristotle’s 
definition of politics in relation to language.  
 
Among living beings, only man has language. The voice is the sign of pain 
and pleasure, and this is why it belongs to other living beings (since their 
nature has developed to the point of having the sensations of pain and 
pleasure and of signifying the two). But language is for manifesting the 
fitting and the unfitting and the just and the unjust. To have the sensation of 
the good and the bad and of the just and the unjust is what is proper to men 
as opposed to other living beings, and the community of these things makes 
dwelling and the city.33   
 
Aristotle insists that language is exclusive to human beings, which leads to political life, 
because language is available for human beings to distinguish between the good and the 
bad, the just and the unjust, in relation to political life and accordingly to exclude and 
                                                          
33 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a, Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7-8. 
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include bare life: “There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, 
separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains 
himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion”34. In contrast with language, 
‘voice’ belongs to both humans and animals: “Speech is something different from voice, 
which is possessed by other animals also and used by them to express pain or pleasure”.35 
For this reason, voice is associated with natural life, or zoe, common to all living beings 
such as humans and animals. Agamben argues that Aristotle situates “the proper place of 
the polis in the transition from voice to language” 36 . For Aristotle and Agamben, 
language is the vehicle that divides zoe and bios for a political form of life. In this sense, 
the transition from voice to language is related to the bios of zoe, or the politicization of 
bare life. 
In terms of this definition given by Aristotle and relayed by Agamben, the 
characteristic displayed by K can be considered as being between a human and a non-
human animal: he is speechless, illogical and amoral. K’s physical appearance is initially 
depicted metaphorically as a hybrid of human and animal: he is born with a “hare lip”, 
“curled like a snail’s foot” (3). In fact K’s life is closer to animals on the grounds that he 
does not have his own house but lives in caves and burrows or endlessly moves like an 
animal. Moreover, he has a lack of responsibility to family relations and social duties:  
 
How fortunate that I have no children, he thought: how fortunate that I have 
no desire to father. I would not know what to do with a child out here in the 
heart of the country, who would need milk and clothes and friends and 
schooling. I would fail in my duties, I would be the worst of fathers. Where 
it is not hard to live a life that consists merely of passing time. I am one of 
the fortunate ones who escape being called. (104) 
 
                                                          
34 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8.  
35 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders 
(London and New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 60.  
36 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7.  
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Although Attridge argues that K shows a “sense of total lack of responsibility” in this 
passage,37 he denies K’s features of being animal and amoral, but rather connects K’s 
attitude with an act of resistance to the norms or morals of the prevailing and empowered 
culture:  
 
That K is some kind of amoral being, more animal than human, or that he is 
perhaps still an infant at heart? Certainly not; the very fact of his open-
minded speculation on this matter indicates a profound ethical awareness. 
Rather, I would argue, passages like this provide a taste of what it might 
mean to resist the urge to apply pre-existing norms and to make fixed moral 
judgements—which, as I’ve suggested, is one form of allegorizing reading—
and to value instead the contingent, the processual, the provisional that keeps 
moral questions alive.38  
 
Concerned with the avoidance of responsibility, K thinks, “My mother was the one whose 
ashes I brought back, … and my father was Huis Norenius. My father was the list of rules 
on the door of the dormitory” (104-5). In this context, what Attridge means by K’s lack of 
responsibility can be understood as a resistance to the rules and norms that society 
regulates. Attridge’s account of an “allegorizing reading” which relies on moral codes or 
meanings is opposed to the way of opening the “space of the other” in literature.39 
However, Buelens and Hoens criticize Attridge’s account of an allegorizing reading: 
“Both allegory and metaphor derive from a fundamental paradigmatic impulse, which 
specializes in finding similarity in spite of difference, differences in spite of 
                                                          
37 Derek Attridge, 56.  
38 Derek Attridge, 54.  
39 Derek Attridge, 64. “Allegory, one might say, deals with the already known, whereas literature 
opens a space for the other. Allegory announces a moral code, literature invites an ethical 
response.” Jane Poyner also provides an allegory with an act of resistance: “So Michael K resists 
not only state oppression but, as a character in a book, he resists interpretation.” (Jane Poyner, 74) 
An allegorical reading of K can be rethought through the medical officer in the ward. The officer 
calls K “allegory”, which may be understood as his elusiveness from the officer’s interpretation, 
but the officer’s view of K has the limitation as suggested in his job, although he sympathizes with 
K and thinks of him as an obscure being. 
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similarities.”40 Instead of an allegorizing reading of K’s life and his elusiveness, it is more 
useful to approach K’s life through the lens of Agamben, because K’s body and life are 
directly dominated and limited by the power of the regime. Moreover, K’s life is based on 
his body in the milieu of nature rather than language.  
Head and Poyner observe that K’s silence is associated with his disprivileged 
position. More specifically, K’s silence is related to the fact that he belongs to a coloured 
labouring class, which is disciplined into being silent by the oppressive society. As Head 
points out, K’s “language acquisition is expressed in the negative”: it is “the cultivation of 
silence in the face of oppression”41 acquired by learning “to be quiet while watching his 
mother polishing floor” (4). Poyner also asserts that “the protagonist Michael K passively 
accepts his marginality”.42 K’s education in being quiet leads him into the problems of his 
communicating with other people. He thinks: “Always, when he tried to explain himself, 
there remained a gap, a hole, a darkness before which his understanding baulked, into 
which it was useless to pour words. The words were eaten up, the gap remained. His was 
always a story, a story with a hole in it: a wrong story, always wrong” (110). One of the 
processes that divide K’s life and political life is presented in the dialogue between K and 
the nurse, which occurs after his mother has passed away:  
 
 He was still sitting in the corner when a man in a suit and tie came to speak 
to him. What had been his mother’s name, age, place of abode, religious 
denomination? What had her business been in Stellenbosch? Did K have her 
travel documents? ‘I was taking her home,’ replied K. ‘It was cold where she 
lived in Cape Town, it was raining all the time, it was bad for her health. I 
was taking her to a place where she could get better. We did not plan to stop 
in Stellenbosch.’ Then he began to fear he was giving away too much, and 
would answer no more questions. The man gave up and went away. After a 
                                                          
40 Buelens and Hoens, 162, “Seen in this light, Attridge cannot escape from the 
allegorizing/metaphorizing tendency that he is aiming to expose in his account of the singularity of 
literature.” 
41 Dominic Head, 98. 
42 Jane Poyner, 69.  
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while he came back, squatted in front of K, and asked: ‘Have you yourself 
ever spent time in an asylum or institution for the handicapped or place of 
shelter? Have you ever held paid employment?’ K would not answer. ‘Sign 
your name here,’ said the man, and held out a paper, pointing to the space. 
When K shook his head the man signed the paper himself. (31) 
 
K cannot properly answer the questions of the nurse, because he “began to fear he was 
giving away too much, and would answer no more questions”. However, from the 
perspective of the nurse, K’s accounts of his dead mother do not constitute proper or 
legitimate answers to his questions. In addition, K cannot prove his identity with any 
cards or documents. In other words, K’s answers are not associated with what Aristotle 
and Agamben call the “language” proper to political life, but just with “voice” concerned 
with his ailing mother’s as well as his own pain and suffering. As a result, the nurse 
identifies K as a person unqualified for political life and sends him to an institution. That 
is why the nurse signs the paper instead of K, meaning he is not recorded as a proper 
person or a citizen in this society. Here again, his simple life becomes a bare or 
unqualified life.  
          However, what Agamben emphasizes about bare life is the inclusive exclusion of 
bare life by the sovereign power. Here, it is necessary to ask how it is possible for the 
sovereign power to produce bare life as the inclusive exclusion. According to Agamben, 
the sovereign ban, or the “state of exception”, enables the sovereign power to politicize 
bare life. For example, the exception of the law, which Agamben quotes from Cavlca, is 
the ban imposed on the bandit in the medieval age: “to ban someone is to say that anyone 
may harm him”.43 The bandit who is banned from his city, is considered as dead and can 
be killed by anybody. This ban, as Ernest Laclau explains, is “not simply a sanction” but 
rather “it involves abandonment”. 44  Homo sacer who “may be killed and yet not 
sacrificed” is also abandoned from the city and the law. Yet, as I noted earlier, homo 
                                                          
43 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 104-5. 
44 Ernest Laclau, 13.  
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sacer, in the form of the exception to the legal order, is situated at the zone of 
indistinction between the inside and the outside of the city and the law. The life of the 
bandit shows clearly the zone of indistinction between the inside and the outside. 
According to Agamben, “the life of the bandit, like that of the sacred man, is not a piece 
of animal nature without any relation to law and the city. It is, rather, a threshold of 
indistinction and of passage between animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion and 
inclusion: the life of the bandit is the life of the loup garou, the werewolf, who is 
precisely neither man nor beast, and who dwells paradoxically within both while 
belonging to neither”.45 Thus, this zone of indistinction means double negation, which is 
neither the inside nor the outside of the law. The bare life, or the life of homo sacer, is 
paradoxically at the threshold between the inside and the outside of the law and the city. 
Agamben insists that homo sacer “stubbornly remains with us”, but he is not produced in 
the city but “in the camp of Nazism and fascism” which “transformed the decision on 
bare life into the supreme political principle”.46 In the camps, humans live a bare form of 
life which is produced by the ban of the sovereign power.  
     The camps in Michael K are also ‘exceptional’ spaces. According to Agamben, 
“the camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the 
rule”.47 These exceptional spaces tend to be produced in the crisis of power or the law. 
The socio-political background to this novel is the chaos of the civil war in which the 
apartheid regime is in conflict with those waging an insurrection, including guerrilla 
activity. This socio-political breakdown causes K to encounter violence in every place. 
For example, at an early stage of this narrative, K is beaten by a group of men and has his 
money and his shoes taken by them (4). When K travels to Prince Albert with his 
mother’s ashes, his dead mother’s money is looted by a soldier: “‘What do you think the 
war is for?’ K said. ‘For taking other people’s money?’ ‘What do you think the war is 
                                                          
45 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 105. 
46 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 10. 
47 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 169.  
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for,’ said the soldier, parodying the movements of K’s mouth. ‘Thief. Watch it’” (37). As 
I noted earlier, the regime of apartheid restricted the movement of the people with permits 
and curfews. These restrictions are what Agamben calls the sovereign ban, which creates 
the inside and the outside of the camps. Yet, the space of the camp is at the threshold 
between the inside and the outside of the law. For this reason, Agamben asserts that “the 
decision of life”, in the camps, “becomes a decision of death, and biopolitics can turn into 
thanatopolitics”. 48  In the Jakkalsdrif labour camp, K becomes homo sacer, at the 
threshold of the inside and the outside of the law, in the form of the exception. When K 
asks the guard of the camp if he opens the gate, the following exchange occurs:  
 
The guard sat in his deckchair on the porch of the tiny guard house with his 
rifle leaning at his side against the wall. He smiled into the distance.  
‘So can you open the gate?’ said K. 
‘The only way to leave is with the work party,’ said the guard.  
‘And if I climb the fence? What will you do if I climb the fence?’ 
‘You climb the fence and I’ll shoot you, I swear to God I won’t think twice, 
so don’t try’.” (85) 
 
In the camp which is, as Agamben emphasizes, “the pure, absolute, and impassable 
biopolitical space”,49 citizens are reduced to homo sacer, an abandoned man, who is in 
the zone of the indistinction between humans and animals, humans and non-humans.  
     The labour camps, in fact, represent the inclusive exclusion in relation to the 
town. The camps are for people who are jobless and vagrants. From the view of the 
captain of the camp, “it’s a camp to teach lazy people to work”. However, the labour 
camps are also perceived as “a nest of vice” and “a nest of criminals” (91). For this 
reason, obscure crimes, such as the explosions within the town, are blamed on the camp 
people. The camps are excluded from the town. However, the camps are also located in 
                                                          
48 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 122. 
49 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 123. 
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the inside of the town, in the sense that the camps guarantee the political life of the town. 
As Agamben remarks, “today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm of the West.”50 Accordingly, from within the frame of Agamben, it 
is clearly shown that K becomes an exceptional being of the law as a result of the 
politicization of his body and life by the bio-power of apartheid. Nevertheless, 
Agamben’s theory of biopolitics has a limitation as an ethics of life on the grounds that K 
becomes an aporia of being, neither a human being nor a non-human being.  
 
 
            3. K’s refusal understood as potentiality  
 
     Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe both K and Herman Melville’s 
Bartleby as “figure[s] of absolute refusal”.51 Bartleby refuses to copy legal documents 
and K refuses to eat food. Although this refusal may imply a political resistance (as with a 
hunger striker), its consequence will also be K’s starvation and death. For this reason, as 
we have seen, Hardt and Negri strongly argue that the “refusal in itself is empty” and 
“leads only to a kind of social suicide”.52 Agamben, however, asserts that Bartleby has 
the potentiality to inactivate the sovereign power for the community to come. Deleuze 
also connects Bartleby’s refusal with a “zone of indiscernibility or inactivity”53 capable of 
abolishing the dominant language. Thus, through the lens of Agamben and Deleuze, I will 
discuss how K, as a figure of refusal, has potentialities and limitations in relation to the 
sovereign power.      
     K’s refusal to eat is associated with the oppressive power which confines him in 
the camps. As the medical officer points out, K seems not to refuse all kinds of food, but 
                                                          
50 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 181, 
51 Hardt and Negri, 203.  
52 Hardt and Negri, 204.  
53 Gilles Deleuze, “Bartleby; or, The Formula”, Essays: Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. 
Smith and Michael A. Grace (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 71. 
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to search “for a different kind of food, food that no camp could supply” (164). In fact, K 
is very conscious about eating food and changes his diet due to his experiences of living 
on the farm and in the camps. His diet is distinctively changed by three events. Firstly, 
after killing and eating the goat on the farm in Prince Albert, K decides to eat only small 
birds. The process of K’s killing and cleaning the goat is vividly described in detail as the 
cruel process of killing a living animal. Despite the fact that K needs the meat of the goat 
in order to survive on the devastated farm, he realizes that killing and eating animals is 
predicated on violence. Secondly, K searches for food produced on the earth, after he 
distributes his dead mother’s ashes on the earth of the farm. With this event, he 
recognizes his nature as a cultivator: “It is because I am a gardener, he thought, because 
that is my nature” (59). This also leads to his realization of the pleasure of eating food 
that he raises on the farm with his labour. Finally, K rejects the food in the camps. His 
need for food is getting slighter and slighter, and he rarely feels his hunger in the labour 
camps. He tells the medical officer in the ward: “I can’t eat the food here, that’s all. I 
can’t eat camp food” (146). His appetite only recovers when he eats food which he raised 
on the earth himself, after he escapes the camps.54 As the medical officer puts it, he seems 
to search for “the bread of freedom” (146). K’s refusal to eat is, thus, associated with a 
kind of resistance to the oppressive power which restricts his own form of life. In this 
sense, K’s refusal can imply a political action against the oppressive power, like a hunger 
striker. Thus, Laura Wright describes K as “the colonial subject” who attempts to “escape 
through the body”.55   
                                                          
54 Thus, K experiences great pleasure in eating the pumpkin which he planted in the earth and 
grew with his labour: “All that remains is to live here quietly for the rest of my life, eating the food 
that my own labour has made the earth to yield. All that remains is to be a tender of the soil. He 
lifted the first strip to his mouth. Beneath the crisply charred skin the flesh was soft and juicy. He 
chewed with tears with joy in his eyes. The best, he thought, the very best pumpkin I have tasted. 
For the first time since he had arrived in the country he found pleasure in eating.” (113) 
55 Laura Wright, Writing “Out of All the Camps”: J.M. Coetzee’s Narratives of Displacement 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 74. Wright explains K’s refusal of food as an act of 
removing of his body: “More specifically, through starvation, he seeks to remove his body from 
the equation of war and from individuals like the medical officer…” (74).  
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   However, from Agamben’s perspective, K’s refusal is not connected with a 
political action but rather a passage or potentiality into an action. Fundamentally, the 
principle of potentiality means the capacity and opportunity to do something. However, 
Agamben, who follows Aristotle’s idea of potentiality and impotentiality in the 
Metaphysics, as we have seen, also links potentiality to being in a position not to do 
something: “Every potentiality (dunamis) is impotentiality (adumnamia) of the same and 
with respect to the same (Aristotle, 1042 e 25-32)”.56 Thus, Agamben suggests a state of 
suspension between a potentiality to do and a potentiality not to do something, by 
employing Aristotle’s conception of (im)potentiality: “the potentiality maintains itself in 
relation to actuality in the form of its suspension; it is capable of the act in not realizing it, 
it is sovereignty capable of its own im-potentiality [impotenza]”.57 For this reason, “not 
doing”, or “to refuse something” deactivates power in the form of suspension. In the light 
of Agamben’s notion of potentiality, K’s refusal to eat food in the camps can be presented 
as a “potentiality not to do” which deactivates the sovereign power’s ability to govern K’s 
life and to imprison him.  
     In order to discuss K’s refusal as a potentiality in terms of Agamben’s theory, it 
is useful to look further at Bartleby who represents Agamben’s figure of potentiality. 
According to Agamben, Bartleby is concerned with “the strongest objection against the 
principle of sovereignty”,58 and with his saying “I would prefer not to”, he “resists every 
possibility of deciding between potentiality and the potentiality not to”.59 In other words, 
Bartleby’s refusal of copying pushes sovereignty to the limits and creates an aporia. 
Agamben insists that “here the metaphysical aporia shows its political nature” (48). 
However, Bartleby still does not completely abolish the sovereign power or free himself 
from the sovereign ban. In his work The Coming Community, however, Agamben 
                                                          
56 Giorgio Agamben, “On Potentiality”, 182.  
57 Giorgio Agamben, “On Potentiality”, 182. 
58 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 48. 
59 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 48. 
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describes Bartleby as “the extreme image of this angel that writes nothing but its 
potentiality to not-write”.60 Thus, Bartleby becomes a pure potentiality not to copy, which 
leads to the promise for the community to come, rather than to a passage into political 
action.  
     From the perspective of Agamben, K’s refusal provides a potentiality in relation 
to the sovereign power. K’s refusal to eat in the camps dissolves the logic of the camps: 
“A camp is for people without jobs. It is for all the people who go around from farm to 
farm begging for work because they haven’t got food, they haven’t got a roof over their 
head” (78).  K does not have a house and a job, and moreover does not have food. For 
this reason, K is imprisoned in the camps in part so he may partake of food. However, his 
refusal will lead to his starvation, and significantly the medical officer in the ward 
describes him as “a skeleton” (129), “a corpse” (145), a “stone” (135) or “a stick insect” 
(149). From the medical officer’s perspective, K is located in-between human and 
nonhuman, the living and the dead. In other words, his state is in the indistinction 
between life and death, in which he is “near to a state of life in death or death in life, 
whatever it was, as is humanly possible” (159). Fundamentally, from the view of the 
medical officer, K’s refusal goes against his body’s natural impulse for life and leads only 
to his death: “the body, I had been taught, wants only to live. Suicide, I had understood, is 
an act not of the body against itself but of the will against the body. … You did not want 
to die, but you were dying” (164). The medical officer represents an agent of the 
oppressive power, despite the fact that he actually tries to sympathize with K and to 
understand K’s starvation.  K’s refusal causes the medical officer to raise questions about 
the mechanism of the camps: “Why? I asked myself: why will this man not eat when he is 
plainly starving?” (163). In this sense, K’s refusal, or (im)potentiality not to eat food, 
serves as an (im)potentiality to undermine the logic of the sovereign power.  
                                                          
60 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community (Minneapolis and London: university of Minnesota 
Press, 1993, 37. 
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     Nevertheless, K’s refusal to eat still creates a dilemma concerned with the ethical 
life. Despite the fact that Agamben’s theory of (im)potentiality enables one to open a 
potential deconstruction of sovereign power, K’s refusal, or potentiality not to eat camp 
food, is, as the medical officer points out, understood as a suicide of “the will against the 
body” (164). In other words, K’s will to refuse camp food negates his body as well as his 
life, which is against the ethics of body. In fact, from the perspective of Spinoza’s and 
Deleuze’s ethics, K’s refusal closes the power of our bodies. For Spinoza and Deleuze, 
the body has potential power to open affective relations between bodies as well as to 
escape the oppressive system and morality. Additionally, in relation to the sovereign 
power during apartheid, as Hardt and Negri note, K’s refusal becomes a social suicide. 
Nevertheless, K’s starvation can be understood as an act of resistance to the sovereign 
power at war. As a paradoxical being between life and death, K sacrifices himself or 
chooses to sacrifice himself to resist and inactivate the sovereign ban.  
      However, it is necessary to investigate Deleuze’s theory about Bartleby in order 
to further discuss K’s refusal in terms of Agamben’s conception of im(potentiality). 
Deleuze focuses on Bartleby’s repetition of “I would prefer not to” and calls it the 
“formula of its glory”.61 Bartleby’s repetition is linked to many variations: “I prefer to 
give no answer,” “I prefer not to be a little reasonable,” “I would prefer not to take a 
clerkship,” “I would prefer to be doing something else…”.62 The variations are connected 
to more diverse particular circumstances concerned with the attorney who orders Bartleby 
to copy. However, the formula becomes “neither an affirmation nor a negation”, as the 
formula “eliminates the preferable just as mercilessly as any nonpreferred”.63 In addition, 
the formula “annihilates ‘copying’, the only reference in relation to which something 
might or might not be preferred”.64 Accordingly, Bartleby’s formula is located in the 
                                                          
61 Deleuze, “Bartleby”, 68.  
62 Deleuze, “Bartleby” 69. 
63 Deleuze, “Bartleby”, 70-1. 
64 Deleuze, “Bartleby”, 71. 
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“zone of indiscernibility or inactivity”65 which annihilates the dominant language and the 
law. In this sense, Deleuze’s account of Bartleby is close to Agamben’s conception of 
“potentiality”. Deleuze asserts that Bartleby’s formula is equivalent to “I prefer nothing”: 
“I would prefer nothing than something: not a will to nothingness, but the growth of a 
nothingness of the will”.66 Regarding Bartleby as a figure of refusal like K, Deleuze’s 
account of Bartley brings about a paradox concerned with the ethics of body. If 
Bartleby’s formula applies to K’s refusal, K’s formula becomes “I would prefer nothing 
rather than something”. It means that, through Deleuze’s account of the formula, K 
becomes a figure of the absolute refusal not to eat food, or “I prefer to eat nothing”.  
     Despite the fact that Agamben and Deleuze both present the power of the refusal 
of (im)potentiality and a zone of indistinction, there is a minor but fundamental difference 
between their respective accounts of indistinction. For Agamben, it is necessary to divide 
bare life from political life, human from nonhuman in order to create the zone of 
indistinction. This zone is offered as a potentiality to inactivate the sovereign power. K’s 
refusal as a potentiality works only in making and determining the division between the 
potentiality to eat camp food and the potentiality not to eat it. However, Bartleby’s 
repeated formula “I prefer nothing rather than something” is related to Deleuze’s 
conception of becoming. In other words, Bartleby’s “I prefer nothing” is not connected to 
the point of being nothing, but to a passage between nothing and something else. Thus, in 
relation to Bartleby, K’s refusal to eat can be understood as his becoming something else.  
 
 
            4. Conclusion 
 
    Michael K explores how K, during the apartheid period, is reduced into a “homo 
sacer”, an abandoned man. K’s simple life is not perceived as a qualified or political form 
                                                          
65 Deleuze, “Bartleby”, 71.  
66 Deleuze, “Bartleby”, 71.  
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of life by the oppressive regime and so he is imprisoned in the labour camps. The camps, 
as Agamben asserts, are the space for producing homo sacer in the modern age. Yet, as 
Michael K shows, the camps are also located in the zone of the inclusive exclusion in 
relation to the town, as the camps exist in order to guarantee the continued political life of 
the town. In this sense, the novel exposes the mechanisms of biopolitics in dealing with 
human bodies and lives by producing homo sacer. However, from the perspective of 
Agamben, K’s bare life provides a political potential by suspending the influence of the 
sovereign power. The apartheid regime excludes K’s bare life in order to produce a 
political and qualified life, but the bare life remains in the zone between natural life and 
political life. K’s bare life leads the apartheid power to being in the state of suspension. 
This is where K’s bare life has a potential of the political.  
K’s refusal to eat can readily be understood as an example of what Agamben 
calls “potentiality”. As we have seen, K’s refusal to eat the camp food leads to a 
suspension of the logic of the labour camps and also has implications for the community 
to come. However, as Hardt and Negri show, K’s refusal is perceived as a “social 
suicide”, as it leads to his deadness to the sphere of politics and law. Additionally, his 
refusal comes to negate the fundamental desire of the body to survive and to close the 
potential power of the body in affective relation to the Other. Deleuze’s account of 
Bartleby’s formula provides another potential means for escaping the law. Deleuze insists 
that Bartleby’s repeated formula “I would prefer not to” can be understood as “I prefer 
nothing”. K’s refusal to eat can similarly be expressed as “I prefer to eat nothing”, which 
is also understood in terms of Deleuze’s conception of becoming-nothing. However, 
Deleuze’s conception of becoming-nothing does not entail negating everything, but rather 
involves “becoming-something else”. K’s becoming-nothing, however, does not engage 
‘becoming-something else’ – and this is its limitation.  
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Chapter 5 
An Ethics of Becoming-animal in Foe 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The question of how we should live with the animal other is inextricably 
associated with the ethical community. This question has been the focus of the debates on 
the difference of or division between humans and animals, which has been remarkably 
dismantled with the advent of ever more innovative discoveries about the bodies of 
humans and animals. In philosophy, Nietzsche emphasizes that there is no “cardinal 
distinction between man and animal”.1 Humans are not higher than animals, but in some 
sense, weaker than them. According to Nietzsche, indeed, men are animals who have lost 
their bestiality or “healthy animal sense”. 2  Nevertheless, the conventional status of 
animals in the West, as beneath humans, as the object of their power and appetites, has 
left a legacy of violence.3 The resulting hierarchy of animals has also been connected to 
the human condition in relation to a minority of class, gender, race and ethnicity. 
                                                          
1  Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R.M. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 112.  
2  Jennifer Ham, “Taming the Beast: Animality in Wedekind and Nietzsche”, Animal Acts: 
Configuring the Human in Western History, eds. Jennifer Ham and Mattew Senior (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1997), 157. 
3 The book of Genesis in both Judaism and Christianity describes how God gave human beings 
dominion over animals. As Coetzee explains, Western philosophy from Aristotle to Kant, has 
conceptualized the hierarchy between humans and animals based on humans’ capability of 
language and reason. See J.M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals (Princeton and New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 22-3. However, in the non-Western religions of Jainism, 
Hinduism and Buddhism, the hierarchy is tempered by the idea of rebirth or transition that humans 
themselves might be reborn as animals in terms of their behaviours. According to Wendy Doniger, 
the idea of rebirth implies that “we must not kill and eat animals because they are like us” 
(Doniger, 98). Quoting Thomas O’Hearne’s remark on animals, Doniger asserts that “to treat 
animals compassionately is “very recent, very Western, and even very Anglo-Saxon”, compared to 
non-Western thought (Doniger, 93).   
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Specifically, minority groups have been regarded as non-human beings or animal others, 
because the discourse of the human and animal division in Western philosophy has also 
served to justify difference or hierarchy among humans. As for this debatable division, 
Coetzee and Deleuze radically articulate a new conception of human-animal 
correspondence in their literary and philosophical works. By focusing on the Deleuzian 
ethics of becoming-animal, I aim to argue the ethical problems to which Coetzee and 
Deleuze bring a compelling account of humans and the animal Other, which will be also 
discussed through Giorgio Agamben’s conception of the division between human and 
animal.    
          Foe (1986), Coetzee’s rewriting of Robinson Crusoe (1719), questions the criterion 
of distinction between humans and animals based on the anthropocentrism during the 
colonial period. As a castaway, the narrator Susan Barton stays with Cruso and Friday on 
Cruso’s island, before being rescued by sailors of returning to England. The dialectical 
relation between the master Crusoe and the slave Friday in Robinson Crusoe, is changed 
into multiple relations between Cruso, Friday and Barton. Barton’s role as the female 
narrator is particularly important. David Attwell argues that Barton’s gender serves as the 
“sign of the position of semi-marginality” on the grounds that “her womanhood suggests 
the relative cultural power of the province as opposed to the metropolis and of 
unauthorized as opposed to authorized speech”.4 Barton’s position of semi-marginality 
indicates a potentiality to make a crack in the dialectical relation between master and 
slave and of providing a new perspective in presenting the slave Friday. However, Barton 
perceives Friday as mere body; for her, he lacks humanness, because his tongue is 
mutilated and his story is never told, although she, as Jane Poyner points out, “sets herself 
the task of releasing him from the bonds.”5 Thus, G. Scott Bishop asserts that Friday is 
                                                          
4 David Attwell, J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing (Berkeley, Los Angeles 
and Oxford: University of California Press, 1993), 112.  
5 Jane Poyner, J.M. Coetzee and the Paradox of Postcolonial Authorship (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 
91. 
 132 
reduced to the “barest frame of man”6 and Derek Attridge claims that “Friday figures as 
an absolute absence”. 7  However, my contention is that Friday’s absolute absence is 
associated with the criterion of the division between human and animal.  
          Agamben addresses the theoretical statement of the anthropological mechanism 
operating behind this division. In discussing the division between humans and animals, 
Agamben calls humans the “anthropomorphous animal”.8 Agamben claims indistinction 
between humans and animals, because humans share with animals the “simple fact of 
living” (or “natural life, simple zoē”).9 However, humans’ self-recognition has, according 
to Agamben, led to the creation of a distinction between humans and animals. In order to 
become humans, humans have produced an “anthropological machine”10: “an optical one 
constructed of a series of mirrors in which man, looking at himself, sees his own image 
always already deformed in the features of an ape”. 11  Humans’ self-recognition is a 
process that relies on a process of excluding animality and including “humanness” within 
the conception of man. As a result, man looks at “non-human[s] in order to be human”.12 
Man is thus “suspended between a celestial and a terrestrial nature, between animal and 
human—and, thus, his being always less and more than himself”.13 At the same time, 
animals also become humanized by humanity’s representation of animals as the non-
human. Since the conception of “the non-human is produced by animalizing the 
human”,14  Agamben importantly recognizes the danger within this logic: everyone is 
capable of being labelled an animal and can thus be excluded from society. This is how 
                                                          
6 G. Scott Bishop, “J.M. Coetzee’s Foe: A Culmination and a Solution to a Problem of White 
Identity,” World Literature Today. 64:1 (Winter, 1990), 56. 
7 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and The Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 83.  
8  Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 27.  
9 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.  
10 The Open, 26.  
11The Open, 27. 
12 The Open, 27. 
13 The Open, 29. 
14 The Open, 37.  
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the division between human and animal has been always connected with political and 
ethical considerations. However, Agamben’s account of the division depends on the 
theoretical aporia involved in the abyssal rupture between humans and animals. As 
Dominick LaCapra points out, while Agamben problematizes the human and animal 
division, he “seems to require a radical divide between human and animal and to envision 
the alternative to this divide, or perhaps the nature of the abyssal, alluring divide itself, as 
a zone of indistinction”.15 For Agamben, aporia or an abyssal divide is available to open 
the relationship between humans and animals.  
Deleuze similarly recognizes the problematic character of Western philosophy’s 
anthropocentric prejudice, but his questioning of animality is quite different from the 
approach taken by Agamben. Deleuze focuses on the question of the mutual 
transformations between human and animal. Deleuze’s notion of becoming-animal 
involves a “zone of exchange between humans and animals in which something of one 
passes into the other”.16 Deleuze’s question is thus how humans become animals rather 
than how humans can have a relationship with animals. Deleuze’s conception of 
becoming-animal is different from Agamben’s conception of locating an abyssal divide or 
an empty space between humans and animals in which a kind of passivity is achieved. 
However, we need to be clear that the becoming-animal of humans does not mean that 
humans identify with animals or mimic the forms of animals. In other words, “becoming-
animal” is not a simple matter of correspondence: it is neither a “resemblance” nor an 
“imitation”. Additionally, becoming-animal does not mean that humans are already 
animals. Deleuze resists the conception of identity and identification that operates here; 
                                                          
15  Dominick LaCapra, History and its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2009), 166. LaCapra argues that Agamben “seems to relish aporia, 
enigmatic anecdotes, dehistoricized erudition, and paradox. And he goes simultaneously in at least 
two directions. On the one hand, he repeatedly discusses and seems to affirm the absence or lack 
of an essence, nature, or vocation in the human. Here he problematizes the distinction human and 
animal... On the other hand, he … seems to require a radical divide between human and animal…” 
(166).  
16 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 109. 
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the conventional logic of identity and identification too often serves to efface individual 
“pure difference”. Instead of presenting a threshold concept (a binary logic of identity: 
either one is, or one is not, an animal), Deleuze presents us with a zone of exchange 
between humans and animals. That is, a field of constant flux and inter-change involving 
individual variations and degrees of difference. How do we become animals? Deleuze 
grounds his account of becoming-animal in a conception of “affect” derived from 
naturalist epistemology and the ethics of Spinoza. Spinoza’s notion of affect describes our 
capacity of affecting and being affected by other things. For Deleuze, this capacity is not 
a passivity but an activity related to sensibility and sensation.17 In this way, the ethos of 
becoming-animal forces us to reconsider animality as a radical activity of affecting and 
being affected by animals. Deleuze’s radical activity of becoming-animal is therefore 
different to a radical passivity involved in Agamben’s notion of indifference between 
humans and animals.  
By discussing Agamben’s and Deleuze’s conceptions of animals and animality, 
this chapter will, first, examine the animalization of Friday derived from the Western 
conventional assumption of the distinction between human and animal. This 
animalization of Friday will be discussed in relation to the constitution of the colonizer’s 
self-recognition of the subject. Secondly, this chapter will discuss the “becoming-animal” 
of Cruso who has an affective relationship to Friday in terms of Deleuze’s ethics of 
“becoming-animal”. Cruso’s becoming-animal will be also shown to be different from 
Barton’s ethical attitude towards Friday. Based on her humanistic view of Friday, Barton 
shows pity at the suffering of Friday and tries to make him speak out. Thus, this chapter 
will explore the animalization of Friday and the becoming-animal of Cruso compared 
with Barton’s ethical attitude toward the Other as outlined in Gayatri Spivak’s theory of 
“marginality” and Mike Marais’s ethics of the “responsibility”.  
 
                                                          
17  Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), 62. 
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2. The Animalization of Friday 
  
           The death of Cruso, in the first part of Foe, implies the death of a colonial master, 
which could affect Friday’s life. However, although he is freed from slavery in England 
with the death of his master Cruso, Friday remains shackled to what Gayatri Spivak calls 
the “wholly other”.18 Despite his legal freedom, Friday is not able to achieve the position 
of the Western subject alongside the female narrator Barton and the male writer Foe, 
because the mutilation of his tongue effectively signifies the loss of his subjectivity. As 
Mattew Calarco asserts, language, in Western philosophy from Descartes to Husserl, 
provides a solid foundation for the “constitution of the human subject”. 19  Without 
language, a human is not able to think of himself as a subject. The lack of Friday’s 
language causes him to be regarded as the mere body, or the radically Other. Friday’s 
muteness also implies his bestialization on the grounds that, as Calarco explains, “there is 
a break between the human and the animal with language”. 20  In this sense, Friday 
becomes the animal Other through the loss of his tongue. My argument will be, thus, 
focused on the mechanism of how Friday becomes the animal Other through the lack of 
language and of how the White European subject (such as Cruso and Barton) attain their 
identity as a human being in relation to the animal Other.     
In order to explore the relation between language and the animal Other, it is 
necessary to start by discussing the critics’ arguments on Friday’s muteness. According to 
G. Scott Bishop’s reading of Foe, Friday’s muteness politically represents the status of 
the extreme Other who has been forced to be silent by the oppressor. In a situation in 
                                                          
18  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Theory in the Margin: Coetzee’s Foe Reading Defoe’s 
Crusoe/Roxana”, English in Africa, 17: 2 (October, 1990), 4. 
19 Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 84.  
20 Calarco, 84.  
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which the voice of the Other is not heard, letting the Other speak out becomes an ethical 
and political matter. In Foe, the writer Foe takes an ethical approach toward Friday, 
claiming that “we must make Friday’s silence speak, as well as the silence surrounding 
Friday” (143). In response, however, Barton says, “all my efforts to bring Friday to 
speech, or to bring speech to Friday, have failed” (143). How can we listen to the Other’s 
voice in oppressive circumstances? Bishop claims that postcolonial literature such as Foe 
makes us hear the silence of the Other. According to Bishop, the mutilation of Friday is a 
“symbol of oppression”,21 more extreme than that of the eponymous protagonist depicted 
in Michael K: “Friday’s freedom is completely entrenched in his inability to use language, 
and he is impotent against any language”.22 Cruso says Friday’s tongue was cut out by the 
slavers, but this is not clearly revealed to us. As a result, according to Bishop, we know 
“almost nothing” about Friday with his muteness, while we learn “very little” about 
Michel K with his reticence.23 What interests Bishop more is the reduction of Friday into 
the “barest frame of man” with his muteness: “we know nothing of his past or of his 
thought. He is an unmediated being, and his story is an unmediated story.”24 However, 
Bishop’s remark on the “barest frame of man” reminds us that language is bound up with 
the condition of being human. In this context, Matthew Calarco, drawing on Emile 
Benveniste’s linguistic theory, asserts that the “I” or “subject” emerges only “in 
language”, when it is uttered : “if language is absent, there can be no self, and where there 
is a self, there is always already language”.25 Given Calarco’s and Bishop’s emphasis on 
language, it is an ethico-political matter to explore the ways in which postcolonial 
literature opens readers to listen to the silence of the Other. Consequently, Bishop 
interprets Coetzee’s Foe as a “distinctive political novel” that leads readers to doubt the 
authorial voice and opens the possibility of hearing Friday’s voice: Friday’s silence will 
                                                          
21 Bishop, 55.  
22 Bishop, 56.  
23 Bishop, 56. 
24 Bishop, 56 
25 Calarco, 83.  
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be told in the future when “the pen and paper have been handed over to Friday”.26 Thus, 
following Bishop’s reading of Foe, Friday would gain his subjectivity with the “pen and 
paper” taken over from the white subject in the community to come.  
          While Bishop tries to provide the possibility of the Other’s speech, Derek Attridge 
rather reads the silence of the Other as an act of resistance against the dominant language. 
Considering the relationship between Friday and Barton, Attridge notes that Friday is “a 
being wholly unfamiliar to Barton, in terms of race, class, gender, culture”.27 However, it 
is Friday’s muteness that results in his being perceived as the wholly other by Barton, a 
possessor of language. In this context, Attridge reads Friday’s mutilation as a sign of his 
“absolute otherness”.28 Forced to be silent by the oppressors, “Friday’s tonguelessness is 
the sign of his oppression: it is also the sign of the silence, the absolute otherness, by 
which he appears to his oppressors, and by which their dominance is sustained”.29 As I 
mentioned, in this oppressive circumstance, Attridge claims that “Friday figures as an 
absolute absence”,30 in spite of Barton’s description of Friday’s gestures and movements. 
With his lack of language, Friday is a figure who seems little more than a ghost or a 
shadow of Cruso. However, from the perspective of Attridge, Friday’s silence expresses 
something in terms of “speechless speech” or “the soundless stream issuing from his 
body”.31 Thus, Attridge points out that Friday’s speech emanates from the body that is 
“the home of Friday” (157). However, in the passage that Attridge quotes from Foe, the 
body of Friday does not articulate words, but rather endlessly expresses its own signs: as 
a result, the body “is not a place of words” (157) but rather “a place where bodies are 
their own signs” (157). Attridge draws particular attention to “the sight of the dark mouth 
                                                          
26 Bishop, 56.  
27 Attridge, 81.  
28 Attridge, 86. 
29 Attridge, 86. 
30 Attridge, 83.  
31 Attridge, 67.  
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opening to emit its wordless, endless stream” (157). 32  On this basis, despite its 
speechlessness, Friday’s body can be understood as a site of resistance to the dominant 
language of the oppressor by constantly expressing its own signs, even without language.  
However, Attridge’s account of Friday’s body risks assigning the locus of the 
Other to the mere body and of excluding the Other from the domain of language. From 
the perspective of racial marginality, Gayatri Spivak criticizes Attridge’s reading of 
Friday’s body by discussing the Western subject and its relation to language. Spivak’s 
well-known question “Can the subaltern speak?” can be directly addressed to the 
incapability of Friday’s speech. From Spivak’s point of view, Friday is not able to have 
“a dominant language or a dominant voice in which to be heard”.33 In this sense, Friday’s 
tongue is symbolically mutilated in order to support the constitution of the subject as 
European. In her reading of Foe, Spivak’s exploration of Friday is focused on the ways in 
which the Western subject creates the marginality of the Other in order to achieve their 
own subjectivity. According to Spivak, the white man Crusoe, marginalized in Robinson 
Crusoe, encounters the savage Friday and constitutes him as the marginality.34 In the 
process of constituting the subject, the white man Cruso would similarly posit Friday as 
the Other by effectively depriving him of his tongue. Yet, in relation to Friday’s 
incapability of language, it is important to consider Spivak’s remark on Defoe’s Friday, 
who has a language acquisition skill at a rather low level. Spivak observes: “It is 
noticeable that, at their first encounter, “I began to speak to him, and teach him to speak 
to me” (RC 161)”.35 Spivak asserts that “like us, Crusoe does not need to learn to speak to 
the racial other. Of course Crusoe knows the savages have a language. And it is a 
longstanding topos that barbarians by definition do not speak language.”36 Compared with 
                                                          
32 Attridge, 83.  
33 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, 
second edition (London and New York: Routeldge, 2007), 201. 
34 Spivak, 4. 
35 Spivak, 13. 
36 Spivak, 13.  
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Crusoe’s Friday, Cruso’s Friday is presented as the more extreme Other because his 
tonguelessness indicates a fundamental lack of language. However, by mutilating the 
Other, the white man will also fail to attain his own subjectivity, because language is, as 
Spivak claims, the locus of opening to undecidability and plurality, rather than confined 
within the singular register. Although Spivak criticizes Coetzee’s presentation of the body 
of Friday caught in the dominant language, she also adds that Friday’s body is not 
consigned to its own sign in this novel: “For this end, texts are porous. They go through 
to wish fulfilment. Yet, we also know that Coetzee’s entire book warns that Friday’s body 
is not its own sign.”37 Thus, Friday’s body cannot be determined as a marginality by the 
white man’s constitution of the subject, because the body is also situated as a resistance to 
the determination of language. However, despite Spivak’s insight into the undecidability 
of Friday’s body, it also important to note that Spivak also risks confining the body of the 
Other within an aporia produced by language.  
Despite Spivak’s emphasis on the undecidability of language, it is undoubtedly 
important to examine the animalization of the Other represented by the power of language. 
Language, in Foe, is regarded as marking the borderline between man and animal or 
between civilized man and savage. This is effectively indicated by the sharp contrast 
between the silence of Friday and the speech of Cruso and Barton. In other words, 
muteness is supposed to be a distinctive feature of a non-human animal, which is 
distinguished from human beings. As noted earlier, philosophically speaking, the 
discourse about animals presented in Western philosophy has hovered around Aristotle’s 
definition of man. In the Politics, Aristotle defines man as a “political animal” but more 
importantly, as a speaking animal:  
 
“She [nature] has endowed man alone among the animals with the power of 
speech. Speech is something different from voice, which is possessed by other 
animals also and used by them to express pain or pleasure; for their nature 
                                                          
37 Spivak, 18.  
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does indeed enable them not only to feel their pleasure and pain but to 
communicate these feelings to each other. Speech, on the other hand serves to 
indicate what is useful and what is harmful, and so also what is just and unjust. 
For the real difference between man and other animals is that humans alone 
have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc.”.38 
 
Since Aristotle, many thinkers have come to further define themselves as non-animal 
beings by their possession of a logos (language) or ratio (reason), which is seen to mark a 
distinct ontological break from the animal. Animals have thereby been regarded as mute 
and unreasonable non-human entities, sharply differentiated by their inability to attain the 
ethical and political forms of life achieved by man. Mute animals have their voices to 
express a sense of pleasure and pain, but only humans can articulate their thought. Since 
Aristotle’s distinction between man and animal, the Judeo-Christian hierarchical relation 
between the language of human beings and the voice of animals has also been established. 
In terms of Aristotle’s distinction between language and voice, Friday is characterized as 
a mute animal who expresses his pain and pleasure through his body rather than his 
artificial thought and ethical judgement through his language.   
          In accordance with Aristotle’s definition of the man and animal division, Friday is 
categorized as a non-human animal because of his lack of language. It is the 
animalization of the Other that Western philosophy has produced by positing themselves 
as speaking humans. As we have seen with Agamben’s theory of the human and animal 
division, it is also important to understand the anthropological character of Western 
civilization that humans’ self-recognition has attained by this process of excluding 
animality and of including humanity within men. In order to explore the animalization of 
Friday, it is useful to look at the apes that Barton describes on the island. Cruso warns 
Barton not to walk around, because the apes are dangerous: “they had roamed all over the 
                                                          
38Aristotle, Politics, 60. 
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island, bold and mischievous” (21). After hearing this warning, Barton sees them among 
cats and foxes:  
 
“On my walks I sometimes heard their cries and saw them leaping from rock 
to rock. In size they were between a cat and a fox, grey, with black faces and 
black paws. I saw no harm in them; but Cruso held them a pest, and he and 
Friday killed them whenever they could with clubs, and skinned them, and 
cured their pelts, and sewed them together to make clothes and blankets and 
suchlike” (21).  
 
In this passage, Cruso thinks of the apes as pests and tries to kill as many as possible. 
However, it is here that we can ask the ontological questions of the distinction between 
humans and animals. The apes are animals like cats and foxes, but these animals are 
regarded as ontologically different to Cruso and Barton who recognize themselves as men. 
Cruso, accordingly, justifies his killing of them, reflected by the presupposition of the 
human and animal division. According to Alex Murray, this distinction is crucial for 
Agamben, as “it directs an idea of the human which not only underpins our relation with 
animal ‘others’ but has worked to determine or naturalise some anthropological qualities 
as innate, covering over the power relations inherent in doing so”. 39  Above all, the 
anthropological definition of this division privileges humans over animals and naturalises 
the hierarchical relation between humans and animals.  
            In this context, it is worth considering the question of cannibalism. Cannibalism is 
constantly regarded as a distinctive feature of the barbaric. Indeed, cannibalism represents 
barbaric life in contrast to the civilized life of the Western man. Although Cruso does not 
call Friday a cannibal, Friday is readily accepted as a man-eater in England. 40  The 
                                                          
39 Alex Murray, Giorgio Agamben (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 44.  
40  In Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), cannibalism is concretely described. Crusoe 
discovers that cannibals often use a desolate beach to kill and eat their captives and he also rescues 
Friday from the cannibals (146-9). As a cannibal, Friday avoids the temptation to eat men because 
Crusoe teaches him that cannibalism is wrong. Crusoe and Friday also save a white Spaniard and 
Friday’s father from the savages who are eating the flesh of one of their prisoners in the 
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Europeans’ preoccupation with cannibals is reflected by three boys chanting the words in 
London: “cannibal Friday, have you ate your mam today?” (55). Friday may not be a 
man-eater on Cruso’s island, but it is not known whether Friday had been a cannibal 
previously. However, like the three boys, Barton and Foe are also preoccupied with their 
idea of Friday’s cannibalism. For example, Barton says, “In Friday here you have a living 
cannibal”, and Foe replies, cannibals “lose their vivacity when deprived of human flesh” 
(127). The cannibalism represented in their dialogue does not only imply the otherness of 
the barbaric, but also cements the distinction between the civilized and the savage. Thus, 
Barton asks herself whether Friday is a cannibal while seeing him at the table: “Truly, 
cannibals are terrible; but most terrible of all is to think of the little cannibal children, 
their eyes closing in pleasure as they chew the tasty fat of their neighbours. I shiver. For 
surely eating human flesh is like falling into sin: having fallen once you discover in 
yourself a taste for it, and fall all the more readily thereafter.” (94) This reductive 
integration of Friday and cannibalism effectively triggers the animalization of Friday.  
           From the perspective of Agamben, the animalization of Friday is more involved 
with a lack of humanness rather than with the conflation of the savage and cannibalism. 
Yet, it is also crucial to note how animals are humanized through the animalization of 
humans. For example, Cruso initially thinks of Friday as a dog, although he corrects this 
thought: “my first thought was that Friday was like a dog that heeds but one master; yet it 
                                                                                                                                                               
“barbarous Feast” (168). Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, ed. Michael Shinagel (New York and 
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975). Defoe effectively projected cannibalism onto savages 
on the island by reflecting the Europeans’ anxieties about cannibals. However, Coetzee in Foe 
does not depict cannibals and their feast but only the Europeans’ anxieties about cannibalism and 
their prejudices against natives. Jane Poyner connects Barton’s anxiety about cannibals with racist 
fantasies: “Like Cruso and Foe, Barton is also susceptible to racist fantasies since she has 
suspicions that Friday practises cannibalism”. (102) Poyner further insists that “As in Robinson 
Crusoe, these fantasies are apparently unfounded, though Defoe’s Crusoe does come upon human 
remains that purportedly have been eaten by natives. Crusoe clings to the belief that through his 
efforts Friday has been saved from his barbarousness.” (103) Despite the fact that Poyner 
distinguishes Crusoe’s thought of a cannibal Friday from Barton’s fantasy of him, Crusoe’s and 
Barton’s views of Friday in both Robinson Crusoe and Foe apparently represent the Europeans’ 
recognition of natives as the animal Other or the lack of humanness, which is involved with racial 
fantasies.    
 143 
was not so” (21). In Cruso’s remark, the animal is effectively humanized by its obedience 
as a dog that “heeds but one master”. Thus, as a non-human animal, the dog is humanized 
by a process paralleled to the animalization of Friday. Yet, what Agamben emphasizes 
here is the function of language or the presupposition of a speaking man”.41 According to 
Agamben, in terms of assumption of the speaking man, we can obtain “an animalization 
of man (an animal-man)” or “a humanization of the animal (a man-ape)”.42 Additionally, 
the core of this operation of language is, according to Agamben, “the anthropological 
machine”: “it functions by excluding as not (yet) human an already human being from 
itself, that is by animalizing the human, by isolating the nonhuman within the human: 
Homo alalus, or the ape-men”. 43  From the perspective of Agamben’s theory of the 
anthropological machine, Friday is constituted as a non-human animal in the process by 
which Cruso and Barton exclude the “non-human” within their constitution of “the 
human”. As a result, Friday is not regarded as a possessor of “the human” or humanness, 
and this constitutes the animalization of Friday.   
              In terms of Agamben’s notion of the anthropological machine, we can also see 
that the animalization of Friday confirms Cruso’s and Barton’s achievement of their 
humanness on the island. Like Cruso, Barton is isolated from civilized life, which implies 
the loss of her human life. However, Barton regains her humanness by recognizing the 
animal Other of Friday. For example, Barton’s view of Friday is remarkably changed, 
once she becomes aware of his mutilation. When Barton arrives on Cruso’s island, she 
thinks of Friday as a Negro: “a Negro with a head of fuzzy wool, naked save for a pair of 
rough drawers”.44  This perception of Friday as a Negro is reinforced by his slavish 
obedience to her: “The Negro offered me his back, indicating he would carry me. I 
hesitated to accept, for he was a slight fellow, shorter than I” (6). However, once Barton 
                                                          
41 Agamben, The Open, 36. 
42 The Open, 36. 
43 The Open, 37. 
44 J.M. Coetzee, Foe (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1986), 5-6.  
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knows the loss of Friday’s tongue, she sees him as the animal Other that she is not able to 
understand. When Cruso lets her see Friday’s mouth without his tongue, Barton says “it is 
too dark” (22). This darkness is the truth she cannot access:   
 
Hitherto I had found Friday a shadowy creature and paid him little more 
attention than I would have given any house-slave in Brazil. But now I 
began to look on him—I could not help myself—with the horror we reserve 
for the mutilation. It was no comfort that his mutilation was secret, closed 
behind his lips (as some other mutilations are hidden by clothing), that 
outwardly he was like any Negro. Indeed, it was the very secretness of his 
loss that caused me to shrink from him. (24) 
 
In this passage, it is with “horror” that Barton looks in the emptiness of Friday’s mouth. 
Barton’s horror is due to an encounter with the Other that she can never know. In other 
words, the emptiness of Friday’s mouth does not provide her with the otherness of the 
Other that affirms her subject. As Wolfe points out, Cavell raises an important question in 
relation to our knowledge of the Other: “The problem of the other is the problem of 
knowing the other”.45 The muteness of the Other makes it impossible for the subject to 
know them. In this sense, the otherness of the Other does not make Barton affirm her 
humanness. That is why Barton endlessly asks mute Friday if he understands Barton’s 
speaking. When Cruso dies, Barton wonders if Friday understands that Cruso has died 
and whether he grasps the concept of death. “His eyes glinted in the candlelight but he did 
not stir. Did he know the meaning of death? No man had died on his island since the 
beginning of time. Did he know we were subject to death, like the beasts? I held out a 
hand but he would not take it. So I knew he knew something; though what he knew I did 
not know” (45). It is the glint in the eyes which suggests that Friday responds to Barton’s 
mention of Cruso’s death, but it is not clear whether that glint is a response on Friday’s 
                                                          
45 Cary Wolfe, “In the Shadow of Wittgenstein’s Lion”, Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, 
ed. Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 3.  
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part or simply the passive reflection of candle light. Even at this decisive moment, her 
understanding of Friday is limited by his lack of language, as she puts it: “what he knew I 
did not know”.  
             
 
          3. The becoming-animal of Cruso  
 
          Cruso is a version of Defoe’s Crusoe, as suggested by his name. However, he is not 
presented as the Western triumphal subject, in contrast to Defore’s Crusoe who succeeds 
in sustaining a civilized life on the island. As Dominic Head says, “Defoe’s Crusoe is the 
archetypal imperialist, governed by economic self-aggrandisement” but “Coetzee’s Cruso 
is concerned merely with subsistence and sterile work”. 46  However, in terms of the 
Western idea of the dialectic of a master-slave relationship, both Crusoe and Cruso are 
positioned as masters and are supposed to assert their identity as white colonizers rather 
than simply as castaways. In doing this, they enable the reader to draw the division 
between their civilized life and Friday’s savage life. However, Cruso’s identity cannot be 
confined to that of the white colonizer represented by Defoe’s Crusoe. In this context, I 
will argue that Cruso enters the zone of proximity in affective relation with Friday in 
terms of Deleuze’s conception of becoming-animal, which is distinguished from Spivak’s 
theory of marginality and Marais’s theory of responsibility.    
           Given the animalization of Friday because of the lack of his language, Cruso’s 
avoidance of language is to be understood as his engagement with an animal life rather 
than a civilized life. As we have seen with Spivak’s and Agamben’s assertions on 
language, Cruso’s capability of language affirms his subjectivity and humanness through 
marginalizing and excluding Friday. However, there is also an affinity between Cruso and 
Friday in terms of their silence. Cruso’s preference for reticence is unfamiliar to Barton 
                                                          
46 Dominic Head, J.M. Coetzee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 114. 
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who thinks of language as the locus of identity. That is why Barton seeks to contact a 
writer, Foe, who would record her adventures in Bahia and on Cruso’s island. By contrast, 
Cruso often reveals his indifference to language and writing. For example, asked by 
Barton about Friday’s capability for language, Cruso replies that “this is not England, we 
have no need of a great stock of words” (21). Barton also asks Cruso why he has not 
taught Friday language by emphasizing the difference between a civilized life and a silent 
life: “you might have brought home to him some of the blessings of civilization and made 
him a better man. What benefit is there in a life of silence?” (22) Cruso does not reply to 
the question. Cruso’s indifference to language is also reflected in the fact that unlike 
Crusoe he does not keep a journal. Barton looks for the traces of any records that Cruso 
might have left, but she finds nothing: “Cruso kept no journal, … I searched the poles that 
supported the roof, and the legs of the bed, but found no carvings, not even notches to 
indicate that he counted the years of his banishment or the cycles of the moon” (16). 
Cruso’s avoidance of language, can be seen to signal his transgression of the identity 
established by the dominant language. In other words, he becomes accustomed to living 
in the new milieu of the island in a very natural way, without using language. His 
preference for silence results in his affective relationship with mute Friday. In fact, Cruso 
does not need to use many words in living on the island with Friday. In this context, 
Cruso does not need Friday to learn his own language, but rather invents a new mode of 
life through his affective relations with Friday. This could be called the becoming-animal 
of Cruso in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming-animal.   
 Becoming-animal is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “only one becoming 
among others”: becoming-vegetable, becoming-child, becoming-woman and becoming-
imperceptible, etc. 47  Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of becoming-animal is more 
involved with “multiplicity”. As Paul Patton notes, Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
multiplicity “is itself a process of becoming other”, as “multiplicities constantly transform 
                                                          
47 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minnesota and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 272.  
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into one another”.48 As Deleuze and Guattari claims, “becoming and multiplicity are the 
same thing”.49  In relation to becoming-animal, Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
becoming and multiplicity is available for us to raise a question about the Western 
conception of the subject. As Gerald L. Bruns points out, becoming-animal provides us 
with ways of thinking Manfred Frank’s question: “who comes after the subject?” 50 
Regarding this question, Bruns asserts that the conception of the subject is centred on the 
word “man”, which is “imperative, not normative or descriptive; it is an order-word—“Be 
a man!”.51 However, Bruns says that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s conception of becoming-
animal is “a movement from major (the constant) to minor (the variable); it is a 
deterritorialization in which a subject no longer occupies a realm of stability and 
identity”.52 Becoming is always linked to the minoritarian rather than the majoritarian. 
Thus, Alain Beaulieu explains that “there is no becoming-man as the male is the 
majoritarian standard and becomings can be minoritarian”.53 In this context, we can see 
that Cruso’s becoming-animal is associated with the becoming-minoritarian. On the other 
hand, Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-animal “is not to attain a form (identification, 
imitation, Mimesis) but to find a zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or indifferentiation 
where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule”.54 To 
become animal is to get away from understanding ourselves in terms of identity and 
identification, and to pass through multiplicity to a zone of proximity. Thus, instead of 
language, Cruso passes through a zone of indiscernibility between human and non-human, 
                                                          
48  Paul Patton, Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), 122.  
49 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 305.  
50 Gerald L. Bruns, “Becoming-Animal: Some Simple Ways,” New Literary History (2007: 38), 
703.  
51 Bruns, 703. 
52 Bruns, 703.  
53 Alain Beaulieu, “The Status of Animality in Deleuze’s Thought,” Journal for Critical Animal 
Studies, vol. IX, issue 1/2, 2011, 76.  
54  Gilles Deleuze, Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 1.  
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subject and the Other, in affective relation to Friday in the milieu of nature. In this way, 
Cruso experiences his transformation into something else.  
           In order to further discuss Cruso’s becoming-animal, it is necessary, at first, to 
explore Barton’s recognition of her own identity. Compared to Cruso’s transformative 
identity, Barton initially tries to bind her identity to the dominant language which asserts 
the binary opposition of the white and the native. Based on the logic of the division, 
Barton identifies herself with the white by negating the Other. However, her negation of 
the Other does not enable her to constitute a stable identity, because her identity basically 
rests on her sense of lack or loss. This sense of lack is expressed in a number of ways. 
Firstly, Barton thinks of herself as the mother of a lost daughter. According to Barton’s 
stories, her only daughter “was abducted and conveyed to the New World by an 
Englishman, a factor and agent in the carrying trade” (10), and she then followed in 
search of her in Bahia. The lost daughter plays the role of the object for which Barton is 
driven to search, but which she is never able to regain, because she remembers only her 
daughter’s body in childhood. Secondly, Barton, as a castaway, has a sense of the loss of 
home and desires to be saved from Cruso’s island. As a result, she always tries to find the 
traces of English culture on Cruso’s island. Finally, as a female castaway, Barton 
recognizes herself as a minority whose voice has not been written in travel tales. Thus, 
she considers the male writer Foe as a proper storyteller who enables her to get free from 
the “burden of our story” (81), or of Friday’s and her story.  
However, we need to rethink Barton’s position of a female marginality in terms 
of Spivak’s assertion of “double value” .55 In other words, Barton represents the affective 
value of mothering and at the same time a female individualism. This female 
individualism is according to Spivak, dismissed by “Coetzee’s Susan Barton as Mr Foe’s 
ideas of a woman’s dilemma, as merely “father-born”.56 For this reason, Barton’s identity 
is located in between mothering and writing, which leads to an aporia. Despite Spivak’s 
                                                          
55 Spivak, 10.  
56 Spivak, 10. 
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emphasis on double value, Barton’s affective mothering is confined within the logic of 
language that eventually repeats the division between an affective value and a father-born 
value, the body and language. Moreover, Barton’s potentiality as an affective mothering 
does not generate her understanding of affective life. For example, Barton’s idea of 
forgetting is sharply distinguished from that of Cruso. For Barton, writing is an act of 
resistance against forgetting. Barton says:  
 
…you have forgotten much, and with every day that passes you forget more! 
There is no shame in forgetting: it is our nature to forget as it is our nature to 
grow odd and pass away. But seen from too remote a vantage, life begins to 
lose its particularity. All shipwrecks become the same shipwreck, all 
castaways the same castaway, sunburnt, lonely, clad in the skins of the 
beasts he has slain. (17-8)  
 
In this passage, Barton is absorbed in the sense of losing life’s “particularity” over time, 
as if by not recording it that quality recedes and is lost. However, Cruso replies to 
Barton’s anxiety about forgetting: “Nothing is forgotten” (17). Then he adds: “Nothing I 
have forgotten is worth the remembering” (17). Regarding her question on the records of 
life, Barton recalls Cruso’s response: 
 
 “I will leave behind my terraces and walls” he said. ““They will be enough. 
They will be more than enough.” And he fell silent again. As for myself, I 
wondered who would cross the ocean to see terraces and walls, of which we 
surely had an abundance at home; but I held my peace. (18)  
 
In this dialogue between Cruso and Barton, Barton cannot understand what Cruso means 
by “terraces and walls”. From Cruso’s point of view, life is also open to what Deleuze 
calls the corporeal and “impersonal” life, which is beyond language. Without depending 
on language or knowledge, people could understand Cruso’s (and others’) life through the 
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remains of terraces and walls, even though they neither face Cruso nor read Cruso’s 
record of his life. However, Barton cannot comprehend Cruso’s affective life.  
There is another example that Cruso and Barton have different views of nature. 
According to Marais, when Cruso looks out to sea from the Bluff, Barton interprets his 
“posture” in diverse ways: first as Cruso’s keeping watch for cannibals; then as his 
“searching the horizon for a sail” (38); and finally as a “practice of losing himself in the 
contemplation of the water and sky” (38).57 Cruso’s losing his identity in the landscape of 
nature is very different from Defoe’s Crusoe who cultivates and possesses nature. In 
facing nature, Cruso is assimilated into the island life rather than imposing the life of 
England on that distant land. This is Cruso’s becoming-impersonal by his affective 
involvement with nature rather than his losing an identity. However, Barton is unable to 
see Cruso’s becoming-impersonal in nature and thus interprets the becoming-impersonal 
as the loss of his identity. The sea and the sky which Cruso sees on the Bluff are for 
Barton just “sea and sky, vacant and tedious” (38). For her, they are simply the 
‘emptiness’. Similarly, Cruso’s idea of law on the island is something close to natural life, 
which is very different from Barton’s comprehension of law. Cruso thinks that laws are 
not necessary on the island: “As long as our desires are moderate we have no need of 
laws” (36). However, Barton cannot maintain this moderation, as she always has a strong 
sense of lack or a desire for England. Cruso’s conception of law seems more like that of 
animals in nature: “On the island there is no law except the law that we shall work for our 
bread, which is a commandment” (36). 
          In order to investigate Cruso’s attitude toward the Other from the perspective of 
Deleuze, it is useful to examine Marais’s understanding of Cruso’s hospitality to the 
Other. Marais asserts that Cruso shows “the openness to otherness” in terms of a 
Levinasian ethics of the Other. According to Marais, Cruso, unlike Defoe’s Crusoe, does 
not “fence” or “fortify” himself “from all the world”. This is why Cruso does not make 
                                                          
57 Marais, Secretary of the Invisible: The Idea of Hospitality in the Fiction of Coetzee (Amsterdam 
and New York: Rodopi, 2009), 71.  
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any furniture except a bed: “the ‘first and only piece of furniture’ that Cruso ‘fashioned’ 
is the bed in his hut of poles and reeds (82)’”. 58  Marais suggests that “Cruso’s 
construction of the bed” signifies his openness to otherness, which is in contrast with 
“Crusoe’s fear of difference, of being engulfed by the other” in Robinson Crusoe.59 
Marais asserts that Cruso’s openness to otherness is to be understood as his 
“unconditional hospitality” towards the other, which is different from a “self-fortifying 
act of hospitality”: “The intertextual juxtaposition is between a self-fortifying act of 
hospitality to otherness and an act of unconditional hospitality in which the self exposes 
itself to the other and thereby runs the risk of forfeiting itself, of being possessed and 
taken over by the other.” 60  However, Barton, as Marais asserts, fails to understand 
Cruso’s openness to otherness. Nevertheless, Marais assertion of Cruso’s “unconditional 
hospitality” still has the limitation of positing an abyssal gap between the subject and the 
Other, which represents the difference between a master Cruso and a slave Friday or a 
White colonizer and a cannibal. By comparison, from the perspective of Deleuze, Cruso 
becomes the Other by experiencing the exchange of affects between Cruso and Friday.  
             As we have discussed, Barton’s hospitality to Friday has its limitations in terms 
of her self-constitution with the Other. Nevertheless, Marais asserts that Barton’s 
responsibility would be ethical with the openness of her responsibility to the Other to 
come. According to Marais, “to appropriate Barton’s description of Friday, the alterity in 
question is “a child unborn, a child waiting to be born that cannot be born” (122). Marais 
emphasizes the subject’s unconditional responsibility toward the Other, since he adds, 
“the quest for the lost child is without term”.61 However, Barton’s quest for the lost 
daughter or the loss of Friday’s tongue is available on the grounds that she has a sense of 
the loss or lack. This leads to Barton’s quest for the unlimited responsibility toward the 
                                                          
58 Marais, 77.  
59 Marais, 77. 
60 Marais, 77.  
61 Marais, 85.  
 152 
Other that she can never meet. Nevertheless, considering Spivak’s insight about the 
relative position of a marginality, Barton can also be situated as a marginality, or the 
Other, for example, in relation to the writer Foe. Her position of a marginality has the 
potential of opening an ethico-political space.  
           However, from Deleuze’s ethics of becoming-animal, as we have seen, Barton 
ultimately fails to be ethical in relation to Friday. This is different from Cruso’s affective 
relation to Friday. As a female narrator, Barton has pity for the mute Friday and tries to 
let Friday speak out. Yet, Barton’s self-recognition and hospitality to otherness has a 
limitation based on language, although Spivak’s account of “aporia” and Marais’s notion 
of “a child unborn” provides the potentiality for Barton’s openness to the Other. However, 
Barton’s preference for language leads to her negation of affective relations with Friday 
and Cruso. In particular, Barton cannot perceive her daughter Susan, but instead questions 
her daughter’s body. In this context, as the narrator, Barton fails to let readers perceive 
and sense the scars or suffering of Friday and to hear his voice from the body. In the last 
part, another narrator produces the slow stream of Friday’s voice:  
 
His mouth opens. From inside him comes a slow stream, without breath, 
without interruption. It flows up through his body and out upon me; it passes 
through the cabin, though the wreck; washing the cliffs and shores of the 
earth. Soft and cold, dark and unending, it beats against my eyelids, against 
the skin of my face. (157) 
 
In this passage, a narrator, like Cruso, becomes animals and impersonal by affecting to 
and being affected by Friday’s body and his suffering. Thus, from the perspective of 
Deleuze, Cruso and the narrator provide an ethical attitude toward the Other in terms of 
the becoming-animal. This is why Cruso’s becoming-animal is different from Barton’s 
hospitality to Friday based on her humanistic pity.  
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4. Conclusion  
 
Foe, Coetzee’s rewriting of Robinson Crusoe, presents Cruso and Friday on the 
island in a narrative described by a female castaway, Susan Barton. The dialectical 
relation between the master Crusoe and the slave Friday in Robinson Crusoe is relayed 
into multiple relations between Cruso, Friday and Barton, which signifies the possibility 
of changing Friday’s position as a slave. However, Friday is presented as the absolute or 
extreme Other, because his tongue is mutilated, even though his master Cruso dies on the 
way to England and he lives with Barton as a semi-marginality in London. In this context, 
Coetzee’s Friday is reduced to the animal Other, which is the animalization of Friday. Yet, 
the animalization of Friday is inextricably associated with the constitution of Cruso and 
Barton’s self-constitution as a human subject on the island, which is processed by the 
ontological distinction between a human and an animal in terms of Agamben’s theory. As 
a possessor of language, the colonizers, such as Cruso and Barton, maintain their 
humanness on the island by linking Friday with the animal Other through lack of 
language.  
Through the animalization of Friday, Coetzee provides us with the ethical 
questions of how we as human subjects approach the extreme Other or the animal Other. 
There are different approaches toward Friday taken by Cruso and Barton. At first, Cruso, 
in living with mute Friday, becomes an animal and experiences the impersonal through 
affective relations to Friday. Cruso’s becoming-animal is quite different from the 
triumphal hero of Defoe’s Crusoe who sustains his identity and implants a civilized life 
on the island. On the contrary, Barton, whom Spivak calls a semi-marginality, fails to 
become an animal, because she confines Friday within the Other through the lack of 
language. Barton tries to let Friday speak his stories, but Barton’s attitude toward Friday 
has the limitation of confining Friday within the locus of the Other and of marking an 
abyssal difference between a human and an animal or the white and the native.  
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Chapter 6 
An Ethics of the exchange of Suffering in Disgrace 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Where the difference between humans and animals is emphasized, the suffering 
or pain of animals is easily ignored or justified. Jeremy Bentham’s question about 
animals has thus been crucial in regard to our understanding of ethical problems about 
animals: “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk: but Can they suffer?”1 
According to Derrida, Bentham’s question of animals’ suffering would be “the first and 
decisive” inquiry into the matter.” 2  Derrida claims that Western philosophy from 
Aristotle to Lacan always discusses animals in terms of the “capacity” or “attribute of 
logos” 3  but Bentham’s question “Can they suffer? is quite different. Derrida then 
connects the question “Can they suffer?” to “Can they not be able?”, because “being able 
to suffer” is, as Derrida emphasizes, “no longer power”.4 Matthew Calarco cites Derrida’s 
remarks on Bentham as the most explicit and sustainable account of the “proto-ethical 
imperative”. 5  According to Calarco, Derrida’s account of animals’ “ability” or 
“capability” for suffering is connected to their “inability or incapacity to avoid pain, its 
fleshly vulnerability and exposure to wounding”.6 By highlighting this powerlessness of 
                                                          
1 Jeremy Bentham, “A Utilitarian View,” Bioethics: An Anthology, eds. Helga Kuhse and Peter 
Singer, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 567.   
2 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham 
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3 Derrida, The Animal, 27. 
4 Derrida, The Animal, 28. 
5 Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 116.  
6 Calarco, Zoographies, 118, emphasis in the original.    
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animals, Derrida asserts that such a “possibility without power or impossibility” is “the 
most radical means of thinking the finitude that we share with animals”.7 Indeed, Derrida 
insists that the loss of power, as experienced in suffering, is grounds for recognizing the 
finitude we share with animals. This ethical experience of powerlessness is thus achieved 
by the subject’s passive attitude towards the suffering of animals. By comparison, 
Deleuze’s ethics of animals is quite different. In his conception of the becoming-animal, 
Deleuze asserts a radical exchange between humans and animals through the sensation of 
suffering. This radical exchange is based on the Deleuzian conception of affect. Thus, 
Derrida and Deleuze offer radically different ways to approach the questions of animals’ 
suffering.    
Derrida’s and Deleuze’s questions about the suffering of animals are among the 
ethical issues advanced in Coetzee’s Disgrace. Most of animals depicted in this novel are 
abandoned, slaughtered or incinerated by humans. As Derek Attiridge notes, “the most 
powerful writing in the novel involves the relation not to animal life but to animal 
death”.8 Considering the vulnerability of animals, we can ask an ethical question: How 
can we sympathize with the suffering of animals as well as humans? Set in the post-
apartheid period, most people and animals in the novel are entirely exposed to violence. 
The protagonist David Lurie is forced to resign his position at the university, because of 
his sexual harassment of his student Melanie Isaacs. After this affair, Lurie visits his 
daughter Lucy’s smallholding in the Eastern Cape, where Lucy is brutally raped by her 
African neighbours. Moreover, Lurie comes into direct contact with dying animals in the 
animal clinic run by Bev Show. As Tim Herron asserts, animals in this novel are “often in 
the process of becoming-lost”: “neglected, abandoned, attacked, burned—animals fare 
badly in a world in which they ‘do not own their lives’ and in which ‘they exist to be 
                                                          
7 Derrida, The Animal, 28.  
8 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 185. 
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used’ (Disgrace 123)”.9 As we have seen, from the perspective of Derrida, animals are 
absolutely powerless and vulnerable in relation to humans in the fact that they are 
incapable of avoiding their suffering. In this context, Lurie is compelled to confront 
ethical questions of how he can sympathize with the Other’s suffering whether they are 
the black Africans or animals.  
In order to discuss the suffering of animals and other people as suggested in this 
novel, it is helpful to examine Derrida’s ethical approach to animals’ suffering. Faced 
with the suffering of animals, humans undoubtedly feel a surge of compassion or pity. 
Derrida says, “no one can deny the suffering, fear, or panic, the terror or fright that can 
seize certain animals and that we humans can witness”.10 However, since animals, as 
beings without speech, cannot express their suffering, humans thereby feel the suffering 
of animals in different ways. As a consequence of this fact, there have been diverse 
approaches to the suffering of animals. As Andrew Linzey notes, “there are, it is 
supposed, two different kinds of suffering” and “traditional ethics privileges human 
suffering over all other kinds of suffering”.11 Animals’ suffering is ignored and justified 
by emphasising a difference between humans and animals. Derrida provides the suffering 
of animals as the ethical issue, but his idea of animality is based on the human and animal 
division. Derrida also implicitly rejects the possibility of there being any exchange of 
suffering between humans and animals in terms of the Deleuzian conception of affect.12 
Instead Derrida marks a difference between humans and animals in a nuanced way: “I 
have thus never believed in some homogeneous continuity between what calls itself man 
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11 Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 9.  
12 Jacques Derrida, “The Transcendental ‘Stupidity’ (‘Bétise’) of man and the becoming-animal 
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and what he calls the animals”. 13  Derrida conceives of an abyssal rupture between 
humans and animals, but he does not deny the animality of humans, so that he tries to 
expose his own animal aspects, such as his “nakedness”: “the animal looks at us, and we 
are naked before it. Thinking perhaps begins there”. 14  This experience of Derrida’s 
nakedness is an attempt to think about an inability of animals from the “point of view of 
animals”. From the perspective of Derrida, this nakedness is the ethical moment of man 
exposing himself under the gaze of the absolute other. This nakedness does not, however, 
mean that man enters a state of nature and has sympathy with animals. For Derrida, this 
experience is neither human nor animal, because there is no nudity “in nature”. According 
to Derrida, “clothing” is “one of the “properties of man” and “the animal is not naked”.15 
This experience of Derrida’s nakedness concerns the inability of animals. 
 Derrida’s notion of nakedness seems close to Deleuze’s conception of becoming-
animal, because “nakedness” (or a “contrempts between two nudities without nudity”16) is 
an experience of encountering between different species, exposing humans to animals’ 
gaze. However, Derrida’s notion of nakedness is focused on the “passivity’ located in 
experiences of “power without possibility” and “vulnerability” and in the fundamental 
impossibility of exchange between humans and animals. By contrast, Deleuze does not 
connect animals and animality with the passivity of powerlessness, but rather with an 
activity of affecting and being affected by animals. In this way, Deleuze tries to open us 
to the possibility of an exchange between humans and animals in terms of the sensation of 
suffering. The sensation of suffering is first associated with the Deleuzian conception of 
“body”, which opens to a zone of exchange between humans and animals. Basing his idea 
on the thought of Spinoza, Deleuze quotes the famous passage from the Ethics, “we do 
                                                          
13 Derrida, The Animal, 30.  
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15 Derrida, The Animal, 5. 
16 Derrida, The Animal, 5.  
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not know what the body can do”. 17  Deleuze describes the body in terms of speed, 
slowness and affects rather than in terms of its “form”, “organs”, “functions”, “substance” 
and “subject”.18 Additionally, Deleuze’s and Spinoza’s conception of body does not mean 
just a corporeal body but rather expands the body to “anything”: “it can be an animal, a 
body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a 
collectively”.19 We need to look at the details of what Deleuze says about the body in 
order to discuss why Deleuze’s and Spinoza’s conception of the body is available for an 
exchange of suffering between humans and animals.  
 
We call longitude the set of relations of speed and slowness, of motion and 
rest, between particles that compose it from the point of view, that is, 
between unformed elements. We call latitude the set of affects that occupy a 
body at each moment, that is, the intensive states of an anonymous force 
(force for existing, capacity for being affected). In this way we construct the 
map of a body. The longitude and latitude together constitute Nature, the 
plane of immanence or consistency, which is always variable and is 
constantly being altered, composed and recomposed, by individuals and 
collectivities.20   
 
In this passage above, the body is an assemblage of “the set of relations between 
unformed elements” and “the set of affects”, which is always variable in composing and 
recomposing of other bodies. As a result, Deleuze claims, “there is no longer a subject, 
but only individuating affective states of an anonymous force”.21 As a result, between 
bodies of humans and animals, there is the possibility of a flow of affects, which is open 
to the exchange of the suffering between humans and animals.  
                                                          
17 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1988), 17.  
18 Deleuze, Spinoza, 127. 
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20 Deleuze, Spinoza, 127-8. 
21 Deleuze, Spinoza, 128.  
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Among the chief examples of such exchange for Deleuze are Francis Bacon’s 
paintings, which show how precisely affect is involved in our becoming animal. Deleuze, 
in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, describes how Bacon’s paintings dismantle the 
identity of humans and animals to express “becoming-animal”. In order to explain 
becoming, Bacon and Deleuze try to escape from the representation or narration of face, 
bone and body in which the difference of humans and animals is clearly present. In 
Bacon’s paintings, the body is not a fixed frame, but a corporeal expression of affecting 
and being affected. This body as a corporeal expression provides a basis for the exchange 
of sensation between humans and animals. Accordingly, as for the suffering of animals, 
Deleuze says that men and animals have “meat” in common. Meat at the butcher shop is 
that of non-human animals killed by humans for consumption. However, it is not by mere 
visual resemblance that the meat of humans and animals leads to the zone of proximity. It 
is only by way of our capacity to be affected by the other, not by pictorial representation 
or physical similitude, that exchange can emerge. Thus, it is strictly by way of our affects 
or sensations, that humans become non-human animals. When we experience meat at the 
shop, Deleuze argues, it is vital to perceive that “meat is not dead flesh: it retains all the 
sufferings and assumes all the colours of living flesh”.22  Consequently, in Deleuze’s 
conception of affect, the suffering of humans and animals can be exchanged, which is 
different from Derrida’s approach to animals, as the latter emphasizes humans’ 
limitations in understanding the suffering of animals and denies the possibility of mutual 
exchange of suffering between humans and animals.  
Through the lens of both Derrida and Deleuze, this chapter will explore how 
Lurie changes his attitude to the suffering of humans and animals and how his sensation 
to others’ suffering has ethical and political implications in the post-apartheid period. 
Firstly, from Derrida’s ethics of animals, Lurie’s attitude to others’ suffering will be 
discussed by focusing on the approaches taken by Derek Attridge’s and Mike Marais’s 
                                                          
22  Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans and intro. Daniel W. Smith 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 21.  
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assertion of the responsibility to the Other based on Derrida and Levinas. Secondly, in 
terms of Deleuze’s idea of becoming-animal, Lurie’s experience of animal death will be 
investigated alongside Paul Patton’s discussion of becoming-minority and becoming-
impersonal. Patton’s approach to the becoming-animal of Lurie will be compared with 
Chris Danta’s claim of becoming-sacrificial-animal. Yet, compared to Patton’s and 
Danta’s approaches to the dying animal, my contention is focused on the corporeality of 
animal death by comparing the animal clinic with the butchers’ shop. Consequently, in 
this chapter, it will be shown that Deleuze’s notion of becoming-animal provides a more 
ethical way of life than Derrida’s ethics of responsibility.  
 
             
2. The ethics of the suffering of the Other  
      
            During the post-apartheid period, the sovereign power of the former regime was 
dismantled and the hierarchical relationship between the colonizer and the colonized was 
challenged. According to Paul Patton, “this painful transition to a new South Africa is 
directly implicated in many of the events that befall these characters”.23 Lurie as the white 
man is attacked and his daughter Lucy is raped by African men, among other incidents 
used to suggest the precarious nature of life in the post-apartheid society. This new socio-
political shift is regarded as “anarchy” from the perspective of young white Dawn, with 
whom Lurie has a sexual relation: “Now people just pick and choose which laws they 
want to obey”. 24 The colonizer’s racial privilege is lost in relation to the colonized. This, 
according to Tom Herron, is the “white dilemma”. 25  In this transitional state, Lurie 
                                                          
23  Paul Patton, Deleuze Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), 119.  
24 J.M. Coetzee, Disgrace (London: Vintage Books, 2000), 9.  
25 Herron expounds on the “white dilemma” in “dark times” (216): “the breakdown of law and 
order there; the ethics of silence as response to black-on-white, male-on female rape; the notion of 
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sexually harasses his student Melanie, which forces him to resign from the university. 
According to Patton, this affair “sets him on a line of flight that eventually leads to the 
deterritorialization of his personal, social, professional, and intellectual world”.26 Through 
his disgraceful affair with Melanie, he becomes aware of the suffering of humans and 
animals that previously he had not truly recognized. In particular, animals are, according 
to Derek Attridge, the “absolute other”27 to humans. Indeed, animals remain vulnerable in 
relation to both the white and the black, although the animals are, as Herron puts it, 
“everywhere”28 in this novel. In this context, I will discuss how Lurie recognizes the 
suffering of other people and animals and also why his sense of suffering has the ethical 
and political implications. 
How could Lurie recognize the suffering of the Other such as an animal, a 
woman or a black person? As we have seen with Derrida’s question of animals’ suffering, 
it is ethical to ask how Lurie could be sensitive to the Other’s suffering. Animals are 
undoubtedly and undeniably victimized and killed by and for humans, but animals, as the 
absolute Other, are incapable of speech. Yet, possessed of speech, humans are also raped 
and attacked, but their suffering is often ignored. In the case of Lurie, Derrida’s question 
“Can they suffer?” seems related to Lurie’s ethical transformation, as his attitude to the 
suffering of other people and animals is changed alongside the shift of his own life. 
However, he was less aware of others’ suffering before Lucy’s rape. There is a 
connection between Lurie’s negligence of the other’s suffering and his self-centred 
personality. This is often exposed by Lurie’s sexual desire for women. In order to solve 
“the problem of sex” (1), Lurie regularly makes an arrangement with Soraya, a coloured 
Muslim woman. Lurie thinks that her work “would be unusual for a Muslim” (3), 
although he considers “the times”, when “all things are possible these days” (3). Yet, 
                                                                                                                                                               
historical retribution; the mechanics of land redistribution; the impact of economic rationalization; 
the status of truth and the possibilities for reconciliation”. Tom Herron, 473.  
26 Paul Patton, Deleuze Concepts, 120.  
27 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee, 184. 
28 Tom Herron, 472. 
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Lurie does not have any regard for her shame. Although Soraya is working part-time as a 
prostitute, she is, he thinks, “surprisingly moralistic” as suggested in her opinion of 
tourists: “she is offended by tourists who bare their breasts on public beaches” (1). After 
being rejected when he tries to arrange a meeting with Soraya, Lurie tracks down her real 
name, address and telephone number. Her shame is described in her response to his call. 
“A long silence before she speaks. ‘I don’t know who you are,’ she says. ‘You are 
harassing me in my own house. I demand you will never phone me here again, never’” 
(9-10). Due to his self-centred personality, he does not consider her shame. Soraya 
expresses her pain to him, but still he remains unable to comprehend her shame.  
There is another indication of Lurie’s ignorance of the Other’s suffering in his 
authority as an intellectual. As an expert on Romantic Poetry, Lurie justifies his sexual 
desire for his student Melanie in his Romantics course by identifying himself with Byron. 
By using his position as a professor, Lurie seduces Melanie and thinks of his desire as 
“strange love” “from the quiver of Aphrodite, goddess of the foaming waves” (25). 
However, as Sue Kossew points out, Lurie acknowledges that “not rape, not quite that but 
undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core” (25), characterized their relationship, but 
he uses “Romantic language” to justify his sexual desire.29 Kossew compares Lurie to 
various literary figures based on the intertexuality of this novel: “both an outcast—a 
Byronic figure (Lucy calls him “mad, bad and dangerous to know” (77)), a Lucifer, a 
Cain (34)—but also a smooth talker of the Stavrogin and Humbert Humbert school, those 
who, in the very act of confession, are seen to be justifying themselves”.30 For this reason, 
according to Kossew, Lurie refuses “public repentance, drawing a distinction for the 
tribunal between a ‘secular plea’ of guilty, and the more spiritual realm of repentance 
which David believes to be ‘another universe of discourse’, that of soul”. 31  Lurie’s 
                                                          
29 Sue Kossew, “The Politics of Shame and Redemption in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace,” Research in 
African Literature, 34:2 (Summer 2003), 158.  
30 Sue Kossew, 158.  
31 Sue Kossew, 159.  
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romantic tendency leads to his ignorance of Melanie’s pain and his refusal to make a 
formal apology, but that romantic tendency is self-justification based on insensitivity to 
others.   
However, as many commentators point out, Lurie’s insensitivity to others’ 
suffering is more problematic in the transformative state of apartheid. This new political 
situation forces white privileged people to negotiate black Africans on different terms. 
Nevertheless, Lurie maintains his form of life and asserts his fixed temperament: “his 
temperature is not going to change, he is too old for that. His temperature is fixed, set. 
The skull, followed by the temperament: the two hardest parts of the body” (2). In this 
context, Paul Patton describes Lurie as an “allegorical figure”: he restates “if not the 
habits and attitudes of the ruling class of the old colonial regime, then at least a certain 
kind of Eurocentric and cultured cast of mind that sustained the possibility of colonial 
relations”.32 In a new political situation, Lurie’s temperament and his privileged desire are 
more problematic. Concerned with Lurie’s affair with Melanie, his ex-wife Rosalind says, 
“Don’t expect sympathy from me, David, and don’t expect sympathy from anyone else 
either. No sympathy, no mercy, not in this day and age. Everyone’s hand will be against 
you, and why not? Really, how could you?” (44). In their dialogue, Rosalind’s emphasis 
on “this day and age” implies the changed political situation. According to Derek 
Attridge, it also hints at “the bitterness of the white South African who has lost the 
privileges her race conferred on her”.33  Nevertheless, Lurie says to Lucy: “I am not 
prepared to be reformed. I want to go on being myself” (77). As Patton rightly observes, 
Lurie “often fails to comprehend the motives of others, especially those of his student, his 
daughter, and her African neighbour Petrus”.34  Patton refers to the limitation of the 
characters’ understanding of other people by quoting Salman Rushdie’s critical remark on 
Disgrace: “The whites don’t understand the blacks and the blacks aren’t interested in 
                                                          
32 Paul Patton, Deleuze Concepts, 121.  
33 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, 167. 
34 Paul Patton, Deleuze Concepts, 120. 
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understanding the whites . . . Petrus comes closest, but his motives remains enigmatic and 
his presences grows more menacing as the novel proceeds”.35 However, Laura Wright 
asserts that “Lurie’s lack of understanding in ‘this place, at this time’” needs to be seen as 
“the necessary product of a postcolonial and post-apartheid narrative about shifting and 
renegotiated power in an historical moment fraught with various racially and sexually 
determined displacements”.36 Patton similarly criticizes Rushdie’s reading of this novel. 
According to Patton, Rushdie encapsulates “its bleak vision of postapartheid politics”: 
“there is no transformation in either the individual characters or the social relations in 
which their lives unfold”.37 However, from the perspective of Patton, Lurie comes to 
transform himself by experiencing the other’s suffering. That is why Lurie’s awareness of 
others’ pain is associated with an ethical way of life in a new South Africa.  
In his affair with Melanie, Lurie is driven to undergo his transmutation with his 
experience of Lucy’s and animals’ vulnerability. Before Lucy’s rape, he had no 
compassion for the ailing animals in Bev Show’s animal refuge. Thus, when Bev says, “I 
sense that you like animals” (81), Lurie cynically replies: “Do I like animals? I eat them, 
so I suppose I must like them, some parts of them” (81). However, after Lucy was raped 
and her dogs were shot by her African neighbours, Lurie is exposed to the vulnerability of 
humans and animals. Indeed, Lurie feels powerless because he was not able to protect 
Lucy from the African men and was almost burnt in the toilet. After the event, Lurie feels 
a sense of numbness: “The trembling, the weakness are only the first and most superficial 
signs of that shock. … For the first time he has a taste of what it will be like to be an old 
man, tired to the bone, without hopes, without desires, indifferent to the future.” (107). In 
this context, we need to look at the ways Lurie faces the suffering of other people and 
animals and undergoes his transformation. The ways Lurie’s responds to the other’s pain 
                                                          
35 Salman Rushdie, “Light on Coetzee,” in Step Across this Line: Collected Non-fiction 1992-2002 
(New York: Random House, 2002), 297-8. Paul Patton, “Becoming-Animal and Pure Life,” 122. 
36 Laura Wright, Writing “Out of All the Camps”: J.M. Coetzee’s Narratives of Displacement 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 99. 
37 Paul Patton, Deleuze Concepts, 122.  
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are linked to the question of the ethical ways to deal with the political problems under 
post-apartheid.  
It may be useful here to examine Derrida’s ethical approach to the suffering of 
the animal Other, as Derrida’s question of animals provides us with ethical ways to 
understand the Other’s suffering. As we have seen, Lurie is insensitive to animals’ pain, 
as animals are a different species to humans: animals are the absolute Other, while his 
African neighbours are the Other. From the perspective of Derrida’s notion of 
“nakedness”, we can consider how Lurie feels gazed at by the animals. Derrida finds 
himself naked in front of his little cat:  
 
No, no, my cat, the cat that looks at me in my bedroom or in the 
bathroom, this cat that is perhaps not “my cat” or “my pussycat,”… does not 
appear here to represent like an ambassador, the immense symbolic 
responsibility … If I say “it is a real cat” that sees me naked, this is in order 
to mark its unsubstitutable singularity. When it responds in its name 
(whatever “respond” means, and that will be our question), it doesn’t do so 
as the exemplar of a species called “cat”, . . . But even before that 
identification, it comes to me as this irreplaceable living being that one day 
enters this space, into this place where it can encounter me, see me, even see 
me naked. Nothing can ever rob me of the certainty that what we have here 
is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized.38  
 
In this passage, Derrida encounters the eyes of a singular, irreplaceable living animal. 
This is the ethical moment of man exposing himself to the gaze of the absolute Other. 
Derrida claims: “nothing will have ever given me more food for thinking through this 
absolute alterity of the neighbour or of the next (-door) than these moments when I see 
myself naked under the gaze of a cat”. As I argued earlier, this nakedness does not, 
however, mean that man enters a state of nature and has sympathy with the animal. This 
experience of Derrida’s nakedness is about an inability of animals from “the point of 
                                                          
38 Jacques Derrida, The Animal, 9.  
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view of animals”: “In the first place there are texts signed by people who have no doubt 
seen, observed, analyzed, reflected on the animal, but who have never been seen seen by 
the animal”.39 Through the experience of “exposing”, Derrida says that “we can encounter 
a difference, a time or contrempts between two nudities without nudity”.40  
From the perspective of Derrida, Lurie experiences something akin to such 
nakedness after Lucy’s rape. In order to discuss his exposure under the gaze of animals, it 
is, at first, important to consider that Lurie should admit his limitation of understanding 
the other’s suffering, given that Lucy refuses to share her pain with him. Faced by a 
member of the African gang in Petrus’s party, Lurie tries to call the police but Lucy stops 
him. As to Lucy’s response, Lurie says: “Lucy, Lucy, I plead with you! You want to 
make up for the wrongs of the past, but this is not the way to do it. If you fail to stand up 
for yourself at this moment, you will never be able to hold your head up again. . . . We 
should just have kept quiet and waited for the next attack. Or cut our own throats” (133).  
However, Lucy replies, “stop it, David! I don’t need to defend myself before you. You 
don’t know what happened” (134). Although Lurie wants to help Lucy deal with her 
trauma, he has to admit his limited understanding of Lucy’s attempts to deal with her 
suffering and disgrace. By comparison, in his encountering with animals’ suffering, Lurie 
experiences what Derrida calls “nudity”. In the case of the Persian sheep, Lurie is 
exposed to the gaze of the animal Other. More specifically, Lurie sees the two young 
sheep that will be slaughtered for Petrus’s party. He suddenly feels a sense of compassion 
for the two sheep:  
 
     A bond seems to have come into existence between himself and the two 
Persians, he does not know how. The bond is not one of the affection. It is 
not even a bond with these two in particular, whom he could not pick out 
from a mob in a field. Nevertheless, suddenly and without reason, their lot 
has become important to him.  
                                                          
39 Jacques Derrida, The Animal, 13, emphasis in the original.  
40 Jacques Derrida, The Animal, 5, emphasis in the original.  
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    He stands before them, under the sun, waiting for the buzz in his mind to 
settle, waiting for a sign. (126) 
 
A sense of the bond Lurie has with the two sheep is related to a moment of what Derrida 
calls “a difference, a time or comtempre between two nudities without nudity”. Lurie sees 
the two sheep from a non-humanistic point of view, which brings about his nakedness to 
them. Lurie’s encounter with the living sheep is neither humanistic nor animalistic: the 
moment of the two nudities without nudity. In this way, Lurie’s exposure to the two 
sheep is connected to what Derrida means by a passivity. Derrida says, “nudity is nothing 
other than that passivity, the involuntary exhibition of the self. …I have just attributed 
passivity to nudity”.41 Yet, from the perspective of Derrida, there is always an abyssal 
rupture between humans and animals or Lurie and the sheep so that we, as humans, are 
not able to understand the animal Other.  
Derek Attridge and Michael Marais effectively posit Coetzee as an ethical writer 
concerned with the unlimited responsibility to the Other, basing their idea on Derrida’s 
and Levinas’s ethics of the Other. Attridge presents the Other as the unidentifiable, while 
Marais explains the Other as the invisible. As to the Other depicted in Disgrace, Attridge 
asserts that Lucy, Petrus, Melanie and animals are all others for Lurie: “If Lucy and 
Petrus are others for David Lurie whom he struggles to know, if Melanie is an other 
whom he wrongs by not attempting to know, animals are others whom he knows he 
cannot begin to know”.42 Among these others, animals are the absolute other. According 
to Attridge, the encounter with these Others forces us to take a responsibility: “the 
other—whether the other I struggle to create or the other I encounter in the shape of a 
person or work—arouses in me in as sense of responsibility”.43 In this context, as Attridge 
argues, Lurie strives to have an unlimited responsibility toward animals, which leads to 
                                                          
41 Jacques Derrida, The Animal, 11.  
42 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee, 184.  
43 Derek Attridge, Singularity of Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 123.  
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“Lurie’s new mode of existence”.44 As Lurie engages with the animals and their death, he 
starts to respond to their suffering. Attridge also emphasizes the function of art for Lurie’s 
new mode of existence. Attridge argues that, from “the text that functions powerfully as 
literature”, we can experience the other, or “the singularity of the other”, “in such a way 
as to open onto that which cannot be accounted for by those materials”.45 Through our 
experience of the Other in literature, he insists that we are forced to have “responsibility 
for the other” and “responsibility to the other”.46 Animals and art in this novel, according 
to Attridge, provide the “substance” of Lurie’s new existence, which is in turn related to 
ways of solving many problems faced by a new South Africa: “Coetzee is offering two 
related ‘solutions’ to the multiple problems of the age his novel delineates: the production 
of art and the affirmation of human responsibility to animals”.47 Indeed, Attridge’s ethics 
of responsibility is epitomized by his account of art and animals in this novel. In 
concluding his discussion of Disgrace, Attridge repeats his emphasis on both literature 
and the Other. He begins: “if there is a political challenge in this novel, and in all 
Coetzee’s novels to date, it is to find a way of building a new, just state”. He then goes on 
to characterize this state: “a state that recognizes the importance of the literary, which is 
to say of an inventive responding to the other that is also a responding to what has made 
the other—a traceable past and a constituting present—and a wagering on, trusting in a 
different future. We might call it, should it ever come into existence, a state of grace”.48 
In this passage, Attridge’s ethical reading of Disgrace is achieved in terms of his 
                                                          
44 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee, 190.  
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understanding the literary form as one that responds to the Other constituted in history 
and related to the community to come.  
Despite the fact that Attridge’s discussion of the responsibility to the Other is 
powerfully influential, we need to rethink what the Other means and how Lurie takes a 
responsibility to the animal Other. In order to discuss this matter, we need to examine 
Marais’s notion of the responsibility to the Other in his reading of Disgrace. Marais’s 
ethics of the Other has an affinity with Attridge’s notion of the responsibility to the Other. 
However, Marais distinguishes his notion of the Other from that of Attridge while 
fundamentally following Attridge’s account of the Other as “the unknowable”. Marais 
describes the Other as ‘the invisible’ on the grounds that “from Elizabeth Costello, the 
metaphor for such otherness is ‘the invisible’, which is described as a power that is 
‘beyond us’”.49 Along the same line of thought, Marais refers to an “otherness outside 
history”: “Coetzee’s concern with alterity is evident in the way in which he refuses to 
attempt to represent the Other in his fiction”, because his earlier fiction and historio-
graphical representation “routinely foreclose on otherness”.50 In this context, according to 
Marais, “Coetzee’s refusal to treat history as a priori system is directly related to the 
strong concern with an otherness outside history”.51 Nevertheless, Marais makes it clear 
that Coetzee does not refuse to engage with history, but his fiction is directed “toward 
something that has not yet emerged”52 and “which is therefore invisible”.53 As a result, 
representation, according to Marais, “inscribes an irreducible tension between the domain 
of history and the order of the other”.54  
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In order to further discuss Marais’s conception of the Other, we need to look at 
the detail in his reading of Disgrace. According to Marais, this novel is “determined by 
tension between desire and responsibility”: “Disgrace examines the effect of Autrui on 
the subject, its ability to transform the subject’s desire for the Other into responsibility for 
the Other”.55  More specifically, as Marais points out, when seducing Melanie, Lurie 
refers to the “weight of the desiring gaze” (12) and, later, justifies the act by arguing for 
“the rights of desire” (89). As for Lurie’s expression of “desire”, Marais emphasizes on 
the “Orphic overtones”, because Melanie responds to Lurie’s desire like a “dead person” 
(89): when Lurie has a sex with Melanie, she “had decided to go slack, die within herself 
for the duration” (25). In this context, Marais asserts that Lurie’s seduction of Melanie 
can be compared to Orpheus’s encounter with Eurydice in the underworld: “In his 
encounter with Isaacs, then, Lurie is exposed to the radical ungraspability of death, its 
impossibility”.56 By describing Melanie as the object of the impossibility of death, Marais 
accordingly describes her as the invisible or the absolute Other. It is here that we need to 
ask how Lurie takes an unlimited responsibility in terms of Marais’s notion of the Other. 
From the perspective of Marais’s theory, Lurie accepts the impossibility of death through 
his encountering with the Other, and in doing so he also gives himself to the Other. This 
passive acceptance of the Other indicates what Marais says about the responsibility for 
the Other. Through Lurie’s passive attitude to the Other, he changes his desire for the 
Other into his responsibility for the Other.  
As we have seen with Attridge’s and Marais’s notion of the Other, the Other is 
regarded as the unidentifiable and the invisible. Thus, we can neither understand nor, in 
Marais’s argument, see the Other, which also implies the impossibility of our 
understanding of the other’s suffering. In this sense, I raise a few questions about 
Attridge’s and Marais’s ethical emphasis on the unlimited responsibility for and to the 
Other. Firstly, it is important to rethink why the Other, such as Melanie and the dogs, can 
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and must remain unknowable and invisible. Secondly, considering the suffering of the 
Other, it is useful to rethink how we can take unlimited responsibility for the suffering of 
the unknowable Other. Thirdly, given that Lurie’s negligence of the Other’s suffering is 
associated with post-apartheid, it is also important to reflect whether Lurie’s 
responsibility for the invisible Other is relative to a practical concerns in demanding new 
political negotiations.  
If we follow Attridge’s and Marais’s discussion of the Other, for Lurie, the 
unknowable and invisible Other can be taken to be Melanie, Lucy, African neighbours 
and animals, on the grounds that there is an abyssal rupture between Lurie and these as 
the Other and it is therefore impossible for Lurie to understand and see them. Due to this 
rupture, the subject’s responsibility for the Other will be unfulfilled and unlimited. Marais 
describes this rupture as “difference”: “the community implied by the concern for and 
with the Other in Coetzee’s fiction is grounded in recognition of difference and is 
therefore always incomplete”.57 For example, in a community where animals are always 
victimized and killed by and for people, Lurie comes to have responsibility for animals, 
but his responsibility is always incomplete. That is why unlimited responsibility is related 
to the community to come. However, by positioning Melanie and animals as the absolute 
Other, it is impossible for the subject to take a responsibility for the Other in the ethical 
and political context. In fact, rather than a rupture between humans and animals, this 
novel shows what humans share with animals in terms of the sensation of the body. For 
example, Bev Show says, “Think comforting thoughts, think strong thoughts. They can 
smell what you are thinking” (81). In order to further discuss the problems of the 
unknowable Other, we need to look at the comments of Daniel W. Smith. Smith, for 
example, argues that the emphasis on the “absolute” Other refers to a realm of 
transcendence rather than the object relied on in reality: “whenever we speak something 
‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ or ‘infinite’, as Derrida often does (the ‘pure gift’, ‘absolute 
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responsibility’, the ‘infinite other’), we are in the realm of transcendence, since we never 
encounter the present to our experience”.58 From the perspective of Smith, Lurie can 
never meet the otherness of Melanie or animals, as they are posited as the transcendental 
object, which results in the impossibility of Lurie’s responsibility.  
Moreover, Attridge’s and Marais’s theory of the unlimited responsibility risks 
fixing the position of the Other. From the perspectives of Attridge and Marais, Melanie 
and animals are posited as the absolute Other in relationship to Lurie. Accordingly, it is 
impossible for Lurie to share in their suffering. Martin Hägglund, however, problematizes 
Levinas’s conception of the absolute Other whilst refusing to conflate Levinas’s ethics of 
the Other with those of Derrida. More specifically, Hägglund asserts that Levinas’ ethics 
does not refer to the “intersubjective encounter”, but rather presupposes that an ethical 
encounter “exhibits a fundamental asymmetry, where the other is an absolute Other who 
reveals the transcendence of the Good”.59 From the vantage point of Hägglund’s theory, 
Melanie and animals are situated at the position of the absolute Good, which Lurie can 
never encounter, nor can he fulfil responsibility to them. For this reason, Hägglund 
criticizes that, for Levinas, “the subject should devote itself entirely to the other”.60 By 
criticizing the Other posited as the transcendental, Hägglund accordingly suggests that the 
relation between the subject and the Other is interchangeable: 
 
It is suffices, however, to place yourself face-to-face with someone else to 
realize that the asymmetry assumed by Levinas is self-refuting. If you and I 
are standing in front of each other, who is the other? The answer can only be 
doubly affirmative since “the other” is an interchangeable term that shifts 
referent depending on who pronounces the worlds. I am an other for the 
other and vice versa, as Derrida reinforces in “Violence and Metaphysics”.61 
                                                          
58 Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence”, Between Deleuze and 
Derrida, eds. Paul Patton and John Protevi (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), 57.  
59 Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), 89. 
60 Martin Hägglund, 89. 
61 Martin Hägglund, 89-90.  
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In this passage, the relation between the subject and the other is interchangeable in terms 
of “referent”, which leads to a double affirmation of both the subject and the other. From 
the perspective of Hägglund, Lurie may see Melanie and animals as the other, but he is 
also the other from their point of view, where by implication the possibility of 
intersubjectity exists. Thus, Hägglund’s reading of Derrida’s and Levinas’s ethics of the 
Other provides a radical possibility of the interchangeable relation between the subject 
and the other. Indeed, this novel remarkably describes how the positions of the subject 
and the other are interchangeable. For example, the white Lurie rapes the coloured 
Melanie, but the white Lucy is raped by the coloured African men. The dog man Petrus 
takes care of Lucy’s dogs, but Lurie helps Bev incinerate abandoned dogs and becomes a 
dog-man in turn: “A dog-man Petrus once called himself. Well, now he has become a 
dog-man: a dog undertaker; a dog psychopomp; a harijan” (146). Despite the fact that he 
bases his ideas on Derrida, Hägglund radically opens the changeable relation between the 
self and the other; nevertheless, there is always an abyssal rupture between the subject 
and the other, as suggested in Derrida’s notion of “nudity”. By contrast, Deleuze’s ethics 
of animals provides the potential not simply of interchangeability but of the exchange of 
the suffering between humans and animals. In the next part, I will discuss how Lurie can 
share with the suffering of the other in terms of Deleuze’s ethics of becoming-animal.   
 
 
3. The becoming-corpse 
 
Paul Patton’s reading of Disgrace is undoubtedly influential in the recent ethical 
approaches to Lurie’s transformation. In “Becoming-Animal and Pure Life in Coetzee’s 
Disgrace”, Patton argues that “Lurie remains an unredeemed and in many ways 
unredeemable character, but he also enters into a becoming-animal, which opens up the 
 174 
possibility of transformation in his way of being in the world”.62  As we have seen, 
Derrida’s and Levinas’s ethics of animals’ suffering is epitomized by the unlimited 
responsibility for the animal Other, which is the position taken by Attridge and Marais in 
reading this novel. However, instead of a difference between humans and animals, Patton 
investigates how human beings become animals and how humans share the finitude of 
life with animals. Specifically, Patton observes two different kinds of becoming-animals 
in his reading of Disgrace: “becoming-minority” and “becoming-impersonal”. Moreover, 
compared with Attridge’s and Marais’s emphasis on an ethics over a politics, Patton’s 
discussion of becoming-animal has political as well as ethical implications on the grounds 
that the becoming-animal of Lurie and Lucy is associated with the becoming-Africans. 
According to Patton, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “minority” in A Thousand Plateaus 
is basically political: Deleuze and Guattari are interested “in the social dynamic by means 
of which majoritarian social and political identities are transformed”.63 In other words, 
majoritarian identities such as human, male and white, experience their transformation 
into a minority such as dogs, women and Black Africans. However, while Patton’s 
reading of Disgrace presents a dynamic in which the characters metamorphoses into a 
minority, he does not emphasize the corporeality of animal death. My contention is that 
the corporeality of animals and their deaths are vital to understanding the becoming-
animal of Lurie in Disgrace. Thus, I will discuss the becoming-corpse of Lurie in terms 
of Deleuze’s conception of the “meat”. This will be different from the approach taken by 
Chris Danta’s notion of a “scapegoat” and the “becoming sacrificial animal”. 64 
Consequently, this part will examine how both Deleuze and Coetzee provide us with an 
ethics of becoming-animal beyond humanistic and moralistic compassion.   
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The death of animals in Disgrace is depicted to be quite different from the death 
of humans. Most of the animals are killed and incinerated for and by humans, but their 
corpses are eaten or burnt. Given that humans’ dead body are buried and mourned in a 
ritual, there are different attitude towards the animal death and corpses drawn in this 
novel. Indeed, after Lurie visits Lucy’s smallholding, he continues to encounter animals 
slaughtered and incinerated. One of the most striking scenes is where Lucy’s dogs are 
brutally shot by the African neighbours who rape Lucy. Yet, when Lurie buries the six 
corpses of the dogs, he does not show a feeling of compassion toward them: “He digs the 
hole where Lucy tells him, close to the boundary line. A grave for six full grown dogs: … 
He trundles the corpses over in a wheelbarrow. The dog with the hole in its throat still 
bares its bloody teeth. Like shooting fish in a barrel, he thinks. Contemptible, yet 
exhilarating, probably, in a country where dogs are bred to snarl at the mere smell of a 
black man. A satisfying afternoon’s work, heady, like all revenge. One by one he tumbles 
the dogs into the hole, then fills in it” (110). In this passage, the death of dogs is 
interpreted as the black Africans’ revenge on the white. Although Lurie thinks the dogs 
are killed as a substitute for the white, he does not seem at all agitated by the corpses.  
However, Lurie’s attitude towards the death of animals changes, as his frequent 
visits to the Animal Welfare clinic expose him to the death of unwanted and stray dogs 
and cats. It is in this episode that Lurie perceives the suffering of animals in terms of 
Deleuze’s conception of affect:  
 
        He had thought he would get used to it. But that was not what happens. 
The more killings he assists in, the more jittery he gets. One Sunday evening, 
driving home in Lucy’s kombi, he actually has to stop at the roadside to 
recover himself. Tears flow down his face that he cannot stop; his hands 
shake.  
        He does not understand what is happening to him. Until now he has 
been more or less indifferent to animals. (142-3) 
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In the passage, Lurie is affected by the death of animals. More specifically, instead of his 
mind, Lurie’s body perceives how the animal body suffered “from distempers, from 
broken limbs, from infected bites, from mange, and from old age” (142) and from their 
death. Lurie’s perception of animal suffering is interactive with the animal bodies, as the 
bodies are also affected by Lurie’s body: “They [the dogs] flatten their ears, they droop 
their tails, as if they too fell the disgrace of dying: locking their legs, they have to be 
pulled or pushed or carried over the threshold” (143). That is what is called the exchange 
of suffering between Lurie and dogs in Deleuze’s conception of becoming-animal. As we 
have seen with Deleuze’s notion of affect, affects are the capacity of affecting and being 
affected by other bodies. In this sense, Deleuze radically defines both humans and 
animals as affects, which goes beyond the humanistic morality: “Consideration of genera 
and species still implies a ‘morality’, whereas the Ethics is an ethology which, with 
regard to men and animals, in each case only considers their capacity for being 
affected”.65 Accordingly, as Deleuze asserts, animals as well as humans, as bodies, are 
defined more by their affects than by their forms. As this suggests, there is no a primacy 
of a human over a non-human animal. Moreover, the term ‘affect’, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, is used alongside the notions of percept and sensation: “Percepts are no longer 
perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no 
longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. 
Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds 
any lived”.66 Sensation and affects are thereby understood as forces to affect and be 
affected by the bodies. Thus, as Lurie often goes to the animal clinic and faces the 
suffering of dogs, his body affects to and is affected by animal bodies, which is the 
exchange of suffering between Lurie and dogs. In this way, the bodies of dogs are not 
regarded as the Other, as suggested in Derrida’s and Levinas’s notion of the Other. 
                                                          
65 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza, 27, emphasis in the original text.  
66 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
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For further discussion of the becoming-corpse of Lurie, let us examine Danta’s 
concept of becoming-sacrificial-animal and Patton’s notion of becoming-impersonal, 
since Danta and Patton argue animal death in terms of Deleuze’s becoming-animal. First, 
I will critically discuss Danta’s notion of a scapegoat. In his reading of Disgrace, Danta 
connects the death of dogs with the figure of the scapegoat and then suggests the 
becoming-sacrifice of Lurie. Following Lurie’s discussion of the meaning of a scapegoat 
in the modern age, Danta explains Lurie’s euthanizing dogs as an act of resistance against 
the sacrifice of animals for religious or symbolic ends. It is useful to look at Lurie’s 
remark about the scapegoat:  
 
“I don’t think scapegoating is the best description,” he says cautiously. 
“Scapegoating worked in practice while it still had religious power behind it. 
You loaded the sins of the city on to the goat’s back and drove it out, and the 
city was cleansed. It worked because everyone knew how to read the ritual, 
including the gods. Then the gods died, and all of sudden you had to cleanse 
the city without divine help. Real actions were demanded instead of 
symbolism. The censor was born, in the Roman sense. Watchfulness became 
the watchword: the watchfulness of all over all. Purgation was replaced by 
the purge. (91) 
 
In this passage, Lurie rejects the traditional idea of a scapegoat in which the city is 
cleansed and purged by its sacrifice. Lurie emphasizes that “we” cleanse the city with real 
actions rather than through a ritual to appeal for the help of God. However, Danta focuses 
on Lurie’s acknowledgment of the death of God and his identification with the death of 
dogs without grace. According to Danta, Lurie’s work with Bev Shaw in the animal clinic 
is “an acknowledgement—in the absence of the gods—that the purge has replaced 
purgation and that real actions are demanded instead of symbolism. Lurie’s sympathetic 
treatment of the dead dogs (which are shown to be the true scapegoats of the modern 
polis) certainly puts him in a relation to his own death—but a relation to death that is so 
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pure it is somehow unconcerned with the possibility of personal redemption or grace”.67 
In other words, as Danta asserts, the dogs are to be understood as scapegoats, but as 
purged or sacrificed without purgation in the modern times. Lurie’s sympathy for the 
dead dogs is considered as a process of his identification with the scapegoats. Lurie 
thereby becomes sacrificial without any possibility of grace. However, most of the dogs 
in this novel are abandoned and slaughtered, which is neither relevant to a possibility of a 
symbolic purgation for the given society, nor to a possibility of the reconciliation between 
the black and the white. Nevertheless, Danta still depends on an image of the scapegoat 
that contains a subtle nuance of the morality of God, which seems very different from 
Deleuze’s ethology of affects. That is why Danta calls Lurie a “scapegrace”: “one who 
escapes the grace of God”.68 However, as Derek Attridge notes, “disgrace” in this novel is 
opposed to honour rather than grace.69 In this sense, Lurie’s disgrace is associated with 
his life in relation to African people, and his experience of dogs’ “dying of disgrace” is 
concerned with the ethology of our corporeal life.  
In order to maintain the scapegoat and its relation to Lurie, Danta uses the term 
“becoming” in an obscure way. Danta insists that Lurie becomes a sacrificial lamb in that 
his “identifying with the poetic image of the dog become a lamb” by giving the dog up. 
To discuss his use of the image of the lamb, Danta quotes from Disgrace:  
 
        He opens the cage door. “Come,” he says, bends, opens his arms. The 
dog wags its crippled rear, sniffs his face, licks his cheeks, his lips, his ears. 
He does nothing to stop it. “Come”.  
         Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters the surgery. “I 
thought you would save him for another week,” says Bev Shaw. “Are you 
giving him up?” “Yes, I am giving him up.” (220) 
 
                                                          
67 Chris Danta, “Like a dog… like a lamb”, 732.  
68 Chris Danta, “Becoming Sacrificial Animal”, 734.  
69 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee, 178. 
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By focusing on “the lyrical overdetermination of the crippled, immobilized dog as a 
lamb”, Danta draws the conclusion that Lurie is a resemblance of the “biblical patriarch 
Abraham”, and then claims that “who gives death to the scapegoat also enter into a 
relation to his own death”.70 In other words, both Abraham and Lurie experience their 
own death by putting the animal to death. By foregrounding this biblical image of the 
lamb and its relation to Lurie, Danta connects Lurie’s experience of the dog death with 
the becoming-corpse. More specifically, as Danta puts it, Lurie becomes aware that “he 
too experiences the disgrace of dying”, that the “longtime corpse” is “in some sense his 
own”.71 In this context, Danta consequently stresses that “the scapegoat that he argues” is 
“above all else a sign of unredeemed finitude; each becoming-animal of the human is also 
a becoming-sacrificial-animal and as such, a becoming-corpse”.72  However, from the 
perspective of Deleuze, the becoming-animal and becoming-corpse of Lurie are not 
achieved through the mediation of the conception of a scapegoat, but through his 
encountering with animal bodies and animal corpses. Moreover, the becoming-animal of 
Lurie is not related to his “identifying with a lamb”, because, Deleuze says, “to become is 
not to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, 
indiscernibility, or indifferentiation where one cannot longer be distinguished from a 
woman, an animal, or a molecule”.73 In other words, the becoming-animal of Lurie is 
focused on a process of the exchange between Lurie and dogs, instead of his 
identification with sacrificed dogs for the given society.  
Despite the fact that Danta remarkably analyzes the relation between a scapegoat 
and a scapegrace via the hint of Deleuze’s becoming-animal or becoming-corpse, Danta’s 
theory of becoming-sacrificial-animal seems irrelevant to Deleuze’s conception of 
becoming, as Danta does not clearly define the meaning of “becoming” or “becoming-
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animal”. In emphasizing “an animalistic perspective” for Kafka’s stories, Danta refers to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s remarks in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature: Deleuze and 
Guattari “claim that Kafka’s narratives ‘are essentially animalistic even though there 
aren’t animals in all of them’. This is because ‘[a]ccording to Kafka, the animal is the 
object par excellence of the story: to try to find a way out, to trace a line of escape’.”74 
Although Danta notes his hesitation in dealing with this complicated approach toward the 
animal and its connection to the scapegoat,75 in his essay “The Melancholy Ape”, he 
suggests that, since the publication of Disgrace, Coetzee wants to express “the thought of 
death in zoomorphic rather than anthropomorphic” terms and adds that “the becoming-
animal, for him”, is “to becoming-mortal, since it serves to convey one into that 
melancholic narrative space between the thought of death and death itself”. 76  In this 
passage, Danta uses the term “melancholic narrative space” to describe the tone of the 
humanistic and the psychological, but this seems to be far from what Deleuze tries to say 
in terms of the becoming-animal. Additionally, in order to connect the becoming-animal 
with the becoming-death, Danta briefly says that “some of Deleuze’s remarks in ‘Life and 
Literature’ are illuminating in this regard”: “One becomes animal all the more when the 
animal dies”.77 Yet, Danta’s notion of becoming-animal and becoming-mortal needs more 
explanation of Deleuze’s theory of becoming that Danta provides.  
How can Lurie become a corpse in terms of Deleuze’s notion of becoming-
animal? As we have seen with Deleuze’s assertion of the proximity between humans and 
animals, the becoming-corpse of Lurie will be found in the zone of the proximity between 
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Lurie and the dog corpses. In other words, the notion of becoming is linked to a “zone of 
proximity with anything”.78 As Deleuze says, “becoming is always ‘between’ or ‘among’: 
a woman between women, or an animal among other”79. In order to understand the 
becoming-corpse of Lurie, we also need to examine Deleuze’s conception of “the virtual” 
by following Patton’s discussion of the two becomings. Patton notes two kinds of 
becomings that, in What is Philosophy?, according to Patton’s account, Deleuze and 
Guattari distinguish as follows:  
 
The first, which is common in certain classes of sensible objects, involves 
“the action by which something or someone continues to become other 
(while continuing to be what it is)” (What is Philosophy?, 168, 177). This 
kind of becoming is confined to the actual and is more or less what Derrida 
understands by the process of iteration, namely incremental transformation 
in the course of repletion of the same. The second kind of becoming involves 
movement beyond the actual toward the virtual. Philosophy and literature are 
political and in the sense that they are concerned with this kind of becoming, 
the kind that liberates the individual from the confines of a particular identity 
and opens up the possibility of transformation.80 
   
In the above passage, Patton emphasizes that the virtual, in the second kind of becoming, 
is available for a possibility of our transforming into something else rather than a 
repetition of our identity in a society. Accordingly, Patton observes that this becoming 
has political implications. It is important to note that the virtual, according to Deleuze, is 
“not something that lacks reality. Rather, the virtual becomes engaged in a process of 
actualization as it follows the plane which gives it its proper reality”.81 The virtual is 
associated with what Patton asserts the becoming-impersonal in terms of animal death. 
Patton observes that Lurie’s encounter with dying dogs forces him to experience his 
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becoming-impersonal. More specifically, in order to explain Lurie’s transmutation, Patton 
takes Deleuze’s example of the character Riderhood in Charles Dickens’s Our Mutual 
Friend. The disrespectful Rogue Riderhood confronts the spark of death. He suddenly 
becomes the object of respect and affection from his neighbours at the moment of his 
dying. According to Patton, life “is present not only at the moment when the individual 
confronts death but rather persists throughout all the moments that make up his life. The 
abstract, impersonal life is an instance of what Deleuze calls the virtual or inner realm of 
being that is actualized in real events and states of affairs”.82 From the perspective of 
Patton, our individual life as well as death is actualized in a state of the indefinite and 
impersonal life. As for the impersonal, John Rajchman clearly explains that what 
Dickens’s tale shows is that “only through a process of ‘im-personalization’ in the 
interval between life and death does the hero become our ‘common friend’.”83 In terms of 
this impersonal life, Patton interprets Lurie’s giving up his favoured dog as the becoming-
impersonal: “Lurie ‘gives up’ his favoured dog to death, thereby signalling his own 
reconciliation to the absence of any higher life and to the finitude of the life that he shares 
with animals”.84 This is also associated with the becoming-corpse of Lurie, as a death is 
what Lurie and the dog have in common. Thus, the becoming-impersonal of Lurie is very 
different from Danta’s notion of Lurie’s identification with the scapegoated dog.  
 The becoming-corpse of Lurie is also related to Lurie’s experience of the dying 
and dead animals that he faces in the animal clinic. As we have seen, Patton explains this 
in terms of the becoming-impersonal of Lurie, but my contention is focused on the 
corporeality of the dog death. In fact, Coetzee in this novel provides a corporeal form of 
life rather than an abstract and transcendental form of life. The becoming-corpse of Lurie 
                                                          
82 Paul Patton, Deleuzian Concepts, 131. 
83 John Rajchman, “Introduction”, Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New 
York: Zone books, 2005), 14 
84 Paul Patton, Deleuzian Concepts, 130.  
 183 
is associated with his understanding of our corporeal life and death in terms of his 
sensation. Lucy’s remark on “life” epitomizes this corporeal form of our life:  
 
“But it is true. They are not going to lead me to a higher life, and the reason 
is, there is no higher life. This is the only life there is. Which we share with 
animals. That’s the example that people like Bev try to set. That’s the 
example I try to follow. To share some of our human privilege with the 
beasts. I don’t want to come back in another existence as a dog or a pig and 
have to live as dogs or pigs live under us.” (74) 
 
As Lucy puts, life is a common zone that we share with animals as well as other people. 
Lucy’s thoughts about life also imply its corporeality, which is distinguished from Lurie’s 
perspective of life and animals. In response to Lucy’s remark on life, Lurie says, “We are 
of a different order of creation from the animals. Not higher, necessarily, just different” 
(74). From his knowledge of animals, Lurie emphasizes that animals are a different 
species from humans. However, Lucy focuses on the life that we share with animals and 
other people. Considering their different perspective on life, it is clear why Lurie 
continuously fails to understand Lucy. Lucy’s explanation for not reporting the African 
men to the police is particularly noteworthy. Lucy says, “No. You keep misreading me. 
Guilt and salvation are abstractions. I don’t act in terms of abstractions. Until you make 
an effort to see that, I can’t help you” (112). In this context, Lucy’s view of life is based 
on its corporeality, which leads to the becoming-dog of Lucy. Accordingly, Lucy enters 
at the zone of proximity between humans and animals:  
 
“How humiliating,” he says finally. “Such high hopes and to end like this.” 
“Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to start from 
again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at ground level. 
With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no 
property, no rights, no dignity.” 
“Like a dog.” 
“Yes, like a dog.” (205) 
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As Patton asserts, Lucy’s abandonment of her claim implies “a becoming-African” by 
“transferring her land to Petrus and accepting his protection, which is related to what 
Deleuze and Guattari would describes as a ‘positive’ rather than ‘negative’ 
deterritorialization of the  social and affective structures of the apartheid era”.85 In other 
words, with this affective relation with Petrus, according to Patton, “Lucy is personally 
engaged in bringing into being new social relations and thereby a new people or a ‘people 
to come’.”86 However, considering her remark on “life as a dog”, Lucy’s transformation 
is also associated with animal life. Lucy’s transformation, in short, is based on her 
affective relation with the African people and animals rather than depending on the 
abstract law.  
In contrast to the becoming-animal of Lucy, Lurie’s transmutation into animals is 
progressed alongside his experience of dying animals and their dead bodies. Although 
commentators such as Danta and Patton focus on dying animals, it is also noteworthy that 
Lurie often faces the corpse of animals. We need to look at the scene where Lurie 
imagines Bev’s euthanizing dogs: “He does not dismiss the possibility that at the deepest 
level Bev Shaw may be not a liberating angel, that beneath her show of compassion may 
hide a heart as leathery as a butcher’s. He tries to keep an open mind” (144). After Bev 
“inflicts the needle” (144) to the animal, he disposes of the remains. In the morning after 
Bev kills the animals, he “drives the loaded kombi to the grounds of Settlers Hospital, to 
the incinerator, and there consigns the bodies in their bags to the flames” (144). The 
details of the dead animals are vividly observed by Lurie: the stiff corpses, the dead legs 
caught in the bars of the trolley, blackened and grinning, smelling of singed fur, etc. Thus, 
through the corporeal pain and death of animals, Lurie experiences his becoming-corpse.  
As noted earlier, Lurie’s becoming-corpse can be understood as what Deleuze 
calls a becoming-meat in Francis Bacon’s paintings. The “meat” depicted in Francis 
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Bacon’s painting shows becoming-animal in terms of the corporeal sensation of suffering. 
Deleuze describes how Bacon’s paintings dismantle the identity of humans and animals 
to express “becoming-animal”. In order to express “becoming”, Bacon and Deleuze try to 
escape from the representations or narration of face, bone and body in which the 
difference of humans and animals is clearly present. Instead Deleuze argues that “the 
body is the Figure, or rather the material of the Figure”.87 By the term “figure”, Deleuze 
means styles or aesthetic figurations which are connected with a matter of expression.88 
The body is not a fixed frame, but a corporeal expression of affecting and being affected. 
For this reason, the figure, conceived as the body, entails that it is not organized or 
structured in reference to, or in relation with the face. Deleuze states that “the figure, 
being a body, is not the face, and does not even have a face”.89 In his analysis of Bacon’s 
paintings, Deleuze distinguishes the face from the head. The face is regarded as the locus 
of an identity in which humans are distinguished from animals. Yet, in Bacon’s paintings, 
the faces are, as Deleuze notes, deformed and disorganized, and the faces of animals are 
replaced by the faces of men. Bacon disorganizes the representation of humans and 
animals and reveals what Deleuze calls the head, the common zone of humans and 
animals. In short, for Deleuze, Bacon’s paintings constitute a “zone of indescernibility or 
undecidability between man and animal”.90  
As for the suffering of animals, Deleuze says that men and animals also have 
“meat” in common. The flesh at the butcher shop cannot in fact be distinguishable from 
that of humans. In this sense, meat is situated at the zone of proximity between humans 
and animals. Accordingly, Deleuze explains that “the painter [Bacon] is certainly a 
butcher, but he goes to the butcher shop as if it were a church, with the meat as the 
                                                          
87 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 19.  
88 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 177.  
89 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 19.  
90 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 20.  
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crucified victim. Bacon is a religious painter only in butcher shops.”91 It is helpful to look 
at Bacon’s remarks on “meat” in this context:  
 
“I’ve always been very moved by pictures about slaughterhouses 
and meat, and to me they belong very much to the whole thing of the 
Crucifixion… Of course, we are meat, we are potential carcasses. If I go into 
a butcher shop I always think it’s surprising that I wasn’t there instead of the 
animal.”92  
 
For this reason, Deleuze explains, “Bacon does not say, ‘pity the beast’, but rather that 
every man who suffers is a piece of meat. Meat is the common zone of man and beast, 
their zone of indiscernibility”.93 Deleuze also claims that “the man who suffers is a beast, 
the beast that suffers is a man. This is the reality of becoming”.94 Deleuze’s notion of 
meat allows affects and sensation to pass between humans and animals, and at the same 
time opens humans and animals to a field of affecting and being affected by each other 
beyond humanistic judgement and morality. In this context, Lurie’s going to the Bev’s 
clinic can be compared to Bacon’s experience in the butcher shop, where Bacon is 
affected by the meat. Through Lurie’s experience of animal corpses, he enters the zone of 
proximity between humans and animals. Lurie thinks about his dealing with the corpses: 
“Curious that a man as selfish as he should be offering himself to the service of dead 
dogs” (146). The corpses of dogs contain the suffering of animals, which they have in 
common with humans. Lurie realizes his transformation to something else: “He saves the 
honour of corpses because there is no one else stupid enough to do it. That is what he is 
becoming: stupid, daft, wrongheaded” (146). This is how Lurie becomes an animal and a 
corpse in terms of Deleuze’s conception of meat.  
 
                                                          
91 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 22.  
92 Francis Bacon, “Interview”, Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 23.  
93 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 21. 
94 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 22.  
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4. Conclusion: Beyond the morality of pity 
 
Derrida’s question of the suffering of animals provides the ethical attitude 
towards the Other, whether they are humans and animals. In particular, as we have seen, 
the animal Other is vulnerable to violence, but is incapable of avoiding the suffering. 
Derrida’s question of animal suffering is thus associated with the ways in which we can 
have compassion for the animals. Yet, Derrida’s idea of the animal Other is based on a 
difference, or an abyssal rupture, between humans and animals. For this reasons, for 
Derrida, the ethical attitude is not involved with an ethical activity to animal suffering, 
but is engaged with “nudity”. This nudity means that a human exposes himself to the 
animal view rather than the humanistic view. Yet, for Derrida, despite humans’ exposure 
to the gaze of animals, there is still a difference between humans and animals, which 
creates in us an unlimited responsibility to the Other.  
From the perspective of Derrida, the protagonist Lurie in Disgrace experiences 
an ethical transformation by changing his attitude toward the Other, such as women, 
black Africans and animals. During the post-apartheid period, as a white male, Lurie is 
insensitive to the suffering of animals and other people, which leads to his sexual 
harassment of his student Melanie. After Lurie visits his daughter Lucy and experiences 
Lucy’s rape by his African neighbours, he becomes sensitive to the suffering of the Other. 
In particular, Lurie experiences animal death in the animal clinic run by Bev Show. In 
this context, basing their idea on Derrida’s and Levinas’s ethics of responsibility to the 
Other, Derek Attridge and Mike Marais, in reading Disgrace, assert Lurie’s ethical 
attitude toward the Other. Attiridge remarks that for Lurie, Melanie, Petrus, and the black 
Africans are the Other and animals are the absolute Other. As Attridge asserts, Melanie 
and animals are defined as “the unknowable”. From the same line of thought, Marais 
expresses the Other as the invisible. In this context, Lurie can never know the suffering of 
Melanie, black Africans and animals. For this reason, Attridge and Marais describe 
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Lurie’s ethical attitude as unlimited responsibility to the Other, which can be never 
fulfilled. However, as Daniel W. Smith and Martin Hägglund argue, the absolute Other, 
as the unknowable and the invisible, is posited as the transcendental Good. Lurie can 
never encounter the Other, nor can he take a responsibility for the Other. Moreover, from 
the perspective of Hägglund’s theory, the relationship between the subject and the Other 
is fixed. However, Disgrace offers a possibility of exchanging the relationship between 
the subject and the Other in terms of the suffering of humans and animals.  
Paul Patton’s and Chris Danta’s reading of Disgrace emphasize Lurie’s 
becoming-animal rather than his unlimited responsibility. Danta connects the dog death in 
the clinic with a scapegoat without grace, and argues that Lurie identifies with the corpse 
of dogs. Accordingly, through the death of dogs, Danta asserts that Lurie experiences a 
becoming-sacrificial-animal and a becoming-corpse. However, Danta’s interpretation of 
Lurie’s becoming has flaws: firstly, Deleuze’s conception of becoming is understood as 
Lurie’s identification with dogs or a lamb. Secondly, Lurie’s becoming-animal is 
achieved through the mediation of a scapegoat figure which implies the morality of God. 
Thirdly, Lurie’s becoming-corpse has still a humanistic view rather than animalistic or 
corporeal. However, Patton clearly shows that Lurie experiences a becoming-minority, by 
entering a zone of the proximity between himself and black Africans. Moreover, through 
his encountering with dying dogs, Lurie also undergoes a becoming-impersonal or death, 
which leads to the common zone of humans and animals. However, despite Danta’s and 
Patton’s arguments on Lurie’s becoming-death, they don’t focus on the corporeality of 
animal death, which is inextricably associated with the becoming-corpse of Lurie. The 
corpses of animals have in common with the dead bodies of humans. Lurie’s experience 
of the corpses leads him to the zone of the exchange of suffering between humans and 
animals. This is how Lurie becomes an animal and a corpse—namely, by affecting to and 
being affected by animals and their dead bodies. Consequently, Coetzee and Deleuze 
provide us with a deep revision of our ethical prejudices about animals and other people 
and thereby show a path towards new forms of life and liberation. 
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Conclusion 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to demonstrate through an approach based on 
Gilles Deleuze’s theory of an ethics of life, how Hanif Kureishi’s and J.M. Coetzee’s 
novels explore ethical modes of life beyond systems of judgements in their different 
postcolonial milieux. Basing his ideas on Spinoza and Nietzsche, Deleuze’s conception of 
life focuses on the capability of bodies to inter-involve with the other and with 
communities. This conception of life also has ontological and ethical implications, since 
he ultimately seeks to show an ethics of affirmative and immanent life. From the 
perspective of Deleuze, life has been condemned by the morality of transcendence and 
systems of judgment which are opposed to an ethics of immanent life. Consequently, 
Deleuze’s life-oriented ethics is sharply distinguished from Aristotle’s teleological ethics 
and Foucault’s and Agamben’s assertions of powerless life. As a result, this thesis 
contends that Deleuze’s ethics of life promotes a triple shift. Firstly, it emphasizes a 
transformative subjectivity in terms of the capability of affecting and being affected by 
other bodies. Secondly, it focuses on affective and reciprocal becoming between self, the 
other and the communities. Finally, it offers inventive modes of life beyond the 
transcendental morality of Good and Evil, ultimately linked to a typology of immanent 
modes of life.  
Taking off from Deleuze’s ethics of life, this thesis has investigated immanent 
modes of life in Kureishi’s and Coetzee’s novels in their different postcolonial situations 
in terms of the ethical principles of becoming and the impersonal. In the first part, this 
thesis has discussed ethical modes of existence and the ethical relations of an individual 
to the other and to the community propelled by Deleuze’s conceptions of “difference”, 
“betrayal” and “assemblage”. This Deleuzian ethical reading of Kureishi’s works has 
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been differentiated from the approaches taken by many commentators (such as Bart 
Moore-Gilbert and Ruvani Ranasinha) who praise hybridity in Kureishi’s works. As a 
result, the first chapter is focused on the way in which the protagonist Karim, in The 
Buddha of Suburbia, repeatedly dramatizes his identities and affirms his minority through 
“difference itself” instead of self recognition of hybridity. Specifically, through an 
analysis based on Homi Bhabha’s conception of hybridity as “difference within” and “in-
betweenness”, we have seen how various characters can trigger their recognition of 
flexible and performative identities in metropolitan spaces and how this undermines the 
conventional conceptions of a racial identity. However, from the perspective of Deleuze, 
this approach has two limitations: firstly, the protagonist as hybridity still relies on the 
representation of identity based on the binary opposition of black and white, and secondly, 
this approach does not provide an affirmation of racial difference and its life. Deleuze 
instead offers the method of dramatization as a way of affirming pluralistic perspectives 
to a racial identity. In terms of a Deleuzian method of dramatization, rather than judging a 
racial minority as a negativity of difference, Karim can create or dramatize a mode of 
being in pluralistic ways and then understand himself as an unrepeatable individual in the 
very act of creating his mode of existence.   
In the second chapter, I have argued that a betrayal can be understood as an 
ethical act as shown in The Black Album. As a member of an ethnic minority, Shahid 
betrays his Pakistani people and community by erotically rewriting Riaz’s holy poem and 
staying with his western liberal tutor Deedee. As a result, he is brutally attacked by his 
Muslim friends. Shahid’s betrayal has brought polarized responses from the critics in 
terms of the reinforcement of the stereotype of the Muslim community and the 
presentation of a fluid identity in relationship to the community. However, my contention 
is that Shahid’s betrayal can be considered as an ethical act for the community as well as 
his life on the condition that his betrayal triggers inventive relations between an 
individual and a community. First, in terms of a Deleuzian conception of betrayal, 
Shahid’s infidelity to the community can be ethical, since he becomes a traitor rather than 
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a trickster. Deleuze distinguishes a traitor from the trickster who takes another face or 
identity. This trickster would fit the conventional meaning of a betrayer. However, Shahid 
as a traitor does not take a white identity by joining an opposing community, but rather 
loses his identity. Secondly, in line with Deleuze’s conception of double turning, Shahid’s 
betrayal has also the potential to be ethical on the grounds that a traitor, whether he is 
black or white, can become paradoxically faithful to the community, when the 
community also turns away from the traitor in the way of excess or through the mercy of 
its law. This mercy continuously enables its members to invent a new relationship to the 
community. Moreover, any alliance within a community has to be broken in order to 
produce the community to come. However, my contention in relation to Shahid’s betrayal 
is that this novel does not provide a Deleuzian conception of double turning, since there is 
neither an excess of the law within the community nor an affirmation of its members’ life.   
In the third chapter, I have discussed both the positivity and negativity of 
hybridity as suggested in The Body, in comparison with Deleuze’s account of the body 
and assemblage. Kureishi in this novel presents the peculiar hybrids of self and other or 
the living and the dead. The protagonist Adam transplants his brain into a young and 
beautiful corpse. This hybrid seemingly dismantles a solid conception of identity based 
on the binary opposition of self and other and the living and the dead, and offers the 
potential of proliferating a new body as a flexible identity. However, from the perspective 
of Deleuze, Kureishi’s presentation of hybridity neither provides an ethical mode of being 
nor exhibits the capability of the body to inter-involve with others. This novel instead 
repeats and intensifies the system of desire as a lack and the structure of the dualism of 
body and mind inherent in society. This is associated with a negative vision of hybridity, 
one that we confront in the system of exploiting and consuming bodies. Nevertheless, 
hybridity incites what Deleuze calls “becoming-other”, since an assemblage of self and 
other leads to the threshold that had previously supported his identity. Consequently, 
from the framework of Deleuze’s ethics of life, I have tried to emphasize that Kureishi’s 
three novels provide the potential of hybridity to invent transformative modes of being, 
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but they do not present affective and mutual becoming between self, the other and 
communities.  
In the second part, I have contended that a Deleuzian ethical reading of Coetzee’s 
novels produces inventive modes of existence and life concerned with the questions about 
bare life, becoming-animal, and the exchange of suffering. In the fourth chapter, the 
relation between bio-politics and an ethical resistance has been explored in Life and 
Times of Michael K in terms of Agamben’s notion of bare life. The life of Michael K is 
precarious and vulnerable under the power of apartheid and his idle life is categorized as 
a bare life or an unqualified life in the given society. K’s bare life is considered as neither 
a human nor a non-human being. This lies at the centre of Agamben’s critique of bio-
politics. However, from the perspective of Agamben, K’s bare life has the potential to 
challenge the oppressive regime: K’s bare life suspends the logic of the apartheid regime 
and the labour camps. Moreover, K’s refusal to eat food subverts the logic of the labour 
camps as the locus for people who need food. In this sense, K’s natural life and his refusal 
to eat represent a potential to resist apartheid. Nevertheless, I have contended that the 
potential of K’s life and refusal depends on an “aporia”, an empty space which is situated 
neither inside nor outside of the law. As a result, K’s refusal closes down the potential 
power of bodies that can open affective and interactive relations with the other and a 
community. Thus, K’s natural life and refusal to eat represent both the potential to 
challenge apartheid and the limitations of that potential.    
In the fifth chapter, the ontological division between a human being and an 
animal in Coetzee’s Foe is shown to be not tenable in terms of Deleuze’s conception of 
becoming-animal. I have contended that this question of division is associated with the 
colonizer’s self constitution as a human being during the colonial period. My approach to 
this novel is to explore how the colonizer (Cruso and the female castaway Barton) have 
an ethical relationship to Friday as the Other. According to the theory of Agamben, 
Friday’s lack of tongue signals the animalization of Friday. I have explored how Cruso 
becomes an animal and experiences the impersonal in affective relationship to mute 
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Friday on the island by discussing the limitations of Spivak’s emphasis on “marginality” 
and Marais’s notion of “responsibility”. In particular, from the perspective of Deleuze, 
Cruso’s becoming-animal is contrasted within Barton’s attitude to Friday. Barton, whom 
Spivak describes in terms of semi-marginality, tries to let Friday break his silence. 
However, basing her identity on language, Barton has the shortcoming of inventing an 
ethical relationship to Friday: firstly, she confines Friday with the locus of the animal 
Other in order to constitute herself as a human being; secondly, Barton’s responsibility to 
Friday is based on the morality of pity, which is derived from the division between 
human and animal or white and black.  
In the sixth chapter, I have discussed how Coetzee’s Disgrace shows the 
difference between a Derridean ethics of responsibility and a Deleuzian ethics of affects. 
Derrida’s investigation of animals is useful to understand how Lurie is insensitive to the 
suffering of other people and animals. Derrida’s discussion of animals is at the centre of a 
difference between humans and animals, which creates in us an unlimited responsibility 
to the Other. Based on Derrida’s and Levinas’s theory of animals, Attridge and Marais 
assert that, for Lurie, Melanie and the animals are the Other as the “unknowable” and the 
“invisible”. Lurie’s ethical attitude is thereby related to the concept of unlimited 
responsibility to the Other, which can never be fulfilled. However, as Daniel W. Smith 
and Martin Hägglund argue, this absolute Other is posited as the transcendental Good, 
which implies that Lurie can never encounter the Other, nor can he take a responsibility 
for the Other. By contrast, the Deleuzian ethics of becoming-animal emphasizes the 
exchange of suffering between Lurie and the Other. Lurie experiences becoming-animal 
as well as becoming-impersonal through his encounter with dying dogs. Through this 
corporeality of animal death, we have seen that Lurie experiences the exchange of 
suffering between human and animal, since the corpses of animals have a commonality 
with the dead bodies of humans. As a result, this novel offers an inventive mode for Lurie 
in affective relationships to other people and animals. Consequently, from the vantage 
point of Deleuze’s ethics of life, Coetzee in his three novels shows how the characters 
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create their mode of existence and life by engaging with the other’s corporeal suffering in 
(post)apartheid South Africa.  
Through the use of a Deleuzian approach to the works of Kureishi and Coetzee, I 
have contended that Kureishi has the potential to invent a Deleuzian ethics of life: 
Kureishi’s presentation of hybridity in metropolitan spaces produces transformative and 
mutant identities. This hybridity, as an assemblage of heterogeneous elements, challenges 
the conception of racial and ethnic identity presented in postcolonial situations. This can 
be associated with Deleuze’s ethical modes of existence. However, hybridity, as 
described in Kureishi’s novels, has the flaws of presenting an ethical relationship between 
self, the other and the community. From the perspective of Deleuze, an ethics of life does 
not just entail an individual’s transformation into the other, but is also connected to a 
more practical ethos of the impersonal. Kureishi’s novels fail to provide affective 
relations with the other and the community grounded in the ethical ideal of the 
impersonal. Compared to Kureishi, Coetzee, in these three novels, presents Deleuzian 
ethical modes of life in (post)apartheid South Africa. My focus on the ethical characters 
of Coetzee’s novels is, firstly, in terms of the invention of an ethical mode of existence 
under the oppressive regime of apartheid, as suggested in Michael K; secondly, I argued 
that Coetzee in Foe offers the becoming-animal of Cruso as an affective and reciprocal 
transformation rather than the morality of pity rooted in an hierarchical idea of identity; 
finally, I contended that Coetzee’s Disgrace provides an ethical principle of the 
impersonal in terms of the exchange of suffering between human and animal. Through 
Lurie’s experience of the corporeality of animal death, this novel opens an impersonal life. 
Coetzee’s works are, therefore, involved with an affirmative and immanent life.  
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